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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers are highly educated and, allegedly, of higher than
average intelligence, but sometimes individual lawyers demon-
strate colossal errors in judgment, especially when insuffi-
ciently trained in the new and emerging risks involved with the
technological age. For instance, although the internet is a nec-
essary tool for attorneys' and is now a prominent feature in the
everyday lives of all actors in the legal system, 2 this technology
poses particularized and often unanticipated risks of profes-
sional and ethical abuse-risks that are extraordinary both in
quantity and intensity. As Harvard's Director of the Center for
the Legal Profession warned: We are "only at the forefront of
seeing the kind of changes that technology is likely to bring to
legal practice," and these changes will "have a profound effect
on how we think about regulating lawyers."4 Unfortunately,
the American Bar Association (ABA) missed an opportunity it
1 Sofia S. Lingos, Solo and Small Firm, A.B.A. TECHREPORT, 2016, at 1, 8
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law-practice/publications/techreport/
2016/solo_small_firm.html [https://perma.cc/E4HK-TQ64] ("It is undeniable
that technology plays an ever increasing role in our profession and that gaining
and maintaining an aptitude early on is necessary."); see also 4 AM. BAR ASS'N,
LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT: WEB AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY xxxi (2013)
(reporting that lawyers increasingly rely on email, text messaging, web conferenc-
ing, and social networking to communicate with clients and others); Robert Am-
brogi, This Week in Legal Tech- Ethics and Technology Competence, ABOVE THE L.
(July 11, 2016, 3:02 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/07/this-week-in-legal-
tech-ethics-and-technology-competence/ [https://perma.cc/KVG6-CZTE] (dis-
cussing how a firm that is not up-to-date with advances in technology not only
faces a odmpetitive disadvantage, but also risks ethical rebuke).
2 See RICHARD SusSIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF
LEGAL SERVICES 107 (rev. ed. 2010) ("[Ihf you are not [connected to the network and
accessible to your client], there is every chance . .. that your competitors will be.
The astute lawyer of tomorrow, even if grudgingly, will want to have more or less
full-time presence, day and night, on the network, to ensure that any queries from
clients will be addressed by their firm rather than by another."); Aaron Street,
Mobile Technology, A.B.A. TECHREPORT, 2016, at 1, 2 https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/law-practice/publications/techreport/2016/mobile.html [https://
perma.cc/5M7X-APLW] (last visited Aug. 10, 2017) ("In total, 77% [of survey
respondents] say they use the internet for working away from the office. Presuma-
bly, these 2016 Survey respondents assumed 'use the internet' was somehow
different than accessing email, because 99% check email while out of the office
(89% regularly do).").
3 Drew T. Simshaw, Ethical Implications of Electronic Communication and
Storage of Client Information, 59 RES GESTAE, Dec. 2015, at 9. See also Lingos,
supra note 1, at 2 ("Technological incompetence is not merely a disadvantage, it
may be an actual ethical violation.").
4 David. B. Wilkins, Some Realism About Legal Realism for Lawyers: Assess-
ing the Role of Context in Legal Ethics, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION
MAKING IN CONTEXT 25, 34-35 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012).
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had with its own Ethics 20/20 Commission5 to address mean-
ingful changes in the practice of law wrought by technology.6
However, the opportunities for unethical and unprofessional
behavior in the use of electronic communications and storage
cannot be ignored. This Article assesses the risks of technology
abuse and proposes a scheme for addressing the professional
and ethical problems that have and will continue to accompany
the shift to digital lawyering.
Part I of this Article sets the stage for how to effect change
within the existing regulatory scheme to address
technoblunders in the legal field. It differentiates various
modes of managing and punishing lawyers and briefly explains
the role of the First Amendment in regulation of the bar. Part II
demonstrates why technologies pose inherent, increased, and
intensified risks for incivility, unprofessionalism, and unethical
behavior. While the core principles of honesty, respect of
others, and confidentiality that are the basis of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct7 (Model Rules or Rule) and civility
standards adopted by individual state, local, and court bar
associations do not change with the use of technology, the gaps
and ambiguities in the Model Rules and the civility standards
make them ineffectual in addressing technology. Lawyers need
to be informed, trained, and warned about specific risks to
avoid in an area where the risks are new and any error in
judgment can be unusually extensive and severe. In addition,
the newness of the technology and the widespread use of email,
Facebook, Linkedln, Twitter, Yelp, Angie's List, AVVO, Law-
yers.com, various platforms for blogs and chatrooms, and
other sites warrant efforts to provide more advance guidance
alerting of risks and defining safe practices than is necessary
with long recognized practice hazards that law students are
taught to avoid. Public realization that lawyers are incompe-
tent to use technology, are spying or otherwise deceiving others
to get electronic information, or cannot be trusted to keep con-
fidential information and defense strategy private undermines
the entire profession.
5 ABA President Carolyn B. Lamnm Creates Ethics Commission to Address
Technology and Global Practice Challenges Facing U.S. Lawyers, ME-
DIA.AMERICANBAR.ORG (Aug. 4, 2009), https://americanbarassociation.wordpress.
com/2009/08/04/aba-president-carolyn-b-lamm-creates-ethics-commission-to-
address-technology-and-global-practice-challenges-facing-u-s-lawyers/ [https://
perma.cc/Y72D-VVEQ] (announcing the creation of the Ethics 20/20
Commission).
6 See infra notes 9-10.
7 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
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Part III provides specific ways that attorneys can and do
use technology unprofessionally and unethically and suggests
specific changes to address these issues. Part III is organized
in the numerical order of the provision of the Model Rules most
relevant to particular harms. Although ordered in accordance
with the Model Rules, the same concerns arise with published
professionalism standards. The recommendations are targeted
not exclusively to changes in the Model Rules. Recognizing the
institutional and political difficulty of effecting any changes in
the Model Rules and the urgency of addressing technology
risks, I recommend that changes be made, first, in the various
bar associations' professionalism standards, and then through
the process of adopting Model Rules. Because drafting consis-
tent and clear professionalism standards can be daunting, I
suggest specific language for each of the concerns. The related
twin problems of educating lawyers and making certain that
regulations are enforced are beyond the scope of this Article.8
I
MECHANISMS FOR ADDRESSING TECHNOLOGY ABUSES
Attorney conduct is subject to regulation as a condition to
licensure, membership in bar associations, and admittance to
practice before particular courts. Like participants in other
endeavors, such as securities traders and sports competitors,
lawyers are subject to rules. The directives and guidelines for
conduct in the profession come in various forms.
In spite of these various rules, the profession has made
almost no effort to explicate for future guidance how technology
may pose particular risks to civility, professionalism, and eth-
ics and how the risks should be addressed. One lawyer stated
it this way: "All the rules that the legal profession relies on to
instruct lawyer behavior were forged before the emergence of
twenty-first century technology. The rule book for this young
century has not been written yet."9
One major issue in regulating lawyers is the need to control
their willful and intentional violations of ethical and profes-
sional standards. Many willful violations are covered in the
Model Rules. But that level of regulation is insufficient. As the
technoblunders explicated in this Article demonstrate, at least
some attorneys are just negligent in their use of technology and
8 For a discussion of these issues, see Cheryl B. Preston, Professionalism in
the Trump Era (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
9 Ken Strutin, Social Media and the Vanishing Points of Ethical and Constitu-
tional Boundaries, 31 PACE L. REV. 228, 264 (2011).
2018]1 883
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others do not seem to consciously register the misrepresenta-
tions inherent in their use of new discovery searches and other
methods. In many cases the lawyer should have realized that
such conduct was inappropriate and foreseen the harmful con-
sequences. Other technoblunders are a result of insufficient
recognition of new risks.
A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The primary mechanism for lawyer regulation is the Rules
of Professional Conduct promulgated in model form by the ABA
and adopted, typically with few variations, by the various state
bar associations.1 0 I refer generally to all state versions as
Model Rules, unless a variation in a particular state context is
noted. The Rules define with some precision the point at which
disciplinary action will be taken." But the level of conduct in
the Model Rules is set to a low goal-minimal ethics. Even
then, continuing and escalating instances of misbehavior
demonstrate that the Model Rules are insufficient to regulate
attorney conduct.12
The ABA has mechanisms to evaluate where the Model
Rules need changes and to propose draft language. '3 Unfortu-
10 All states have based their ethics rules on the Model Rules, except Califor-
nia, where the Model Rules "may be considered as a collateral source." Diane
Karpman, ABA Model Rules Reflect Technology, Globalization, CAL. ST. B.J. (Sept.
2012), http://www.calbarjoumal.com/September2012/EthicsByte.aspx [https:/
/perma.cc/PUJ7-QCD4]. In other states, the Model Rules are "considered highly
influential guidance when states update their own idiosyncratic Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct." Id.
11 Cheryl B. Preston & Hilary Lawrence, Incentivizing Lawyers to Play Nice: A
National Survey of Civility Standards and Options for Enforcement, 48 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 701, 710-11 (2015).
12 See John S. Dzienkowski, Ethical Decisionmaking and the Design of Rules
of Ethics, 42 HoFsTRA L. REv. 55, 70-71 (2013) (citing, e.g., Joan C. Rogers, Ethics
20/20 Commission Airs Proposals on Conflicts-Checking, Choice of Rules Pacts,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.bna.com/ethics-2020-commnis-
sion-nl2884903471, [https://perma.cc/CH4Q-WLKDI for its discussion of an
interview with Anthony E. Davis, Esq. about the limited scope of the Ethics 20/20
Commission's recommendations and its discussion of the ABA's inability to effec-
tively revise the Model Rules to keep current with the realities of modem practice
and the debilitating politics within the ABA).
13 The ABA commenced a review of the Model Rules in 1997 when it estab-
lished the ABA Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
("Ethics 2000 Commission") to consider necessary changes based on develop-
ments since the Model Rules were adopted in 1983. For a more detailed descrip-
tion of how changes to the Model Rules can be initiated and adopted, and the
history of such amendments, see Dzienkowski, supra note 12, at 87-88. The
product of the 20/20 Commission was thoughtfully criticized by Professor
Dzienkowski. Id. at 71 ("Most observers viewed Ethics 20/20 as a major opportu-
nity to examine and consider changes that recently have taken place in the legal
professions of the United States and other countries. The resulting work product,
[Vol. 103:879884
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nately, the ABA Commission 20/20, specifically tasked to ad-
dress advances in technology, made its contribution
submerged into the comment for Model Rule 1.1.14 The Com-
ment offers only the following vague and insubstantial advice:
"[A] lawyer should keep abreast of changes in the law and its
practice, including the benefits and risks associated with rele-
vant technology."1 5 In terms of other forms of direction, the
ABA has only begun to scratch the surface with an opinion
letter on social media, but it is directed only at judges.' 6 Com-
mentators widely criticized the failure to realistically address
technology; for instance, one quipped, "The Deafening Silence
of the ABA Model Rules."' 7
Even in an ideal world, the process of the ABA adopting
changes to the Model Rules and urging each bar association to
adopt the changes, is political, cumbersome, and lengthy.", A
level of care to involve all constituencies and changes that are
the result of long term thoughtfulness may be necessary for
crafting a uniform set of rules that lead directly to enforceable
punishments,' 9 but the ABA has used these procedures to
however, has disappointed many scholars and lawyers because the results do not
match the promises.").
14 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) ("To
maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of
changes in the law and its practice, including the benefits and risks associated
with relevant technology, engage in continuing study and education and comply
with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.").
15 Id.
16 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 462 (2013) [here-
inafter ABA Formal Op. 462] (discussing judge's use of electronic social network-
ing media).
17 Saleel V. Sabnis, Attorney Ethics in the Age of Social Media, A.B.A. (June 8,
2016,) http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/professional/arti-
cles/spring2O16-0616-attorney-ethics-age-social-media.html [https://perma.cc/
T4GQ-6S6P]. He continued, saying:
When the ABA amended the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in
2013, there was no specific mention of social media other than a
not-so-subtle reminder that an attorney must stay abreast of
changes in technology. The ABA's silence was incongruous with the
everyday demands placed on litigators to harvest information on
social media.
Id.
18 See, e.g., Lorelei Laird, Discrimination and Harassment Will Be Legal Ethics
Violations Under ABA Model Rule, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 8, 2016, 6:36 PM CDT), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/houseof delegatesstrongly-agrees-tojrule
makingdiscrimination andharass [https://perma.cc/L7DR-KJSL] (discussing
how difficult it is to amend the Model Rules).
19 Albeit in a different context, one author's argument that we should not
address advances in technology by changing the Rules is convincing. In arguing
that the rules of civil procedure should not be amended to take into consideration
advances in technology, the author states, "'a change devised now might be irrele-
vant, and might even be harmful, four years from now.'" Steven S. Gensler,
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:879
avoid taking action. Expecting timely revisions of the Model
Rules to further address technology is at best a long-term goal.
In fact, Professor Dzienkowski argues that "the structure of the
ABA is such that few, if any, fundamental reforms have any
chance of adoption by the ABA House of Delegates."2 0
B. Professionalism and Civility Standards or Creeds
In an attempt to address the lapses of the Model Rules,2 1
many states and courts adopted express statements of accept-
able and unacceptable behavior norms.22 Taking on many dif-
ferent names, these statements of professionalism were
originally envisioned to serve an aspirational purpose, clarify-
ing and in some instances going beyond the Model Rules.
These published best practices are denominated as profession-
alism and civility standards, creeds, pillars, codes, etc. 2 3 I use
these common titles interchangeably. The stated expectations
in creeds generally aim higher than the minimums delineated
in the Model Rules and are designed "to encourage dedication
to professionalism and civility." 2 4 Today, many jurisdictions
Special Rules for Social Media Discovery?, 65 ARK. L. REv. 7, 36 (2012) (quoting
Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of Electronic
Material, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 280 (2001)).
20 Dzienkowski, supra note 12, at 92.
21 See id. at 73 (noting that codes of civility "were largely viewed as a solution
to the failures of the ABA Model Codes").
22 See A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions, 57 MD. L.
REv. 273, 302 (1998) (citing 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE
LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
§ AP4:107, at 1269-70 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997)) ("Many civility or conduct
codes were formulated in the 1980s and 1990s."). The number of creeds seems to
have fluctuated over the years from 100 in 1995 to 150 in 2005. Marvin E. Aspen,
A Response to the Civility Naysayers, 28 STETSON L. REv. 253, 253 n.2 (1998). See
also Allen K. Harris, Increasing Ethics, Professionalism and Civility: Key to Preserv-
ing the American Common Law and Adversarial Systems, 2005 PROF. LAW 91, 112
("More than 150 state, county and city bar assodiations have adopted profession-
alism codes to encourage enhanced professional behavior and support increased
judicial control of incivility and other unprofessional behavior."). Today there are
about 125 such creeds that various organizations and jurisdictions in the United
States have adopted. This decline may reflect consolidation, for instance, where
lower courts exchange individual creeds for those of the state or circuit. The ABA
has compiled an extensive, but not exhaustive nor current, list of the profession-
alism creeds adopted in various jurisdictions around the United States. Profes-
sionalism Codes, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional
responsibility/resources/professionalism/professionalismcodes.html [https://
perma.cc/K9E9-V3CB] (last updated Mar. 2017).
23 For a list of extant creeds and how they are styled, see Preston & Lawrence,
supra note 11, app. A.
24 Id. at 707.
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have taken steps towards making professionalism creeds
enforceable. 25
In professionalism standards, an ideal place to address
new and changing issues, there is virtually no treatment of
technology abuses.2 6 The first two states to hint at the issue in
professionalism standards are Utah and Florida.2 7 The pream-
ble to Utah Standards of Professionalism and Civility now
states:
Lawyers should educate themselves on the potential impact
of using digital communications and social media, including
the possibility that communications intended to be private
may be republished or misused. Lawyers should understand
that digital communications in some circumstances may
have a widespread and lasting impact on their clients, them-
selves, other lawyers, and the judicial system.28
The Florida Expectations of Professionalism was amended
in 2015 to include:
2.5 A lawyer's communications in connection with the prac-
tice of law, including communications on social media, must
not disparage another's character or competence or be used
to inappropriately influence or contact others. (See R. Regu-
lating Fla. Bar 4-8.4(d)).
2.6 A lawyer should use formal letters or e-mails for legal
correspondence and should not use text messages to corre-
spond with a client or opposing counsel unless mutually
agreed. 29
25 Id.
26 Id. at tbl.9. Only three creeds from that survey mention technology in any
form, and they address it only in terms of transmitting material. Id. The most
comprehensive treatment of technology is from the Denver Bar Association:
1. We will use data-transmission technologies only as an efficient
means of communication and not as a means of obtaining an unfair
advantage. The use of such technologies does not require receiving
counsel to discontinue other matters to respond.
2. We will honor reasonable requests to retransmit materials or to
provide hard copies.
DENVER BAR ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM (May 2007), http://www.den
bar.org/portals/dba/repository/professionalism.pdf [https://perma.cc/JFN8-3
RLP].
27 No professionalism statements included other uses of technology as of
2014. See Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, at 714 n.75.
28 UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILTY pmbl. (2014).
29 FLA. BAR, PROFESSIONAL EXPECTATIONs 2 (2015), https://www.floridabar.org/
wp-content/uploads/2017/04/professionalism-expectations.pdf [https://
perma.cc/R3KJ-DZ7T]; see also FLA. BAR, OATH OF ADMISSION TO THE FLORIDA BAR
(2017), https://www.floridabar.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/oath-of-ad
mission-to-the-florida-bar-ada.pdf [https://perma.cc/TGQ4-464W] ("To opposing
2018]1 887
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To avoid negligent and accidental abuses, lawyers must be
educated in, and then reminded of, the ethical and professional
risks.30 Professionalism creeds, even if not directly enforced,
can form a basis for educating and mentoring lawyers with
respect to advances in technology.3 1 They may be the most
appropriate medium for addressing technology issues in the
short run until the ABA or another regulator can provide a
firmer solution.
C. Ethics Opinions and Court Opinions
Another method of regulating attorney conduct is through
the issuance of ethics opinions, which address a question sub-
mitted about a specific issue or behavior. In addition, bar as-
sociations can issue individualized, ad hoc responses to
members of the bar who ask specific questions about the inter-
pretation of the Model Rules. Although some formal opinions
include excellent discussion of the risks and expectations, only
a very few have addressed technology. 32 The best effort
emerged in November 2016 from the District of Columbia Bar
Association.3 3 But formal opinions are, in practice, of limited
use in disseminating widespread standards and guiding future
conduct.3 4 Few lawyers think to consult ethics opinions on
new questions of technology use. Fewer take the time to search
through ethics opinions unless they understand they are tak-
ing a considerable risk.
In addition to ethics opinions, in a few jurisdictions, tech-
nology abuses by lawyers have resulted in published opinions
by the disciplinary body or the courts.3 5 These are useful in
parties and their counsel, I pledge fairness, integrity, and civility, not only in
court, but also in all written and oral communications.").
30 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT pmbl. (AM. BAR. Ass'N 2013) (asserting
that lawyers must be subject to the profession's rules of conduct as well as their
"personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers" (emphasis
added)).
31 Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, at 724.
32 See, e.g., N. Y. C. Bar Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op.
2012-2 (2012); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 466
(2014); Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op.
2014-300 (2014).
33 See D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 370 (2016); D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 371
(2016).
34 See Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, at 724 (noting that formal opinions
are usually not binding but persuasive).
35 See, e.g., In re Reines, 771 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reprimanding the
lawyer for his misconduct in disseminating an email from a then-judge to clients);
In re Eisenstein, 485 S.W.3d 759, 761 (Mo. 2016) (en banc) (holding that the
lawyer violated several disciplinary rules by not immediately disclosing that he
received the opposing party's emails including direct examination questions); Mis-
888 [Vol. 103:879
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training lawyers in this area but tend to involve only the most
egregious cases with the most extreme facts. The few prece-
dents on proper technology use are not available in each juris-
diction and are not uniform or consistent in coverage or result.
D. Best Approach for an Immediate Need
Although changes to the Model Rules to account for tech-
nology are necessary, the professionalism creeds offer a mech-
anism that can be more responsive and flexible in the
meantime. The potential of stated standards in creeds to ad-
dress ongoing developments in practice such as the advent of
technology is enormous, but most creeds are not currently ef-
fective. The use of creeds in this function will require focused
attention and significant redrafting.3 6 Unfortunately, as pres-
ently written, almost all of the professionalism creeds are in-
consistent, erratic in coverage, and poorly worded. Even the
best of creeds are also largely impotent. Including references to
common technology related abuses would be an important im-
provement, but bar associations should also consider using
this opportunity for change to undertake a general revision of
the wording of their creed and consider options to give them
souri v. Polk, 415 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (holding that Defendant
could not show substantial prejudice stemming from the prosecutor's Twitter
comments about the case to justify reversal); In re Anonymous Member of S.C.
Bar, 709 S.E.2d 633 (S.C. 2011) (holding that lawyer engaged in conduct "prejudi-
cial to the administration of justice" by sending an inflammatory and insulting
email about a party to opposing counsel); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Beatse, 722 N.W.2d 385, 386-90 (Wis. 2006) (holding that attorney's lies about
source and viewing of pornographic images on State computer and sending and
receiving of sexually explicit emails violated Rules of Professional Conduct); In re
Tsamis, No. 2013PROO095 (Ill. Att'y Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n Jan.
15, 2014), http://www.iardc.org/HB-RBDispHtml.asp?id=11221 [https://
perma.cc/E8RU-W64D]; In re Herr, Kan. Sup. Ct. Order 2012 SC 94 (Kan. Jan.
13, 2014), http://www.kscourts.org/pdf/Herr-Admonition-Final-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FAY8-LV3C].
36 See, e.g., Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, at 723.
The provision that appears most frequently in [various state creeds]
is the vague charge to "treat others in a courteous and dignified
manner" or to "act in a civil manner," which forty-five of the forty-
seven creeds included. This general objective is not very helpful
without being further refined and defined within the creed .... Also
common are provisions urging honesty (without specific definition
or elaboration) and provisions against knowingly deceiving or mis-
representing fact or law. Because Model Rules 3.3, 4.1, and 7.1
cover misrepresentation, restating the honesty requirement in un-
enforceable creeds may suggest that honesty is aspirational, not
essential. Such a creed would be more helpful if it articulated bor-
derline cases where the honesty implications are less obviously ad-
dressed in the Model Rules.
Id.
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teeth. The survey in Incentivizing Lawyers to Play Nice: A Na-
tional Survey of Civility Standards and Options for Enforcement
offers a comparison of the subjects that these creeds handle
and commentary on the problems in which some of them wal-
low.3 7 With this information available, each bar association
has some comparables to assist them in being more inclusive
in the subjects they address and in improving wording. The
ideal would be carefully worded sets of standards that are fairly
uniform across the nation.
A related issue is how to make revised creeds more effective
in sending the message. Some bar associations are already
treating creeds as enforceable in various ways, and others are
active in making such creeds effective starting points for lawyer
education and guidance.3 8 For example, some states are incor-
porating the creeds into their Attorneys' Oaths; other jurisdic-
tions have implemented programs for referring offenders to
investigation boards.3 9 Some courts have gone so far as to
issue serious sanctions for uncivil conduct violating profes-
sionalism creeds. 40 Because of poor drafting and little enforce-
ment, most codes of professionalism have failed. 4 '
Despite their flaws, professionalism standards offer the
best vehicle within the current regulatory framework for meet-
ing the urgent need to address the issue of technology and
social media until we can treat these issues more formally in
the Model Rules.
E. Speech and Other Legal Implications of Lawyer
Regulation
Finally, a note on the speech implications of regulating
professionalism and civility is in order. A robust and thorough
discussion of the historical and current treatment of the inter-
section between attorneys.and free speech is well beyond the
scope of this Article. This issue has been addressed in detail in
a plethora of books and articles. 4 2 I include here only a short
37 Id. at 713-23.
38 Id. at 724.
39 Id. at 729-32.
40 Id. at 732-34.
41 See Dzienkowski, supra note 12, at 73.
42 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is. Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer
Speech Under the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859 (1998); Terri R. Day, Speak
No EviL- Legal Ethics v. the First Amendment, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 161 (2008); Peter
Margulies, Advocacy as a Race to the Bottom: Rethinking Limits on Lawyers' Free
Speech, 43 U. MEM. L. REv. 319 (2012); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of
Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on Lawyers' First Amendment
Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 569, 569 (1998); Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be
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summary of the status of speech and lawyer regulation law in
hopes of exposing the implausibility of successful First Amend-
ment challenges to the proposed professionalism creeds or
Model Rules.
It is well accepted that licensed members of bar associa-
tions are subject to speech restrictions that would not apply to
lay persons.4 3 These restrictions go well beyond what can be
said in court filings, at hearings, and other official contexts and
cover speech technically outside of legal system processes.4 4
Although these restrictions are not without strain, "important
state interests compete with attorneys' First Amendment rights
and justify greater restrictions on lawyers' speech rights."4 5
The Model Rules and local rules of states and courts often
restrict and penalize attorneys for what they say. These re-
strictions generally fall into two broad categories: restrictions
on commercial speech4 6 and restrictions on speech that affects
the administration of justice.4 7 In deciding whether a restric-
tion is constitutionally permissible, the court weighs "the
State's interest in the regulation of a specialized profession
Damned: The First Amendment, Attorney Speech, and Judicial Reputation, 97 GEo.
L.J. 1567 (2009); W. Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 305 (2001); Sarah DeFrain, Note, Grievance Administrator v. Fieger:
The Tenuous Link Between Attorney Silence and Public Confidence in the Legal
System, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1823, 1824 (2008).
43 In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646-47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring in the
result) ("Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what in other
circumstances might be constitutionally protected speech."); see also Sullivan,
supra note 42, at 569.
44 See, e.g., Grievance Adm'r v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123, 142 (Mich. 2006)
(punishing an attorney for undignified speech made on a radio broadcast); In re
Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 709 S.E.2d 633 (S.C. 2011) (upholding repri-
mand of attorney for email communication made to opposing counsel outside of
formal proceedings).
45 Day, supra note 42, at 162 (citations omitted); see In re Snyder, 472 U.S.
634, 644 (1985) ("'Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.'
[An attorney is] received into that ancient fellowship for something more than
private gain. He [becomes] an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." (alterations in original)
(quoting People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (N.Y. 1928))); Grievance
Adm'r, 719 N.W.2d at 142 (holding that coarse attorney speech "warrants no First
Amendment protection when balanced against this state's compelling interest in
maintaining public respect for the integrity of the legal process" (citing United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968))).
46 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 7.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013); SUPREME
COURT OF OHIO COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, PROFESSIONAL IDEALS FOR OHIO LAWYERS
AND JUDGES (2013).
47 E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.6; WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASS'N,
CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (2001).
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against a lawyer's First Amendment interest in the kind of
speech that [is] at issue."48
Where the restriction is supported by a compelling govern-
mental interest, it will be upheld as constitutional.4 9 In gen-
eral, the state's interest in regulating commercial speech is less
compelling than the interest in regulating attorney speech that
affects the administration of justice.5 0 It follows, then, that
rules restricting attorney commercial speech are sometimes in-
validated when challenged on First Amendment grounds,
whereas rules implicating the administration of justice and the
image of the profession-such as the majority of the profes-
sionalism creeds herein discussed-are generally upheld as
constitutional.5 1 Attorneys knowingly and willingly enter into a
highly regulated profession, implicitly waiving the right to un-
restrained expression.5 2 They should expect to be subjected to
some speech restrictions by virtue of being "officers of the
court," capable of influencing the administration of justice.5 3
In conclusion, regulation of attorney conduct is generally
allowed even when it involves speech. Many provisions of the
Model Rules address restrictions on speech. 54 The suggestions
in this Article for clarifying and modifying creeds of profession-
alism in the short term, and the Model Rules in the long term,
are well within the exceptions for regulating lawyers.
48 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1073 (1991).
49 See cases cited supra note 45 (describing what constitutes a compelling
government interest).
50 See Kyle Lawrence Perkins, Note, Attorney Advertising: The Marketing of
Legal Services in the Twenty-Flrst Century, 35 GONZ. L. REv. 99 (2000).
51 E.g., In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985) (reversing an attorney's suspension
for heated criticism of the judiciary's administration of the Criminal Justice Act);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626
(1985) (nullifying a state ban on the use of pictures in legal advertisements); Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking Arizona's flat ban on attor-
ney advertising of legal services, but leaving open other options to regulate adver-
tising attorneys); cf cases cited in supra note 45 (upholding restrictions on
attorney speech); see also Mattel Radu, The Difficult Task of Model Rule of Profes-
sional Conduct 3.6: Balancing the Free Speech Rights ofLawyers, the Sixth Amend-
ment Rights of Criminal Defendants, and Society's Right to the Fair Administration
of Justice, 29 CAMPBELL L. REv. 497 (2007) (arguing that Rule 3.6 strikes an
appropriate balance between an attorney's right to free speech and the state's
valid interest in the proper administration of justice).
52 See DeFrain, supra note 42, at 1824 (citing another source).
53 Id. at 1844.
54 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.6, 7.1 (AM. BAR AsS'N 2013).
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II
WHY TECHNOLOGY ABUSES WARRANT IMMEDIATE AND
TARGETED COVERAGE
Technology use imposes both unique and heightened risks
to lawyers, clients, and the legal system. As compared to the
type of conduct that was originally targeted in the Model Rules
and professionalism creeds, the features of electronic commu-
nications make more likely unethical and unprofessional be-
havior and, when it occurs, more damage to individuals and
the legal system.5 5 The interests and values that animate the
Model Rules and creeds are the same whether on or offline.
But the ways the harm is inflicted are subtler and outside of
the awareness of many attorneys, even those who are not naive
or inexperienced technologically. Thus, a tantrum online is
much more likely to be exposed and disseminated than oral
conversations or a sheet of paper. The digital era represents
some fundamental behavioral and attitudinal changes. For
instance:
With social media, the world is literally just a few mouse
clicks away from a company's most confidential information,
raising growing concerns about a company's own employees
disclosing confidential information via social media. Exacer-
bating this is the fear that social media has desensitized peo-
ple to the fact of disclosure of formerly private information
because so much of it is done voluntarily-and so easily.
When taken with the tendency of social media users-espe-
cially younger ones-to blur the line between social life online
and work, crucial proprietary information can be out the door
almost before the employee knows it. The concept of infor-
mation-any information-being private is almost obsolete to
many people. If they have access to it, what's so bad about
others having it?5 6
Thus, Part II reviews various non-exclusive reasons why tech-
nology warrants specific attention in the regulation of the
profession.
A. Lack of Anonymity and Privacy
The internet creates an unwarranted illusion of anonymity
and privacy. Although an expert in encryption, Tor, and anti-
55 See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Becoming A Competent 21st Century Legal
Ethics Professor: Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Technology (But
Were Afraid to Ask), 2015 PROF. LAw. 75, 91-95 (citing State Bar of Cal. Standing
Comm. on Profl Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 2010-179 (2010)).
56 Michael C. Smith, Social Media Update, 58 ADvoc. (TExAS) 1, 4 (2012).
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trace relays can hide the source and content of some messages,
the average internet user cannot expect privacy or anonymity
unless no one is trying to find or unmask a post. Any savvy
computer user can trace the source IP address for a post and
the identifying MAC number of the originating computer. In
addition, many lawyers are still extremely sloppy about creat-
ing secure and uncommon passwords and then keeping the
passwords private.5 7 Leaving a confidential letter or an ifl-ad-
vised note on one's desk or within easy access of a determined
snooper is unwise. Stepping away from a computer that is
logged into a user's account runs the risk of exposing what is
on the screen and anything else a search of the computer or a
look at browsing history might reveal. Social media is particu-
larly risky. Recently, in hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn, a district
court expressed skepticism about an argument that LinkedIn's
users expect privacy, noting that LinkedIn's privacy policy is
illusory. "LinkedIn ... trumpets its own product in a way that
seems to afford little deference to the very privacy concerns it
professes to be protecting in this case. . . . LinkedIn's own
actions do not appear to have zealously safeguarded those pri-
vacy interests."5 8
Federal laws cover the intentional interception of electronic
transmissions and hacking or exceeding access authoriza-
tion.5 9 Additionally, unauthorized access to electronic infor-
mation is covered in some states by the common law trespass
to chattels.60 However, these laws have not prevented wide
scale violations by people unaware of the law, the risk of being
57 Using the same password for all password-protected services you use
means that when someone obtains your password for one of these sites, they will
have access to all of them. Using words from the dictionary for a password means
a brute force dictionary attack by hackers will crack your password. Using long
strings of letters and symbols and numbers means that passwords will be difficult
to remember. Many sites now require the use of numbers and characters in
passwords.
It is time to start using a password manager .... A password that is
short and simple enough for you to remember is too short and
simple to be secure.
Jim Calloway, Client Confidentiality, Personal Privacy and Digital Security, 87
OKLA. BAR J. 2579, 2579 (2016). For examples of password problems involving
lawyers, see infra notes 150-153, 184, 193, 194.
58 hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., Case No. 17-cv-03301-EMC, 2017 WL
3473663, at *3, *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017); see also Venkat Balasubramani,
Linkedln Enjoined From Blocking Scraper-hiQ v. LinkedIn, TECH. & MARKETING L.
BLOG, (Aug. 15, 2017), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2017/08/linkedin-
enjoined-from-blocking-scraper-hiq-v-linkedin.htm [https://perma.ce/4HMC-
A7DZ].
59 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2018).
60 See, e.g., Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 404 (2d Cir. 2004).
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caught, and the seriousness of the implications. Furthermore,
in most cases, even when a perpetrator is caught, the harm has
already been done. Once an embarrassing or unethical com-
munication has been made public, arguing that access to in-
ternet posts was obtained illegally or that the material on a
computer was stored by someone else is not an effective re-
sponse. 6 1 As in the case of Yath v. Fairview Clinics, once the
information about plaintiffs sexually transmitted disease and
her new lover had travelled through her husband's family and
onto Myspace.com, it was little comfort that the information
had been obtained illegally by an employee of a medical
clinic.62
Moreover, the law does not prevent the reproduction and
distribution of information by a third-party who did not partici-
pate in the illegal access. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, an activist
allegedly found a tape of a private cell phone conversation in
his mailbox, which he then sent to the press.6 3 Because it
could not be proved that the recipient of the tape was a party to
the illegal acquisition of the conversation, the wiretap statutes
did not apply and thus spreading this information was legal.64
B. Rights Waivers
Increasingly, internet users are waiving what rights to pri-
vacy and protection they have. Websites often assert a "terms
of use" policy, "end user license agreement," or the like in click-
wrap or even browsewrap form.65 These wrap contracts may
give the website owners or operators a license to use customer
postings and photographs for their own purposes and to sell or
sublicense these to others.6 6 If so, the author and original
61 Ask Sarah Palin and Judge Kozinsky of the Ninth Circuit. See Erin Fuchs,
9th Cir. Chief Judge Escapes Porn Download Case, LAw360 (Oct. 28, 2009, 3:04
PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/130925/9th-circ-chief-judge-escapes-
porn-download-case [https://perma.cc/YQ33-AHQZ]; Erik Wemple, Fox News
Drops Sarah Palin, WASH. PosT (June 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2015/06/24/fox-news-drops-sarah-palin/?utm
term=.d5c 1 777ad58d [https://perma.ce/23LP-9ZPX].
62 See Yath v. Fairview Clinics, N.P., 767 N.W.2d 34, 38-40 (Minn. Ct. App.
2009). The plaintiffs personal information was released online prior to the deter-
mination that the information was obtained illegally. The response could not
remedy the damage done. Id.
63 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 519 (2001).
64 Id.
65 Cheryl B. Preston & Eli W. McCann, Unwrapping Shrinkwraps, Clickwraps,
and Browsewraps: How the Law Went Wrong from Horse Traders to the Law of the
Horse, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 19-22 (2011).
66 For example, Facebook's terms of service provide that "you grant us a non-
exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license to use any
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copyright owner of the post cannot force the site, or the assign-
ees and sublicensees, to take it down.6 7 Some websites offer
processes that allow users to erase personal information them-
selves; however, this is not a guarantee of privacy and creates
no legal obligation for the service provider.68
Many employers have access by contract. Courts have up-
held the right of employers to access the content of internet
transmissions and stored computer content originating from,
received on, or saved on company owned machines.6 9 The
same applies to employer owned internet access accounts and
mobile devices. 70 Some employers disclose their right to such
access and require employees to consent in an internet use
policy or employee handbook. Others do not, but courts have
generally found that an employee cannot have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in such content. 7 1
C. Misplaced Trust
Many communicants on the internet share an unfounded
belief that their message will be seen only by the intended
recipients. Recently, the adultery-based dating website Ashley
Madison suffered a serious hack that exposed the names and
email addresses of the site's users, which information went
IP content that you post on or in connection with Facebook." Statement of Rights
and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms [https:/
/perma.cc/673P-K27L] (revised as of Jan. 30, 2015).
67 See Venkat Balasubramani, Xcentric Ventures Chips Away at Small Jus-
tice's Copyright Workaround to Section 230, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 5,
2014), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2014/04/xcentric-ventures-chips-
away-at-small-justices-copyright-workaround-to-section-230.htm [https://
perma.cc/MNQ5-PXDT] (saying that even though a lawyer gained copyright to the
contents of a website post, that website had a right to keep the post online
because of the license granted in the terms of service).
68 See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 66 ("When you
delete [intellectual property] content, it is deleted in a manner similar to emptying
the recycle bin on a computer. However, you understand that removed content
may persist in backup copies for a reasonable period of time (but will not be
available to others).").
69 See Kara R. Williams, Protecting What You Thought Was Yours: Expanding
Employee Privacy to Protect the Attorney-Client Privilege from Employer Computer
Monitoring, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 347, 357 (2008).
70 See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(holding as early as 1996 that there is no "reasonable expectation of privacy in e-
mail communications voluntarily made by an employee to his supervisor over the
company e-mail system notwithstanding any assurances that such communica-
tions would not be intercepted by management.")
71 Id.
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viral.72 As with prior, well publicized disclosures, these hack-
ers will inspire copycats.7 3 Any promise that digital informa-
tion will be hermetically sealed in a mayonnaise jar is tenuous.
Although secrets have always spread, in years past, fewer peo-
ple had the technology to rapidly share secrets. Moreover,
passed-on oral information was recognized to become increas-
ingly less reliable with each subsequent retelling, while exact
copies of a writing or a tape are hard to refute.
Even if no one intercepts an online conversation or circum-
vents privacy settings, the content of group posts is only as
trustworthy as the others who have authorized access.
Friends, family members, coworkers, and others may not un-
derstand that another's posts made in a "private" group should
not be copied and sent to outsiders.74 This often happens with-
out the slightest intent to criticize or harm the author, but
some later recipient may have other ideas. One Myspace user
posted ajournal entry that was later submitted to a local news-
paper.7 5 The court reached the obvious holding on the law:
users of social media have no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.76 In a Fourth Amendment context, one court observed:
"While [the user] undoubtedly believed that his Facebook pro-
fie would not be shared with law enforcement, he had no justi-
fiable expectation that his 'friends' would keep his profile
private."77
The ABA's formal opinion on social media issued to judges
states what every lawyer should be taught:
Judges must assume that comments posted to [a social me-
dia site] will not remain within the circle of the judge's con-
nections. Comments, images, or profile information . .. may
be electronically transmitted without the judge's knowledge
or permission to . . . unintended recipients.78
72 Jeff Yang, Ashley Madison Hack: Privacy Becomes Extinct, CNN (Aug. 27,
2015, 7:50 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/27/opinions/yang-ashley-
madison-hack/ [https://perma.cc/WVM3-BFVH].
73 Id.
74 ABA Formal Op. 462, supra note 16, at 1 ("Judges must assume that
comments posted to [a social media site] will not remain within the circle of the
judge's connections. Comments, images, or profile information ... may be elec-
tronically transmitted without the judge's knowledge or permission to persons
unknown to the judge or to other unintended recipients.").
75 Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 1130 (2009).
76 Id. at 1130.
77 United States v. Meregildo, 883 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(citations omitted).
78 ABA Formal Op. 462, supra note 16, at 1.
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In addition, an array of observers may be present in a
chatroom without disclosing their presence or their real iden-
tity. Interested third parties may convince another member of
the group to disclose his or her password, and access the com-
puter of a co-worker or family member while it is logged into a
chat room, blog, or social media site. In its opinion regarding
proper technology use for judges, the ABA correctly observed a
truth applicable to all technology users:
In contrast to fluid, face-to-face conversation that usually
remains among the participants, messages, videos, or photo-
graphs posted to [social media] may be disseminated to
thousands of people without the consent or knowledge of the
original poster.79
D. Ubiquity and Diffusion
Internet use has become pervasive in all ages and groups,
including lawyers.8 0 Every person can be a publisher on a
national and global scale with a few keystrokes and a click.
Each person's associates, friends, and relatives (including prior
acquaintances entirely ignored for the last forty years), are now
sending numerous messages that seem to warrant a quick re-
ply. The ease and speed of electronic communications means
writers give less thought to what they write (or tweet) back.8 '
Conversations in which two like-minded people whispered cas-
ually at the watering hole after work are now taking place on-
line and can, in painful detail, be displayed in writing and out
of context for the world to see. Unprofessional and hotheaded
comments in emails are prone to being found, copied, reposted,
and forwarded to the person berated in a way that face-to-face
comments between two people would not. The risk that mala-
droit messages will be forwarded to a judge, opposing counsel,
79 Id. at 2.
80 See Allison Shields, Blogging and Social Media, A.B.A. Techreport, 2016, at
1, 2 https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law-practice/publications/techre-
port/2016/social mediablogging.html [https://perma.cc/DFY5-Z4ZA] (last vis-
ited Aug 11, 2017) (reporting that "76% of respondents report that they
individually use or maintain a presence in one or more social networks for profes-
sional purposes. This number has also remained relatively steady since 2013.
Not surprisingly, the group most likely to report individually using or main-
taining a presence in a social network is respondents under the age of 40, at 88%,
followed by those between the ages of 40-49 at 85%, then 50-59 years old at 81%,
and 64% of those 60+ years old, again all remaining reasonably consistent from
2013 to the present." (emphases omitted)).
81 Given the nature of some of President Trump's tweets, hopefully they were
not thoroughly thought through. Leslie Currie, Trmp's 8 Worst Tweets of 2018
(So Far), STUDY BREAKs (Jan. 9, 2018), https://studybreaks.com/culture/trump-
tweets-worst-2018/ [https://perma.cc/X47B-9PUW].
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client, juror or other target is vastly magnified online. Thus,
electronic communications are more lethal than prior modes of
discussion.
E. Verifiability
The accuracy of a report of others' statements using elec-
tronic communication can be easily verified, whereas oral in-
teractions cannot. It is difficult to "spin" the meaning when the
exact words used are on display. The experience of Federal
District Judge Richard Cebull serves as a prime example.8 2
After he forwarded a racially charged email to some "old bud-
dies," the exact content of that email was forwarded in a chain
to unintended recipients.83 Judge Cebull lamented, "It was not
intended by me in any way to become public."84 Unfortunately
for the judge, his name was attached to contents circulated
beyond his reach.
F. Permanence and Aggregation
The internet's memory cannot be controlled by the original
poster.8 5 A computer drive or disk can keep innumerable
messages without bothering with space, filing cabinets, or doc-
ument clerks. And unlike oral or print communication, digital
information is easily searchable by names and other terms. A
tidbit of a client confidence in a tweet can be connected to other
bits of digital information to reveal information lawyers believe
was never told to anyone. Internet service providers often
cache copies of "deleted" data forever.86 Material thought to
have been destroyed can resurface at a later date.87 In contrast
to the European Union,88 the United States does not require
82 Kim Murphy, Montana Judge Admits Sending Racist Email About Obarma,





85 See Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 25, 2010, at
30, 33.
86 What Is Browser Caching and ISP Caching?, GEEK HOST, https://geek-
host.ca/supp/knowledgebase.php?action=displayarticle&id=90 [https://perma.
cc/EY5E-73SR].
87 ABA Formal Op. 462, supra note 16, at 2 ("Such data [posted to social
media] have long, perhaps permanent, digital lives such that statements may be
recovered, circulated or printed years after being sent.").
88 See, e.g., Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espaftola de Protec-
ci6n de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 317 (ruling that a person may request to have third-
party websites containing information about them removed from search engine
result lists); Charles Arthur, Explaining the 'Right to be Forgotten' - The Newest
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internet service providers to delete electronic information, un-
less the content is illegal and the provider is under notice. 89
G. Instantaneity and Informality
The instantaneity of online communications permits, if not
encourages, severely pococurante messages. Because of the
ease and informality of online communication, people say
things online that they would not say in a letter or face-to-
face.9 0 Social norms that encourage people to self-regulate-
for example, shunning or reprimands from neighbors, family,
and coworkers-are largely lost online.9 1 Internet use seems to
override any sense of inhibition or caution, perhaps because
Cultural Shibboleth, GUARDIAN (May 14, 2014, 1:42 PM), http://www.theguardian.
com/technology/2014/may/ 14/explainer-right-to-be-forgotten-the-newest-cul-
tural-shibboleth [https://perma.cc/V3QY-8F2D] (discussing the Google Spain re-
sult and analyzing the European "right to be forgotten"); Julia Fioretti, France
Fines Google over 'Right to Be Forgotten,' REUTERS (Mar. 24, 2016), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-google-france-privacy-idUSKCNOWQ1WX [https://
perma.cc/ATG8-SWIT] (demonstrating France's enforcing the European Court of
Justice's ruling in Google Spain); Lance Ulanoff, EU Wants a 'Right to Be Forgot-
ten,' But the Internet Never Forgets, MASHABLE (May 13, 2014), http://mash-
able. com/2014/05/13/eu-google-ruling op-ed/#wlmNGubLpqqW [https://
perma.cc/B8ZS-WYNS] (arguing that the ruling in Google Spain represents a mis-
understanding of the nature of the internet).
89 See David Wolpe, Drunk Mistakes Posted on Facebook Are Forever, TIME
(Apr. 28, 2015), http://time.com/3838345/drunk-social-media-permanence/
[https://perma.cc/9VJ3-6E4R].
90 See Elizabeth Bernstein, Why We Are So Rude Online, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2,
2012, at DI, D4.
91 Anonymity removes many of the social controls that may have de-
terred offenders in the pre-Internet era. Anonymity also reduces
accountability and accuracy.... While one may argue that anony-
mously authored postings are not as credible as identified postings,
the mere existence or prevalence of online gossip or online insults
may have a negative effect even where such information is refuted or
discredited. One study showed that repeated exposure to informa-
tion made people believe the information was true, even where the
information was identified as false. The "illusion of truth" appears
to come from increased familiarity with the claim and decreased
recollection of the original context in which the information was
received.
Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 UTAH L. REv.
993, 1009 (footnotes omitted).
Significant work has been done on the power to control behavior generated by
the social expectations of members of communities and even strangers who share
expectations and whose shock or disapproval is enough to discourage unaccept-
able behavior. See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGH-
BORS SETrLE DISPUTES 230 (1991) (discussing inter alia the role of gossip and hero
worship in adjusting behavior); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Mean-
ing, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 943, 976-77 (1995) (analyzing the coercive effects of lan-
guage); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903,
916 (1996) (describing ways in which norms and roles incentivize and disincen-
tivize conduct). For many online posts, anonymity is assured unless someone is
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users wrongly harbor an illusion that their communication will
never reach beyond the intended recipient. In addition, digital
natives are carrying on more and more conversations electroni-
cally that historically were not in writing. Given the immediacy
of texting coupled with clumsy, tired thumbs, an electronic
reply may be more easily misspelled, misstated, and mis-
aimed.
Language in electronic messages is typically more casual
and filled with hyperbole and tasteless attempts at humor. Re-
search by social scientists reveals that we tend to be vastly
overconfident in our ability to clearly communicate by email.9 2
Comments that might be in an offhand aside to the person in
the next seat in a meeting can, and frequently do, implicate
flaws in clients, other lawyers, judges, jurors, and the legal
system, and project messages that erode public trust in the
legal system. When made electronically, such comments can
be preserved, verified, and disseminated in writing to a wide
audience.
Employees who would not confront a boss in the hall seem
willing to say what they think online. An employee shared that
she and another employee had been fired on Facebook.9 3 A
third worker commented on the post, stating that "[the boss]
did both of y'all wrong."94 Word got back to the boss,9 5 who
disapproved of what could be read as disloyalty. The third
worker then posted: "[Slomeone did not like what I had to say
even though it's MY fb, MY post/comment. I can say what I
please. don't like whatcha see? then scoot."9 6 Ultimately, the
person who had to "scoot" was the third worker, who was fired
and initially denied unemployment benefits.9 7
The sender may choose the wrong emoji. I once included a
face with big tears to convey sadness and the recipient had to
motivated enough to expend time and money in uncovering the source. See Kim,
supra, at 1010-11.
92 See various studies discussed in Kristen E. Murray, You Know What I
Meant The Science Behind Email and Intent, 14 J. AM. LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS
119, 120-25 (2017).
93 Venkat Balasubramani, Employee Kvetching About Job on Facebook Still







97 Id. She was first denied unemployment benefits and consequently sued




tell me that this emoji conveys laughing so hard that one is
crying. The message, thus, was inappropriate. Many elec-
tronic devices autocorrect words that appear (to it) to be mis-
spelled. The text is replaced with what may be a common-
sense choice but is inaccurate, sometimes after the writer has
moved down several lines. My daughter announced the birth of
her baby named Hugh. A friend's voice text came across as
"Congrats on BBQ." This is a trivial error; others might be
significant. Following an interview with a Salt Lake City firm,
one applicant wrote to praise the firm for its "nurturing" of new
associates and instead praised their "neutering" of new
associates.98
Often, the author of a post believes that catchy comments
will be seen as a harmless jest. However, for defamation pur-
poses, that assumption cannot be relied upon. At least one
judge has ruled that comments made on Twitter should be
taken just as seriously as comments in other, more formal
settings.99 After Courtney Love tweeted that her former lawyer
was "bought off," the lawyer brought a libel suit.10 0 Counsel for
Courtney Love argued that the tweet was just the hyperbole
often found on the internet. The court ruled that Love made
the comments with "a widely used internet vehicle for commu-
nicating personal views,"10 1 and will be held to the words she
used. 1 0 2 This is only the decision of a single district judge, but
the analysis is convincing and other courts may be willing to
take online messages literally. 103
98 Message on file with author. It is probably true that neutering new associ-
ates would result in higher billable hours.
99 Martha Neil, Courtney Love Testifies at First US 'Twibel' Trial, Sued by Her
Ex-lawyer over Critical Tweet, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 16, 2014, 3:25 PM), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/courtney_love takes-standin_former-attor-
neyslibel-lawsuit overcritical/ [http://perma.cc/4NVF-UVQCI.
100 Bill Hetherman, Lawsuit Against Courtney Love Can Proceed, Judge Rules,





103 Ellyn Angelotti, How Courtney Love and U.S.'s First Twitter Libel Trial Could
Impact Journalists, POYNTER (Jan. 14, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.poynter.org/
news/how-courtney-love-and-uss-first-twitter-libel-trial-could-impact-journal-
ists/ [http://perma.cc/4R8K-XALB]. This article suggests that "this decision
could be influential in future [Twitter-libell cases" and urges publishers to "keep a
close eye on how this court applies traditional defamation to Twitter." Id.; see also
Lizzie Plaugic, Clara Hits Future with $15 Million Libel Suit over Tweets, VERGE
(Feb. 9, 2016, 12:40 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/9/10949564/ciara-
future-lawsuit-slander-tweets-interviews [http://perma.cc/R4VP-BA3G] (dis-
cussing a lawsuit for libel and slander originating from statements made over
Twitter).
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H. Lack of Context
Internet interactions can be taken easily out of context. 1 0 4
Ask Sarah Palin about seeing RussiaIO5 and Michelle Obama
about being proud of her country.1 0 6 It is much easier to copy
and paste word snippets that, without context, carry a different
meaning than the speaker or poster intended. The casualness
and back and forth of an email chain means that writers may
be more terse and improvident than in other settings. Without
the entire chain, a statement in one email could carry an en-
tirely different meaning.
Internet posts consist only of bare words and an occasional
emoji, without the body language usually present in face-to-
face conversations and without the tonal distinctions of oral
conversations. 107 The impediments in accurately conveying a
message electronically are so acute that some have called for
punctuation that indicates mood (such as one to denote sar-
casm).108 Facebook even started experimenting with a "satire"
tag to help users avoid getting duped by popular satiric news
stories. 109
The speed and the ease with which an electronic communi-
cation can be sent means that an errant click on "reply all"
could send one's snotty commentary on a post to the entire
listserv. Other potential pitfalls lie in the ability to copy and
paste a long list of recipients' emails without reentering or re-
reading each. A prior message may have been used to reply.
The parties believe the new interchange includes only two peo-
ple, not realizing that the "reply" went to everyone on the list.
Just recently, one of my research assistants accidentally sent a
"kissy face" image and a personal message to his landlord; it
104 ABA Formal Op. 462, supra note 16, at 2 ("Relations over the Internet may
be more difficult to manage because, devoid of in-person visual or vocal cues,
messages may be taken out of context, misinterpreted, or relayed incorrectly.").
105 Eoin O'Carroll, Political Misquotes: The 10 Most Famous Things Never Actu-




106 Cate Carrejo, The Infamous Comment Michelle Obama Made in 2008 That
Would Be Better Understood Today, BUSTLE (Dec. 27, 2016), https://
www.bustle.com/p/the-infamous-comment-michelle-obama-made-in-2008-that-
would-be-better-understood-today-26371 [http://perma.cc/M34U-9BR9].
107 ABA Formal Op. 462, supra note 16, at 2.
108 See Erin McKean, Yeah, Right, Bos. SUNDAY GLOBE, Feb. 7, 2010, at C2.
109 Anu Passary, Facebook Tests 'Satire' Tag to Avoid Confusion on News Feed,





was intended for his wife. No harm done, but it is easy to
imagine more damaging images and messages. The old-fash-
ioned process of printing duplicates and typing out the ad-
dresses on envelopes, by contrast, makes this kind of
unintentional over-distribution so much less likely in non-digi-
tal contexts.
In a provoking example, after oral arguments for a case
involving the State Bar of Nebraska, the former bar president
sent an email to the attorneys who had argued for the bar.110
He also cc'd the bar's Executive Council, which unfortunately
included the Chief Justice as the Supreme Court Liaison.11 '
The email congratulated the attorneys for dealing with "ill con-
ceived [sic] and uninformed questions" from the bench.1 12 Be-
cause the Chief Justice had seen the email, he felt it necessary
to reveal it to the other members of the court, as an ex-parte
communication.11 3 This whole embarrassment was facilitated
by the ease of including groups in the recipient field of an email
without separately inputting names. Clearly, the internet
presents a host of new issues that make ethical and profes-
sional faux pas more likely and spread their harm more widely.
III
PROPOSED CHANGES TO ADDRESS TECHNOLOGY ABUSE
IN THE LAW
Stopping uncivil and unprofessional behavior by lawyers is
the focus of many of the Model Rules and the clear intent of
professionalism standards. Most printed court and bar associ-
ation standards include a generalized and overarching state-
ment, such as this one: "[L]awyers shall treat all other counsel,
parties, judges, witnesses, and other participants in all pro-
ceedings in a courteous and dignified manner."" 4 The senti-
ment is noble, but it does little to incentivize change and less to
identify when the line is crossed.
In this Part, I discuss how technology use frequently runs
afoul of various principles of ethical and professional behavior.
110 Joe Patrice, This Is Why You Always Check the Address Field Before Send-






114 UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILYY r. 1 (2014). Around nineteen
states have adopted a similar standard. Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, at
tbl.1.
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I organize this discussion in the numerical order of the individ-
ual Model Rule that is most closely associated with a particular
type of abuse. I do not mean to suggest that the problems must
now be addressed in terms of the Model Rules. Although en-
forcement actions could currently take the form of violations of
the Model Rules, my main concern is preventing abuses in the
future. Thus, I suggest that each bar association and court
explain these issues in the official statements of expectations
or professionalism creeds that they enact. At some point,
hopefully, the Model Rules will be reexamined to consider ex-
press inclusion of these ethical and professional problems in
the text of the Model Rules. I order the discussion in accor-
dance with the format of the Model Rules only for convenience.
I begin with issues related to the content of Model Rule 1.1.
However, the most important discussion falls at the end in the
coverage of Rule 8.
A. Rule 1.1: Competence
Model Rule 1.1 requires "competent representation."1 15
The ABA Commission 20/20 took a small step toward acknowl-
edging the importance of technology in the practice when they
added a comment to Rule 1.1 stating that "a lawyer should
keep abreast . . . of the benefits and risks associated with
relevant technology."116 Many states have adopted this provi-
sion, 117 including Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware,
Kansas, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, and Utah.118
Commendably, Florida went beyond the suggested language of
Model Rule 1.1 and not only adopted the language of the Rule,
but also took a concrete step toward making sure that Model
Rule 1.1 is followed by requiring Florida lawyers to "take at
least three hours of CLE in an approved technology program as
part of the 33 total hours of CLE they must take over a three-
year period." 19
115 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
116 Id. at cmt. 8.
117 See Ambrogi, supra note 1.
118 CPR POL'Y IMPLEMENTATION COMM., A.B.A., VARIATIONS OF THE ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, RULE 1.1: COMPETENCE at 1-5 (2017), https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional responsi
bility/mrpc 1_1.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/HCN4-QMJN].
119 Victor Li, Florida Requires Lawyers to Include Tech in CLE Courses, A.B.A.





Admonitions of competency are being considered or
adopted in various states in a variety of alternative forms. 120
Many courts now encourage or require lawyers to conduct dis-
covery in digital formats. A California ethics opinion states
that if an attorney lacks the required competence for proper e-
discovery, she should "(1) acquire sufficient learning and skill
before performance is required; (2) associate with or consult
technical consultants or competent counsel; or (3) decline the
client representation."l 2 1 A few bar association creeds mention
use of technology in discovery and transfer of documents.1 2 2
As technology becomes more and more pervasive, igno-
rance of beneficial uses of technology is increasingly unaccept-
able, and can result in very real consequences for lawyers and
their clients. Many have opined that not using technology dur-
ing legal research may constitute a lack of diligence because
online legal research provides the most up-to-date picture of
the law.1 2 3 Further, online fact discovery is likely to reveal
important additional information to help build a client's case or
assess a client's risk. Failing to use technology to streamline
practice and save wasted time could lead to fees a court might
find unreasonable.1 2 4
Although most discussion of technology uses and abuses
centers on litigators, transactional lawyers are not immune
from technoblunders. The recent District of Columbia Bar as-
sociation ethics opinion warns that lawyers entrusted with ful-
filling due diligence for cases involving securities, pending sales
120 See Ambrogi, supra note 1.
121 State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Profl Responsibility & Conduct,
Formal Op. Interim No. 11-0004 (2014).
122 See, e.g., UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY, supra note 28, 14
cmt ("Lawyers should only use data-transmission technologies as an efficient
means of communication and not to obtain a tactical advantage."); AsS'N Bus.
TRIAL LAWYERS, Los ANGELES CHPT., ETHIcs, PROFESSIONALISM AND CIVILY GUIDELINES
3-4 (2016) http://www.abtl.org/pdfs/la-civilityguidelines.pdf [http://perma.cc/
QDJ8-55TW] (containing an entire section on electronic discovery); FIA. BAR,
supra note 29, at 2.17 ("A lawyer must ensure that the use of electronic devices
does not impair the attorney-client privilege or confidentiality.").
123 See, e.g., Ellie Margolis, Surfn' Safari-Why Competent Lawyers Should
Research on the Web, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 82, 92 (2007) ("Courts routinely
emphasize the relative ease and quickness of Shepardizing, particularly with the
use of Westlaw or Lexis, implying that failing to perform this simple task is a basic
lack of diligence.").
124 Ivy B. Grey, Not Competent in Basic Tech? You Could Be Overbilling Your
Clients-and Be on Shaky Ethical Ground, A.B.A. J.: LEGAL REBELS (May 15, 2017),
http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/tech-competence_andethical_
billing [http://perma.cc/X8BA-LBER] ("{F]ailing to become competent in technol-
ogy would also lead to unreasonable fees. This may be more than a billing write-
off-it may constitute an ethical violation.").
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and purchases, and regulatory compliance must thoroughly
review all social media postings and the situation may "require
advice about whether social media postings or use violate stat-
utory or rule-based limits on public statement or market-
ing."' 25 It references limitations on such public statements
and guidelines from federal, state, and local agencies.1 2 6 It
explicitly notes the Security and Exchange Commission's re-
cent action relating to the risk that social media may be a
communication about an initial public offering,1 27 and that
"[ilnadequately disclosed interactive Internet downloads may
constitute unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation of
Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act."1 28 The
Model Rules do not address the risks for transactional lawyers,
and neither do the professionalism standards of any state.
This specificity is novel to the D.C. Bar Ethics Opinion 371.
The ABA goes so far to change the Model Rules to require
lawyers to be competent in electronic communications but of-
fers no guidance for transactional lawyers.
Not just disuse, but mistakes in understanding how tech-
nology works can have serious consequences. In Wisconsin for
example, a lawsuit was recently dismissed because of an email
that allegedly landed in a lawyer's junk mail folder.129 The
plaintiff and his lawyer Timothy Davis did not appear at a depo-
sition on June 6th because "the email notice went to the law-
yer's junk email folder."1 30 Apparently no one in the office saw
a mailed notice. Assuming the lawyer in this case is telling the
truth, this example is a warning about relying on the delivery of
electronic notices and neglecting careful handling of hard copy
mail. In addition, Davis alleges that the lawyers for the opposi-
125 D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 371, supra note 33, at 3.
126 Id.
127 Id. (first citing Complaint, In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., FTC No. 082,
3009, No. C-4264 (F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009); and then citing Decision and Order, In re
Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., FTC File No. 082, 3009, No. C-4264 (F.T.C. Aug. 31,
2009)).
128 Id. at 3 (citing Netflix, Inc., and Reed Hastings, Exchange Act Release No.
69279, 2013 WL 5138514, at 5 (Apr. 2, 2013) ("[Ilssuer communications through
social media channels require careful Regulation FD analysis comparable to com-
munications through more traditional channels[, and] the principles outlined in
the 2008 Guidance . .. apply with equal force to corporate disclosures made
through social media channels.")).
129 Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer Says He Missed Deposition Because Email
Notice Went to His Junk Folder, A.B.A. J. (July 5, 2017, 9:42 AM), http://www.
abajoumal.com/news/article/lawyer says-he_missed-deposition becauseemail





tion did not receive discovery documents he sent because their
system could not receive email files larger than ten
megabytes. 13 1 Lawyers must be on the alert for sending docu-
ments in smaller batches or emailing opposing counsel to be
sure that files were received before assuming they were.
Although a lack of a technological savvy may not always
result in consequences as drastic as having a case dismissed or
missing discovery deadlines, it will never do the client any fa-
vors. One way to approach this issue would be to amend the
requirements for continuing education to require some credits
for classes on properly using technology in the practice of law.
In the last year promising materials are starting to be available
for even the smallest bar association to use in providing at least
initial education to members. 132
Unfortunately, much of the education on social media
available to lawyers is promotional. That means it is teaching
about how to promote yourself and your practice and it is given
by commercial interests that are happy to assist you by selling
use of their platforms. For instance, Kevin O'Keefe, CEO of
LexBlog, introduces his various presentations with this: 13 3
The key for lawyers is learning how to turn the digital dials by
using social networks and media effectively. Learning here
comes from trial and error.
Adapting to the cultures each social media present is like
traveling to a foreign country. You get comfortable over time
and keep the faux pas to a minimum as you start. 1 3 4
But encouraging lawyers to dive in and hope to overcome mis-
takes over time is the wrong message. Lawyers should be
131 Id.
132 See, e.g., Robert C. Nagle & Pamela Chandran, Attorney Misconduct on
Social Media Recognizing the Danger and Avoiding Pitfalls, A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP.
L. 427, 432-33 (2017) (advising lawyers on how to properly safeguard evidence on
social media); SOCIAL MEDIA LAW BASIcS (ON-DEMAND CLE) A.B.A., Jan. 18, 2017,
https://shop.americanbar.org/ebus/store/productdetails.aspx?productId=
263192541 [http://perma.cc/K2QT-9955] (presenting a webinar for lawyers
about social media law).
133 Kevin O'Keefe, Nuts and Bolts of Social Networking and Social Media, LEX-
BLOG (Nov. 2014), http://rlhb.wp.lexblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/
2014/11/Social-Media-Nuts-and-Bolts-by-Kevin-OKeefe.pdf Ihttp://perma.cc/
H84P-Y5NX]. This material and versions of it are promoted widely. The presenta-
tion O'Keefe gave to the Utah Bar Association is available at https://
www.utahbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Social-Media-Nuts-and-Bolt-
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taught how to avoid "faux pas" as well as ethical and profes-
sional violations first.
While waiting for the Model Rules to be more explicit, bar
associations should consider professionalism standards that
encourage the use of electronic discovery and recommend on-
line factual research. Moreover, technological competency re-
quires recognizing the risks of online social media and
electronic communications. No lawyer is competent to practice
law in this century without becoming aware of the risks of
electronic communications and social media as described in
Part II. A general statement in a professionalism creed could
include the following language, but as the following subparts
illustrate, various issues require more detailed individual
coverage:
Lawyers should educate themselves on the merits of e-dis-
covery and online research, as well as the obligations of re-
searching social media in the course of due diligence.
Further, lawyers should be aware of potential negative conse-
quences of using digital communications and social media,
including the possibility that communications intended to be
private may be republished or misused. Lawyers should un-
derstand that digital communications in some circumstances
may have a widespread and lasting impact on their clients,
themselves, other lawyers, and the judicial system.
B. Model Rule 1.6(a) and (c): Confidentiality of Information
Model Rule 1.6(a) provides: "A lawyer shall not reveal infor-
mation relating to the representation of a client," except under
limited circumstances. 13 5 Of course, attorneys have been on
notice about the importance of confidentiality for a century.
However, attorneys may not recognize the ways that electronic
communications, research, and storage lures a conscientious
attorney into inadvertent violations.
What lawyers should be required to know is that, with
more options of storing and transmitting client information,
inadvertent disclosure of client information is much more likely
in the cyberworld. 3 6 Protection of important digital data is
often handled too casually by attorneys. The frequency of on-
135 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT r. 1.6(a) (Am. BAR ASS'N 2014).
136 See Anne Klinefelter, When to Research is to ReveaL The Growing Threat to
Attorney and Client Confidentiality from Online Tracking, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1,
8-9 (2011) (discussing the possibility that third parties can gain access to private
information through online tracking); Michael E. Lackey, Jr. & Joseph P. Minta,
Lawyers and Social Media The Legal Ethics of Tweeting, Facebooking and Blog-
ging, 28 TOURO L. REV. 149, 155-56 (2012) ("The ease of sharing and publicizing
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line posts, texts, tweets, and other forms of social media corre-
spondingly increase the risk of exposing confidential
information. Also, the ease and instantaneity of the medium
encourages sloppy and thoughtless disclosures. Something
about the internet leads people to overshare, to unduly trust
those they imagine are watching, and to fail to use caution or
even proofread. 1 3 7 Lawyers must be aware that, in addition to
their own electronic devices, access to confidential information
may occur from third parties' devices when they receive or
generate messages to the lawyer.
Lawyers fail to consider the various kinds of techno-
blunders that give rise to ethical and professional risks. This
section reviews common categories of confidentiality breaches
arising with the use of technology.
1. Oversharing
Attorneys have been known to complain about their day's
work or regale others with tales of competence and success in
particular cases or transactions. Some of these communica-
tions provide enough information to lead a recipient to figure
out exactly what client and what transaction was involved,
even if the lawyer did not mention specific names or obvious
facts. Historically, these kinds of sloppy and "accidental" dis-
closures took place in closed groups during oral conversations,
making it less likely for those disclosures to spread and be
made available to others who might want to harm the client. In
writing online, such disclosures can easily be spread and be-
come exceedingly dangerous both to the client and to the integ-
rity of the legal system.
An outrageous example of oversharing involves an assis-
tant public defender in Illinois who posted sensitive client in-
formation on her blog, referring to clients by their first names
and even revealing information relating to a client's drug
use.' 38 A less outrageous, but still problematic, example in-
volved posting that "the client just lied to me about a crucial
information through social media, however, raises a danger that lawyers might
fall afoul of this duty [of confidentiality].").
137 See, e.g., Martha Neil, Lawyer's Request for Reprimand over Her Own Web
Comments Nixed by Top State Court, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 20, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://
www.abajoumal.com/news/article/topcourt_nixes_1awyers-request for repri-
manddismissescasedue_to_1ack/ [https://perma.cc/J7F6-REBC].
138 Robert J. Ambrogi, Lawyer Faces Discipline over Blog Posts, LAw.COM: LE-
GAL BLOG WATCH (Sept. 11, 2009, 3:10 PM), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/
legal blogwatch/2009/09/lawyer-faces-discipline-over-blog-posts.htni [https:/
/perma.cc/8QG4-CBN5].
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fact - I hate it when they do that."1 3 9 Such a post could "reveal
confidences because the post has a date and a time, and a
reader might well be able to identify which client [she was]
meeting with." 1 4 0
A thoughtful District of Columbia ethics opinion states that
"[wihile lawyers may ethically write about their cases on social
media, lawyers must take care not to disclose confidential or
secret client information in social media posts" and that it is
always necessary to obtain consent from the client before post-
ing any details of their case online.1 4'
Even if an attorney is reasonably certain that disclosures of
case or client details will not be prohibited by the rules of his or
her jurisdiction, it is always best to err on the side of caution in
obtaining consent from the client.1 4 2 Added complications
arise where a lawyer posts on social media about a client, and
then posts personal opinions on seemingly unrelated political
or social topics that ultimately are adverse to the potential
interests of the client.1 43
2. Reviews, Ranking, and Feedback
Another hotspot for disclosure mistakes arises with the
trend of using the internet for feedback. A significant feature of
the internet is a lawyer's ability to invite comments and ratings
and clients' ability to gripe online. Lawyers have revealed confi-
dential client information while responding to negative feed-
back on rating sites. One lawyer responded to a negative rating
with this: "I dislike it very much when my clients lose, but I
cannot invent positive facts for clients when they are not there.
I feel badly for him, but his own actions in beating up a female
co-worker are what caused the consequences he is now so
upset about."144 A lawyer may in self-defense spill out a justifi-
cation that reveals too much about the case. When it happens
139 Smith, supra note 56, at 7.
140 Id.
141 D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 370, supra note 33, at 3.
142 See id.
143 See id.
144 Debra Cassens Weiss, Lawyer Accused of Revealing TMI in Response to
Bad Avvo Review Is Reprimanded; Overdraft Also Cited, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 21, 2014,
11:45 AM), http:/ /www.abajoumal.com/news/article/lawyer-who revealedtmi_
in-response tobadavvoreviewis-reprimanded [https://perma.cc/V9SX-
NBJP]; see also In re Tsamis, No. 2013PROO095 (Ill. Att'y Registration & Discipli-
nary Comm'n Jan. 15, 2014), http: //www.iardc.org/HBRBDisp-Htnl.asp?
id= 11221 [https://perma.cc/X2P5-F999] (joint stipulation and recommendation
for a reprimand by the hearing board).
9112018]1
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
in writing on a publicly accessible and easily duplicated and
preserved medium, the harm is vastly enlarged.
In a culture where a company's online presence is just as,
if not more, important than its physical presence, a bad review
online can have a substantial impact. One lawyer in Utah de-
cided that the best way to deal with a negative online review
that stated he was the "[w]orst ever," among other things, was
to sue the person who posted the review for "defamation, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, and intentional interfer-
ence with prospective economic relations."145 The district
court dismissed all of the claims and was upheld by the appel-
late court, holding that the online review was merely an opinion
and thus did not rise to the level of a tort. 146 The publicity from
the suit brought far more attention to the negative review and
did nothing to make this lawyer more appealing to future cli-
ents. As one blogger .who covered the opinion said, "Spoiler
alert: suing the client is not the correct answer."1 4 7 Someone
should have given this bit of advice to Alisa Levin, a lawyer who
filed a defamation lawsuit against a former client for calling her
a "legal predator" and a "con artist" in a Yelp review. 148
In responding to reviews of any nature, lawyers must be
careful not to reveal client confidences. The District of Colum-
bia, for example, permits lawyers to reveal client confidences
only when responding to "'specific' allegations by the client
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client."14 9 D.C.
rules also "specifically exclude[ I general criticisms of an attor-
ney from the kinds of allegations to which an attorney may
respond using information otherwise protected . . . ."1so The
New York State Bar takes an even stricter stance and holds
145 Spencer v. Glover, 397 P.3d 780, 783 (Utah Ct. App. 2017).
146 Id.
147 Eric Goldman, How Should a Lawyer Respond to a Yelp Review Calling Him




148 Debra Cassens Weiss, Chicago Solo Files $1. 1M Defamation Suit Against
Ex-Clientfor Alleged 'Legal Predator' Yelp Review, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 14, 2018, 8:00
AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chicago-solofiles_1.1m-defama
tionsuit against exclientfor alleged_1egal/
?utmsource=maestro&utm - medium =email&utmcampaign=weekly-email
[https://perma.cc/J3GY-J7PP. In response, the former client republished the
Yelp review, which, as a top review, drove Levin's name and the allegations to
national fame. Id.
149 D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 370, supra note 33, at 3 (quoting MODEL RULES
OF PROF. CONDucT r. 1.6(e)(3) (Am. BAR ASS'N 2014)).
150 Id.
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that, "[a] lawyer may not disclose confidential client informa-
tion solely to respond to a former client's criticism of the lawyer
posted on a [lawyer-rating website]."' 5
3. Internet Provider Disclosures
Other risks arise with social media websites. Lawyers'
three most commonly used social media networking sites are
Facebook, Twitter, and especially LinkedIn.1 52 The ABA 2016
Tech report found that ninety-nine percent of large firms,
ninety-seven percent of mid-size firms, ninety-four percent of
small firms, and ninety-three percent of solo firms have a
LinkedIn profile. 15 3 Linkedln offers users the option to import
contact information from an existing email account; doing this
may "publicize details about clients, witnesses, consultants,
and vendors."15 4 Caution is warranted in such instances and
confidentiality issues may arise because use of social media
websites often involves access to address books, and
allows the social media site to suggest potential connections
with people the lawyer may know who are already members
of the social network, to send requests or other invitations to
have these contacts connect with the lawyer on that social
network, or to invite non-members of the social network to
join it and connect with the lawyer. 5 5
This can be a huge technoblunder because:
[Iun many instances, the people contained in a lawyer's ad-
dress book or contact list are a blend of personal and profes-
sional contacts. Contact lists frequently include clients,
opposing counsel, judges and others whom it may be imper-
missible, inappropriate or potentially embarrassing to have
as a connection on a social networking site. The connection
services provided by many social networks can be a good
151 Id. (quoting N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Ethics Opinion
1032 (2014)).
152 See Stephen Fairley, How Lawyers Are Using Social Media in 2017, THE
NAT'L L. REv. (June 20, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/how-law-
yers-are-using-social-media-2017 [https://perma.cc/SED7-RV5Q].
153 Shields, supra note 80 ("In total, 78% of respondents report that their firms
maintain a presence on LinkedIn. This represents a drop from previous years,
when this number topped 90%. This could be due to a greater understanding on
the part of respondents that a firm presence on LinkedIn (a law firm business
page), may be different than firms requiring or encouraging their lawyers to com-
plete their individual LinkedIn profiles, or it could mean that firms are not seeing
the value of firm business pages on LinkedIn and prefer to focus more on individ-
ual lawyers [sic] profiles and networking to gain visibility for both the lawyers and
the firm.").
154 Lackey & Minta, supra note 136, at 155.
155 D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 370, supra note 33, at 3.
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marketing and networking tool, but for attorneys, these con-
nection services could potentially identify clients or divulge
other information that a lawyer might not want an adversary
or a member of the judiciary to see or information that the
lawyer is obligated to protect from disclosure. Accordingly,
great caution should be exercised whenever a social network-
ing site requests permission to access e-mail contacts or to
send e-mail to the people in the lawyer's address book or
contact list and care should be taken to avoid inadvertently
agreeing to allow a third-party service access to a lawyer's
address book or contacts. 156
4. Unsecured Access
A major, but often unappreciated, risk arises from the
prevalence of unsecured internet connections. Lawyers and
clients may send and receive digital communications on un-
secured internet access services at a restaurant, park, airport,
and other public locations. Some still have home wireless rout-
ers that do not require passwords. Someone on the street can
access an inadequately protected internet access point, even
from outside a building or home, and monitor communica-
tions.15 7 If a party other than the lawyer, such as a spouse,
child, or untrained staff member, uses a computer, phone, or
email account, conmmunications and stored information are not
secure.
In a recent case, an employee working with the lawyers for
an insurance company made a grave mistake involving un-
secured access. In Harleysville Insurance Co. v. Holding Fu-
neral Home, Inc., 15 8 the district court with odd analysis
overruled the magistrate judge's opinion stating that the insur-
ance company waived any attorney-client privilege in, or work-
product protection of, their "Claims File."' 5 9 However, the
magistrate's reasoning is compelling. The magistrate observed
that the insurance company knowingly uploaded the Claims
File to a cloud storage and file sharing service operated by Box,
Inc.16 0 Although the purpose of putting the Claims File on Box
was to share it with outside counsel, the folder was available to
156 Id.
157 Cheryl B. Preston, WIFL in Utalk Legal and Social Issues, 20 UTAH B.J. 29,
at *31, Sept.-Oct. 2007.
158 Harleysville Inc. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057,
2017 WL 4368617 (Oct. 2), overruling in pertinent part No. 1:15CVO0057, 2017
WL 1041600 (W.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2017).
159 Id. at *5.
160 Harleysville Inc. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057,
2017 WL 1041600, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 9, 2017).
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anyone with access to the internet because it was not password
protected. 161 In addition, an email to opposing counsel in-
cluded the link to the Box folder, which included the Claims
File.162 The insurance company later sent a thumb drive to
opposing counsel in response to discovery requests.1 6 3 The
thumb drive also contained the full Claims File.16 At this
point opposing counsel alerted the insurance company's coun-
sel of a perceived mistake involving the thumb drive, but be-
lieved the online availability of documents through the
provided link was intentional.16 5 In the magistrate's opinion,
this was the "cyber world equivalent of leaving its claims file on
a bench in the public square and telling [opposing] counsel
where they could find it."1 66 The magistrate imposed a mone-
tary sanction for failure to alert the insurance company that
the file was available using the provided link, but refused to
disqualify opposing counsel or take any further action.1 67
The district court found, on the other hand, that the
Claims File had been inadvertently disclosed.1 68 In a particu-
larly generous move, the district court held that the insurance
company took reasonable measures to protect the Claims
File, 169 notwithstanding the double disclosure. First it found
that the Box cloud storage folder "was not searchable through
Google or any other search engine, nor was it searchable on the
Box, Inc. website. Therefore, a person would need to enter the
specific URL of the 'sharing' link, which consisted of 32 ran-
domly-generated alphanumeric characters."170 Unfortunately,
the link was knowingly given to opposing counsel.
The insurance company claimed it voluntarily provided op-
posing counsel with the link for the purpose of making availa-
ble a video of the relevant fire. 171 The district court excused the
employee of the insurance company for putting the Claims File
in the same Box folder with the video.1 7 2 The court noted that
it was the employee's first time using Box, he lacked a technical
161 Id. at *5.
162 Id. at *1.
163 Id. at *2.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at *5.
167 Id. at *8.
168 Harleysville Inc. Co. v. Holding Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:15CV00057,
2017 WL 4368617, at *5-6 (Oct. 2, 2017)
169 Id. at *7.
170 Id.
171 Id at *6.
172, Id. at *7.
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background, and he believed he had utilized the security
features. 173
Then the court looked at whether the insurance company
waited too long to rectify the error.17 4 The court determined
that the insurance company's delay in rectifying their error
resulted from its ignorance, not its negligence.
It was perfectly reasonable-and, indeed, accurate-for Har-
leysville's counsel to expect that no one could access the Box
Folder unless he was given that specific URL. The fact that
[opposing] counsel could access the Box Folder via a 32-
character, randomly-generated "sharing" link in an email
sent by Harleysville did not, and should not have, put Har-
leysville's counsel on notice that anyone with an Internet
connection could do the same.' 7 -
The court also found that the disclosure to just one party, and
not multiple parties, meant the disclosure was not extensive
and concluded that no waiver occurred.1 7 6
I find it very difficult to interpret as reasonable lawyers' use
of cloud storage files unprotected by password. The distinctive
URL is no protection, even if the link was not disclosed. An
experienced hacker can search the cloud without using Google.
How can sharing the link not put lawyers on notice that the
material in the folder accessed by that link has been made
available to the recipient of the link? Actual realization of the
consequences of an error is not required. In addition, employ-
ees and agents of lawyers are not typically excused because
they are inexperienced in handling confidential material.' 77
Most people do not have a technical background. In any event,
outside of this court, lawyers cannot justify a breach of confi-
dentiality by having client information handled by inadequately
trained employees.
5. Temiinated Devices
Another common problem involves lawyers, clients, and
firm employees who exchange or sell devices, or return com-
pany owned equipment. A departing employee may return a
device with digital information still on it, even if the employee
tried to erase it. If the employee did not remove passwords or
173 Id.
174 Id. at *8.
175 Id.
176 fj.
177 See, e.g., Frances P. Kao, No, a Paralegal Is Not a Lawyer, A.B.A. Bus. L.
TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 11, 13-14 (discussing a lawyers' duty to ensure that a
paralegal maintains confidentiality).
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did not log out of accounts, privileged attorney-client messages
could appear on the device now in the possession of another
owner or former employer. One employee sued a former em-
ployer when he found out that his old company-issued iPhone,
which he had returned to his former employer, was still linked
to his Apple account.1 7 8 The text messages he received on his
new phone were automatically sent to the phone that was now
in his former employer's possession. 179 This case did not in-
volve a lawyer, but a lawyer or litigant could easily make the
same mistake. In addition, devices may have been program-
med to remember passwords or otherwise contain cookies that
store and apply all kinds of information automatically, giving
the new owner access to a host of personal data containing
confidential information.
The Florida Bar, the leader in addressing technology, is-
sued an ethics opinion on the proper ways to handle hard
drives from discarded computer equipment to protect confiden-
tial client information.1 80 The Florida Bar addressed the obli-
gations of lawyers regarding information stored on hard drives
in hopes of preventing the leak of confidential information. In
the ethics opinion, the Bar stated that "hard drives from high
speed scanners and other like computer equipment" may re-
tain records of scanned documents that can be accessed after
the equipment is discarded.I' "[Ljawyer[s] must take reasona-
ble steps to ensure that client confidentiality is maintained and
that the Device is sanitized before disposition."1 8 2 Other bar
associations need to incorporate similar warnings.' 8 3
6. Ransomware
An increasingly common risk involves third parties who
hack in and freeze lawyer's computer systems and demand a
178 Venkat Balasubramani, Employer Isn't Liable when Former Employee
Linked His Apple Accounts to Its Devices-Sunbelt v. victor, TECH. & MARKETG L.




180 Profl Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Op. 10-2 (2010); see also Jake Schickel, A
Report from the Florida Bar Board of Governors Meeting, FIN. NEWS & DAILY REC.
(June 7, 2010), http://www.jaxdailyrecord.com/showstory.php?Storyid
=531175 [http://perma.cc/2MGF-GHA7].
181 Schickel, supra note 180.
182 Fla. Bar., Op. 10-2, supra note 180.
183 See Zelda Gerard, What After the Sony Hack? Examination of the Develop-
ment of Cybersecurity Law in the United States and in France and Its Impact on
Lawyers, 32 ENT. & SPoRTs LAw 28, Winter 2016, at 28, 32 (citing Florida and
California as examples of states that have implemented such warnings).
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ransom be paid to unlock the system. 184 Although the pay-
ment of the ransom does not itself raise ethical concerns, firms
that are unable to pay the ransom risk the "or else" threat,
which is that the hackers will release the information into the
public or permanently delete it. A public release results in a
breach of confidentiality and permanent inability to access firm
files that dramatically affects a lawyer's ability to competently
represent a client. Loss of records entrusted to a lawyer raises
a plethora of common law and statutory claims from affected
clients.1 8 5 The incidence of ransomware attacks is rising. 1 6
John Simek, the vice president at Sensei Enterprises Inc. said
that
[wihen it comes to ransomware . .attacks are growing and
that many firms end up having to pay the ransom because
they didn't have systems in place to recover the stolen data.
"Our own clients are beginning to wake up to the fact that
these types of attacks can happen anytime."18 7
In Rhode Island, the law firm Moses Afonso Ryan allegedly
lost $700,000 in billings from a ransomware virus that infected
the firm's computer network.1 88 The virus was unwittingly in-
troduced to the firm's network because a lawyer clicked on an
infected email attachment which downloaded the virus and
encrypted the law firm's network for three months until the
ransom of $25,000 was paid to release the network.18 9 The law
184 See Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, "Why Can't We Be 'Friends'?": Ethical
Concerns in the Use of Social Media, 57 S. TEx. L. REv. 551, 568 (2016) (giving
examples of firms that have been subject to such attacks).
185 See Vincent I. Polley, Cybersecurity for Lawyers and Law Firms, 53 JUDGES'
J. 11, 11 (Fall 2014) ("In 2012, the American Bar Association updated the model
ethics rules to require lawyers to keep abreast of the benefits and risks associated
with new technology and to maintain basic competency in the use of computer
technologies. A blizzard of ABA and state ethics opinions address lawyers' duties
to protect confidential client information and to keep clients informed . ... ).
186 See Herb Weisbaum, Ransomware: Now a Billion Dollar a Year Crime and
Growing, NBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2017, 11:51 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/
security/ransomware-now-billion-dollar-year-crime-growing-n704646 [https://
perma.cc/QQ3M-QMTY] ("Ransomware payments for 2016 are expected to hit a
billion dollars, according to the FBI. That compares to just $24 million paid in
2015. And it's expected to get even worse this year - with more victims and more
money lost.")
187 Victor Li, How Prepared Are Law Firms for Cyber Breaches? And How Often
Are Firms Being Attacked?, A.B.A. J. (June 29, 2017, 8:41 AM), http://www.aba
journal.com/news/article/how-prepared-arelawfirms-for-cyber-breaches
and how oftenare-they being_ [https://perma.cc/8RM9-BEAE).
188 Debra Cassens Weiss, Victimized by Ransomware, Law Firm Sues Insurer
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firm had an insurance policy through Sentinel, which paid the
maximum $20,000 as provided under the policy for virus cov-
erage, but the policy would only cover "lost business income
when there is physical loss or damage to property at the busi-
ness premises."1 90 Moses Afonso Ryan filed a claim against
Sentinel for the $700,000 in lost billings because of the vi-
rus.191 Cases like these demonstrate how lawyers need to
guard themselves against the risks of not only their unethical
behavior, where purposeful or not, but also against the behav-
ior of others who could use technology to extort money from a
law firm or compromise confidential client data.
7. Employer Access
A serious and not uncommon example of confidentiality
breach involves the attorney who communicates with a client
who is at work. Recently in California, a lawyer permitted a
client who was involved in litigation with her employer to dis-
cuss the case, facts, and strategy from her workplace using her
employer's equipment.1 92 A company policy had warned that
an email account "was to be used only for company business,
that e-mails were not private, and that the company would
randomly and periodically monitor its technology resources to
ensure compliance with the policy."' 9 3 The employee had been
given the company's handbook and signed that she had read
its terms.19 4 Like the rest of us, she did not think twice about it
again and fell into the common illusion that emails are private.
Of course, the court determined that the emails were not pri-
vate, and therefore, they were not protected by attorney-client
privilege. 1 The employer could use against her any content it
found.
The emerging view is that employees, like this client, have
no reasonable expectation of privacy when using employer
equipment or systems.19 6 And even if there were a reasonable
expectation of privacy, many companies require the employee
to enter into an agreement regarding the terms of using the
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 See Holmes v. Petrovich Dev. Co., 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 878, 884-87 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2011).
193 Id. at 896.
194 Id. at 883.
'95 Id. at 895.
196 See, e.g., id.
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employer's equipment or internet access.197 If an employee's
email address or IP address includes words or numbers relat-
ing to the employer, a reasonable employee should realize that
the employer may have rights to access and use electronic
communications.
8. Lawyers' Employees' Access
A member of a lawyer's staff who has terminated employ-
ment at a firm or other business may retain passwords that
allow continued access to company email and electronically
stored information. If a dispute arises, or just out of curiosity,
the former employee may seek to access digital information.19 8
In a recent criminal complaint, Michael Potere, a former associ-
ate at Dentons' Los Angeles office, was charged with extor-
tion.199 Potere allegedly threatened to reveal sensitive firm
documents that he had obtained by using the email password
of a partner at Dentons. 200 The email password was given to
Potere when he worked on a case together with the partner in
2015.201 Potere, upset about not being able to continue work-
ing at Dentons until the fall where he would start a political
science degree program, "demand[ed] that the law firm pay him
$210,000 and give him a piece of artwork to ensure the docu-
ments remained secret." 202 This is a prime example of why
lawyers must frequently change passwords, especially when
employees are terminated.
In addition, lawyers should be warned about the frequent
cases involving current employees allowing others to use their
online identities or passwords that link and allow access to
lawyer information. One attorney in West Virginia repeatedly
197 See, e.g., Kristin J. Hazelwood, Technology and Client Communications:
Preparing Law Students and New Lawyers to Make Choices that Comply with the
Ethical Duties of Confidentiality, Competence, and Communication, 83 MIss. L.J.
245, 270 (2014) (discussing cases in which plaintiff waived reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy because defendant had retained right to access in employee
handbook).
198 See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505 (2d Cir. 1991)
(describing how a Cornell researcher used his knowledge and access to security
networks to infect them).
199 Complaint at 1, United States v. Potere, No. 2:17-cr-00446 (C.D. Cal. June
20, 2017).
200 Debra Cassens Weiss, Former Dentons Associate Accused in Extortion Plot
Involving Threat to Leak Documents to Legal Blog, A.B.A. J. (June 28, 2017 9:47
AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/exdentons_associate_s_ac-
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accessed the emails of his wife and seven of his wife's co-work-
ers at her law firm because he thought she was engaging in an
extramarital affair. 203 There is no evidence in this case that the
outside attorney was looking for client information, but if the
fear had been that the wife was having an affair with a client,
sensitive information on the client's legal matters may have
been exposed. Spouses of employees may have legal access to
passwords or share computers with cookies permitting access
to private sites. Lawyers and firms need to be much more
vigilant in policing employee access to client information.
Some kinds of employees and agents have access to com-
puter systems or equipment for repair or maintenance pur-
poses. Something available on the computer may tempt such a
person to copy or use the information or disclose it to others.
Or, as happened to the Utah Bar Association in March 2018,
someone in the office may stick a full frontal photo of naked
breasts at the end of an email sent to all active attorneys asking
them to sign up for the bar convention. 204 Anyone in the office
may access a lawyer's computer and any open internet sites
while the lawyer is out to lunch, in a conference, in the bath-
room, etc. Of course, before the digital era, co-workers and
maintenance staff could always have looked at papers on the
desk or opened files and drawers. However, papers on a desk
do not include a record of the user's search history or networks
of stored information. Digital information can be searched by
keyword easily and quickly. It can be printed, forwarded to
another account, or saved on a flash drive. Moreover, someone
with access to a lawyer's email account or blog may post infor-
mation in the name of the lawyer or send out requests for
information that may result in breaches to confidentiality.
203 Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Markins, 663 S.E.2d 614, 615-17, 622 (W. Va.
2008).
204 Christina Zhao, Utah State Bar Emaits Photo of Naked Breasts to Every
Lawyer in the State, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2018, 12:12 PM), http://
www.newsweek.com/utah-state-bar-emails-photo-boobs-every-lawyer-state-
832710 [https://perma.cc/MY7-SUMR]; see also David Wells, Utah Bar Com-
mission Cites Human Error for Email Containing Nude Photo, Fox 13 NEWS Now
(Mar. 9, 2018, 9:54 AM), http://fox13now.com/2018/03/09/utah-bar-commis-
sion-cites-human-error-for-pomographic-email/ [https://perma.cc/22NA-4L5U]
(quoting email from John Baldwin, executive director of the Bar, to Utah lawyers.
The Bar's response email said, "We have determined that a link to the inappropri-
ate image was inadvertently added to the email as a result of human error. That




Storing information in a cloud creates a risk of disclosing
confidential client information. 205 In addition to large, sophis-
ticated firms, the 2016 ABA Legal Technology Report found
that forty-six percent of two-to-nine attorney firms and forty-
two percent of solo practice attorneys use the cloud. 206 Out-
sider hacking of firm computer systems to obtain information
on clients, potential stock offerings, and political dirt is a seri-
ous risk brought on with the use of technology.
A startling report released on June 27, 2017, by
LogicForce, a cybersecurity firm, detailed just how "woefully
unprepared" law firms are against cyber threats. 207 The report
used data compiled from surveys and found that "77 percent of
responding firms did not have cyber insurance, 95 percent of
responding firms were noncompliant with their own cyber poli-
cies, 100 percent were noncompliant with a client's policies,
and 53 percent of responding firms do not have a data breach
incident response plan."208 The report notes that, because of
most law firms' dreadful state of unpreparedness, "It is truly
not a question of if, but when, an incident will occur."209 The
risks go beyond a failure to keep client information private, and
include the loss of the attorney/client privilege, loss of work
product claims in discovery, and loss of trade secret protection.
In addition, information exposed may be a violation of various
securities laws and confidentiality agreements with third par-
ties. 2 10 Exposing client information opens up an attorney to a
variety of common law and statutory claims. This section dis-
cusses various information storage related technoblunders and
their consequences.
Of critical concern is cloud storage. Much has been written
elsewhere on the benefits and risks of attorneys using the
205 Martha Neil, Potential Privilege Pitfalls Posed by Cloud Storage, A.B.A. J.
(Sept. 9, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/online
docrepositories [https://perma.cc/8VCE-XLBD].
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210 See David G. Ries, Safeguarding Confidential Data: Your Ethical and Legal
Obligations, 36 L. PRAC., July-Aug. 2010, at 49.
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cloud and this is not the place for a thorough exploration of all
the implications. However, the risks are sufficiently substan-
tial that mention of methods to protect stored information in
professionalism creeds warrants discussion. Even with ordi-
nary precautions, electronic storage of large amounts of data is
risky and history has amply shown that such data can be
hacked, 2 11 or worse, can be accidentally downloaded on an-
other user's device. 2 12 In relation to trade secrets, Professor
Sharon Sandeen has gone so far as to say, "The mere fact that
you're storing on the cloud, in my opinion, is a strong argu-
ment that you've waived your trade secrecy." 2 13
The ABA now "recognizes a . . . world where law enforce-
ment discusses hacking and data loss in terms of 'when,' and
not 'if,"' 2 1 4 and offers an insurance policy to cover cyber-inci-
dents, including network extortion. 2 15 A press release noted:
In recent years, the legal profession has become a popular
target for hackers. Despite vigilance and increased aware-
ness by law firms and individual lawyers, cyber-related risks
have escalated based on the sensitivity and nefarious uses of
that data. Last year, for example, the Manhattan U.S. attor-
ney's office unsealed indictments against three Chinese men
who are accused of using stolen law firm employee creden-
tials to access troves of internal emails at two law firms. The
men, according to prosecutors, used details they obtained
from partners' emails about pending deals to make more
than $4 million in illegal stock trades.2 16
One study estimated that eighty percent of the 100 largest
law firms have had a malicious computer breach during a one-
2 11 See Victor L1, Tools for Lawyers Worried that NSA is Eavesdropping on Their
Confidential Conversations, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 30, 2014 12:44 PM), http://
www.abajoumal.com/news/article/tools-for_1awyersworriedithat nsais-eaves
dropping-on theirsconfidentialc/ [https://perma.cc/PV7C-SGCEI;.
212 Debra Cassens Weiss, Verizon Worker Told Customer to Hire 'Big Shot Law-
yer' over Nude Photo Migration, Suit Says, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 15, 2018, 10:53 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/verizon worker told customerto
hire-big-shot_1awyer-over_his_nude-photoni [https://perma.ce/TIWM-AM3Y].
213 Neil, supra note 205.
214 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 477R*,
at 2 (revised May 22, 2017) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 477R*] (referencing THE
ABA CYBERSEcURnY HANDBOOK: A RESOURCE FOR ATrORNEYS, IAW FIRMs, AND Busi-
NESS PROFESSIONALS (2013)).
215 ABA Begins Offering Cyber Liability Insurance to Lawyers, Law Firms of All






year period.2 17 Some of these may include ordinary phishing
scams, but an occasional employee falls for the ploy and
reveals confidential information. 2 18 Some have been major
breaches with serious confidentiality implications and may re-
sult in class action lawsuits against the firms.2 1 9
Another risk of storing large amounts of data in the cloud
is access to the information by the service provider. Recently,
Google introduced a free service called Optical Character Rec-
ognition (OCR) that extracts information from documents and
images stored in your drive to make your files more searcha-
ble. 2 2 0 Google uses information to trigger advertising and sells
user data to others. Some commentators suggest that "lawyers
should avoid using free email or cloud storage services like
Gmail and Dropbox. The free versions allow Google and
Dropbox to scan everything sent 'to the service, which com-
promises client confidentiality." 2 2 1 While Google may use cli-
ent information for advertising, a potentially greater risk is that
Google Drive may be hacked.
10. Reasonable Efforts to Protect
Following the 2012 amendments, Model Rule 1.6(c) pro-
vides: "A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, or unauthorized ac-
cess to, information relating to the representation of a cli-
ent." 2 2 2 At least nineteen state and local ethics opinions have
217 Matthew Goldstein, Law Firms Are Pressed on Security for Data, N.Y. 'TMES
(Mar. 26, 2014, 7:00 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/law-firms-
scrutinized-as-hacking-increases/?_php=true& type=blogs&_php=true&_type=
blogs& php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&emc=edit tnt_201403
26&nlid=1166199&tntemailO=y&.r=3 [https://perma.cc/DBX3-RJEW]; see also
Lisa Morgan, Panama Papers Fallout: What If Your Lawyer Gets Hacked?, INFO.
WEEK (May 31, 2016, 9:06 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/strategic-cio/
security-and-risk-strategy/panama-papers-fallout-what-if-your-lawyer-gets-
hacked/a/d-id/1325545 [https://perma.cc/77JZ-BZGX] (identifying various
firms suffering data breaches).
2 18 See Waqas Amir, Google Docs Users Targeted with "Confidential Document"
Phishing Scam, HACKREAD (July 9, 2015, 4:51 AM), https://www.hackread.com/
google-docs-phishing-scam/ [https://perma.cc/WWV9-UEBB].
219 Gabe Freeman, Threats of Litigation After Data Breaches at Major Law
Firms, BLOOMBERG L.: BIG Bus. (Mar. 30, 2016), https://bol.bna.com/threats-of-
litigation-after-data-breaches-at-major-law-firms/ [https://perma.cc/HV5P-
R496] (reporting on data breaches at Well, Gotshal & Manges, Cravath, Swaine &
Moore, and other firms).
220 Convert PDF and Photo Files to Text, GOOGLE DRIVE HELP, https://sup-
port.google.com/drive/answer/176692?hl=EN [https://perma.cc/B2KC-LM6D].
221 Tsutomu Johnson, Sorry I Lost Your Files: Cybersecurity Threats to Confi-
dentiality, 28 UTAH B. J., July-Aug. 2015, at 41, 43.
222 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT r. 1.6(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
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addressed the question of cloud-based information storage,
and all have decided that it is ethically permissible to use cloud
storage services, but only if attorneys use "reasonable care." 2 2 3
The problems with this advice is that lawyers may not be alert
to the risks and will not seek out advice from ethics opinions
and, more importantly, there are no concrete standards for
"reasonable care." Each opinion notes different specific obliga-
tions of attorneys to shield against confidentiality concerns. 224
One thing is clear: the failure to take any precautions certainly
is a violation of the duty of confidentiality. And failure to re-
spond appropriately once a system is hacked is another risk, as
Yahoo!'s top lawyer can attest.2 2 5 In addition, lawyers need to
be reminded of the obvious professional duty to report data
breaches to clients, who are the real victims of these kinds of
attacks.
When the ABA amended Model Rule 1.6, rather than clari-
fying a position reconciling or directing the suggestions in vari-
ous bar associations' statements on cloud computing and
rather than giving lawyers a clear standard for what is "reason-
able," it chose to give vague and limited guidance in the Com-
ment to Rule 1.6226:
[A] lawyer [must] act competently to safeguard information
relating to the representation of a client against unauthorized
access . .. and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclo-
sure .... When transmitting a communication that includes
information relating to the representation of a client, the law-
yer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the informa-
tion from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. 227
Lawyers' views of "reasonable" depends on their awareness of
the risks, which is still doubtful, and their awareness of the
easily available security options.
Unfortunately, the Comment begins by ignoring the facts of
modern practice and lulling lawyers into believing that "[tIhis
duty, however, does not require that the lawyer use special
223 Cloud Ethics Opinions Around the U.S., A.B.A., http://www.ameri-
canbar.org/groups/departmentsoffices/legal_technology_resources/resources/
chartslfyis/cloud-ethics-chart.html#AZ [https://perma.cc/UY9L-TVEY].
224 Id.; see also Peter Geraghty and Susan Michmerhuizen, Encryption Com-
panion, ABA (July 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/youraba/
2015/july-2015/encryption-conniption.html [https://perma.cc/MP9H-U57J].
225 Vindu Goel, Yahoo's Top Lawyer Resigns and C.E.O. Martssa Mayer Loses
Bonus in Wake of Hack, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/03/01/technology/yahoo-hack-lawyer-resigns-ceo-bonus.html?smid=pl-
share&.r=0 [https://perma.cc/PW6K-MF8P).




security measures if the method of communication affords a
reasonable expectation of privacy."22 8 The Comment admits
that "[s]pecial circumstances, however, warrant special precau-
tions," and offers a list of extremely vague factors. 229 First is
the "sensitivity of the information." 230 What information about
a lawyer's representation of a client is not per se "sensitive,"
other than what can be reported in the newspaper, such as
scheduling and published court orders, and friendly chitchat?
The Comment also reminds lawyers that some information is
"protected by law or by a confidentiality agreement." 23 1 The
Model Rule 1.6 Comment does not educate or guide lawyers by
identifying various laws that protect information. Moreover, all
attorney-client information is protected by a "confidentiality
agreement" imposed as a matter of common law, if not ethics
rules.
Other factors include "the likelihood of disclosure if addi-
tional safeguards are not employed." 232 Like speeding, not eve-
ryone gets caught, but the risks of disclosure are broad and
cannot be denied. Another factor is "the cost of employing
additional safeguards [and] the difficulty of implementing the
safeguards." 2 33 While technoneophytes likely think that inves-
tigating and implementing security measures is daunting, the
2017 ABA Opinion 477 acknowledges
a variety of options to safeguard communications including,
for example, using secure internet access methods to com-
municate, access and store client information . . . using
unique complex passwords, changed periodically, imple-
menting firewalls and anti-Malware/AntiSpyware/Antivirus
software on all devices upon which client confidential infor-
mation is transmitted or stored, and applying all necessary
security patches and updates to operational and communi-
cations software. Each of these measures is routinely acces-
sible and reasonably affordable or free.234
Why not require the use of measures that, at any given time,
are "routinely accessible and reasonably affordable or free" or
at least provide a list of the kinds of simple, low cost measures
that are available in the Comment Rule 1.6? At a minimum,
the ABA Model Rules should address the use of unsecured




232 Id. at cmt. 18.
233 J&d
234 ABA Formal Op. 477R*, supra note 214, at 6 (emphasis added).
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networks and public Wi-Fi and the risk of unsuspectingly
downloading viruses.
The last factor found in the Rule 1.6 Comment for deter-
mining the level of security necessary is "the extent to which
the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer's ability to represent
clients (e.g., by making a device or important piece of software
excessively difficult to use)." 2 3 5 The Comment thus offers an
easy excuse, without acknowledging that almost none of the
routinely available security measures make anything "exces-
sively difficult to use." Moreover, ample examples in this Arti-
cle and elsewhere show that some lawyers believe that avoiding
unsecured networks, restricting posts on social media, occa-
sionally changing passwords, and avoiding cell phones for sen-
sitive communications is just too difficult. Some lawyers may
think that giving up the convenience of discussing client mat-
ters with a colleague in a crowded elevator or at a bar makes
practice excessively difficult, but that has never been an
excuse.
In an attempt to add some specificity to the woefully inade-
quate Comment to Rule 1.6, the ABA recently issued ABA For-
mal Opinion 477. It adds various tips about obvious risks and
is a starting point for training lawyers, even though it offers no
more concrete standards than the Comment to Rule 1.6. Opin-
ion 477 mentions the well-known fact that a "client [may use]
computers or other devices subject to the access or control of a
third party," and it reminds lawyers of their duties to supervise
staff and nonlawyers to whom work is delegated. 2 3 6
Finally, in addition to other "may"s and "should"s, Opinion
477 suggests one specific "better practice" of marking commu-
nications "privileged and confidential." 2 3 7 Such disclaimers
are usually at the bottom and not noticeable until the message
has been read in full. In addition, those with a financial or
strategic stake in the legal matter are unlikely to immediately
delete it, even if they had not already read the contents.
Opinion 477 lists in a footnote various lawsuits involving
the breach of confidentiality by electronic communications, 2 3 8
235 See Model Rule 1.6, supra note 222, at cmt. 18.
236 ABA Formal Op. 477R*, supra note 214, at 6.
237 Id. at 8.
238 E.g., Bingham v. BayCare Health Sys., No: 8:14-cv-73-T-23JSS, 2016 WL
3917513 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 2016) (collecting cases on privilege waiver for privi-
leged emails sent or received through an employer's email server); Mason v. ILS
Tech., LLC, No. 3:04-CV-139-RJC-DCK, 2008 WL 731557 (W.D.N.C. Feb. 29,
2008); Holmes v. Petrovich Dev Co., LLC, 191 Cal. App. 4th 1047 (2011) (employee
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but nothing in the Opinion sets a standard stronger than "rea-
sonable," but undefined, steps to avoid these or other risks.239
A specific step that should be required as a reasonable
effort to protect against technoblunders is a requirement for
lawyers to become aware of the policies of online platforms and
services and then avoid those whose policies allow the provider
wide powers to access information and relieve the provider
from liability for giving information to others or other mishan-
dling of information. The District of Columbia Bar recently
addressed an issue few if any lawyers have grasped. 240 "It Is
critically important that lawyers review the policies of the social
media sites that they frequent, particularly policies related to
data collection. Privacy settings on social media are not the
equivalent of a guarantee of confidentiality." 24 1 Lawyers, as
with all other internet users, will resist taking the time to find
the providers' terms on their webpages, reading the lengthy
statement, and understanding how the policies relate to
risks. 242 Even if the policies were initially read, lawyers do not
keep up on the regularly changing terms even if they have
notice of the changes. Bar associations might provide the ser-
vice of reviewing the policies of popular social media sites and
advising lawyers of the specific risks. Certainly professional-
ism standards in each jurisdiction should specifically alert law-
communications with lawyer over company owned computer not privileged); Scott
v. Beth Israel Med. Center, Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct. 2007).
239 ABA Formal Op. 477R*, supra note 214.
240 D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 370 (2016).
241 Id at 2.
242 See NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CoNTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 1, 213
(2013) (citations omitted):
One study estimated that it would cost the average American In-
ternet user 201 hours or the equivalent of $3,534 a year to read the
privacy policies of each website that he or she visits, you would not
have time to engage in productive work, recreational activities, or
relationships. Modern life, in other words, would break down if we
treated wrap contracts just like other contracts.
See also Cheryl B. Preston, "Please Note: You Have Waived Everything": Can
Notice Redeem Online Contracts?, 64 AM. U. L. REv. 535, 553 (2015) (citations
omitted):
In addition to time drain, a second reason not to read wrap con-
tracts is that they are difficult, dense texts. Most readers cannot be
expected to comprehend them even if they read every word. Wrap
contracts are increasingly elaborate, monotonous, and written in
ways that suggest the drafter intended to obfuscate the scariest
parts by embedding them in excess verbiage and repetition. Re-
member, wrap contract drafters do not have to worry about printer
or paper costs, mailing or storage costs, or the cautionary impact of
presenting a long paper contract to a consumer in its obvious full-
ness. Key sections in wrap contracts are frequently presented in all
capital letters, but that does not help.
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yers to the risks created by common online provider contracts
and advise against using platforms with certain terms or a
history of disclosures.
Although using two-step passwords and encryption is a
better practice, a minimum step that should be required is
strengthening and protecting passwords. Risks abound. For
instance, the Heartbleed bug, which allowed third parties to
potentially view encrypted data, affected many sites that could
contain sensitive information, such as Yahoo!, Google, Box,
and Dropbox, as well as other sites that cater specifically to
lawyers. 243 One commentator opined that, at a minimum, eth-
ics required lawyers to change their passwords regularly. 244
Requiring particular methods of security runs the risk of
becoming outdated, but the Model Rules or state professional-
ism standards can require the use of at least one of a variety of
methods subject to advances in the field. Without federal legis-
lation, the bar can adopt standards for ethical behavior that
draw on the specifics in The Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX),245 Fed-
eral Information Security Management Act (FISMA), 24 6 Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),24 7 Gramnm Leach
Bliley Act (GLBA), 248 or Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard (PCI-DSS).249
Bar association standards can, at a minimum, advise law-
yers who are not technologically sophisticated and not employ-
ing existing security measures to get professional advice on
securing communications and cloud storage from an informa-
tion systems expert. If a disclosure or breach occurs, a law-
yer's failure to have reasonable security measures in place
should be an ethics violation subject to bar disciplinary action.
Bar associations could also require continuing legal education
hours in the subject of communications and information
security.
243 Robert Ambrogi, Which Legal Sites Did Heartbleed Affect?, L. SITES (Apr. 14,
2014), http://www.lawsitesblog.com/2014/04/legal-sites-heartbleed-affect.html
[https://perma.cc/SM7X-V5FB].
244 See Aaron Street, Heartbleed: What Lawyers and Law Firms Need to Know,
LAWYERIST (Apr. 11, 2014), http://lawyerist.com/72733/heartbleed-lawyers-law-
firms-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/X562-YUEH (suggesting encrypting and
backing up hard drives).
245 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
246 44 U.S.C.A §§ 3145 et seq. (2012).
247 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g et seq. (2012).
248 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (adding to and amending
various sections of Tities 12 and 15 U.S.C.)




Language setting forth the most minimum of standards
that can be added to bar association standards is as follows:
Lawyers should be alert to the increased risk of interception
of, and unauthorized access to, digital communications and
information storage, including the risks of unauthorized ac-
cess, unintended disclosure of details that can be aggregated,
and oversharing of personal information or activities that
might allude in any way to clients and cases. Lawyers should
carefully screen any information posted to social media sites.
Lawyers should use frequently changed and robust pass-
words, two-factor authentication, or encryption. Unless
technologically sophisticated or advised by a security expert,
lawyers should not store client information on the cloud.
Lawyers should not use unsecured internet access points or
routers to discuss client business. Lawyers should consider
cyber liability insurance.
Lawyers are responsible for failures to protect informa-
tion from improper use by employees, agents, and repair ser-
vice technicians who have access to electronic devices on
which client information may be stored. Lawyers should dis-
cuss with, and obtain consent from, clients regarding the use
of electronic communications in various circumstances.
Lawyers should request that clients store and discuss case
details only on reasonably secure devices and provide clear
advice about the risks of client use of social media.
C. Rule 1.7(b) and (c): Conflicts of Interest
Rule 1.7(b)(4) prohibits representing a client with respect
to a matter if "[t]he lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of
the client will be or reasonably may be adversely affected by the
lawyer's own financial, business, property, or personal inter-
ests," unless the conflict is resolved in accordance with Rule
1.7(c). 2 50 Posts on social media may take a position that is
contrary to the interests of a current or potential client. The
District of Columbia Bar warns about such inadvertent cre-
ations of conflicts and notes that even "the acquisition of unin-
vited information through social media sites . . . could create
actual or perceived conflicts of interest for the lawyer or the
lawyer's firm." 2 5 1 Lawyers and firms often post legal updates
where they may opine on the merits of new legislation or a
recent case. Others run opinionated blogs as a way of at-
tracting clients or garnering social and peer acceptance for
250 D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT r. 1.7 (D.C. BAR 2015).
251 D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 370, supra note 33, at 2 (2016).
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positions taken by existing major clients. These practices must
be carefully monitored.
Professionalism standards adopted by bar associations
should include:
Lawyer or firm postings on social media, as well as third
party comments (invited or uninvited) may create subject
matter conflicts even if a future client is not adverse to a prior
client.
D. Rule 3: Obstruction and Extrajudicial Statements
1. Rule 3.4(a): Obstruction and Spoliation of Evidence
Model Rule 3.4(a) creates the duty not to "obstruct another
party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or con-
ceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value, [or] counsel or assist another person to do [so]."252 Cop-
ies of electronic communications should be preserved in the
client's file. The District of Columbia Ethics Opinion 370 adds
a further twist: "Social media sites may not permanently retain
messages or other communications; therefore care should be
taken to preserve these communications outside of the social
media site, in order to ensure that the communications are
maintained as part of the client file." 2 5 3 In addition to keeping
their own records, lawyers must warn clients of the conse-
quences resulting from spoliation of evidence, 254 including an
adverse inference at trial, assessment of costs and fees, disci-
plinary action, default judgment, as well as tort and criminal
liability. 255 A good reference is Professor Browne-Barbour's ci-
tation of several cases, ethics opinions, and commentators that
discuss spoliation. 2 56
252 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT r. 3.4(a) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013).
253 The D.C. Bar Association also recommends that lawyer-client communica-
tions be made through a secure office email rather than social media. D.C. Bar
Ass'n, Ethics Op. 370, supra note 33, at 2.
254 Browne-Barbour, supra note 184, at 575.
255 Id.
256 Id. at 575 n. 187 (citing Gatto v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 10-CV-1090-ES-
SCM, 2013 WL 1285285, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2013); Patel v. Havana Bar, Rest.
& Catering, No. 10-1383, 2011 WL 6029983, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 5, 2011); Lester
v. Allied Concrete Co. (Lester II), Nos. CLO8-150, CLO9-223, 2011 WL 9688369, at
*1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 21, 2011), affd in part, rev'd in part, 736 S.E.2d 699 (Va.
2013); Profl Ethics Comm. of the Fla. Bar, Proposed Advisory Op. 14-1 (2015);
N.Y. Cty. Lawyers Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Ethics Op. 745, at 3 (2013); N.C.
State Bar Ethics Comm., 2014 Formal Ethics Op. 5 (2014); Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm.
on Legal Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 2014-300, at 7 (2014); Phila.
Bar Ass'n Profl Guidance Comm., Op. 2014-5 (2014); John G. Browning, A Clean
Slate or a Trp to the Disciplinary Board? Ethical Considerations in Advising Clients
to 'Clean Up' Their Social Media Profiles, 48 CREIGHTON L. REv. 763, 763-64 (2015);
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In addition, District of Columbia Ethics Opinion 371 warns
that the law, which varies among jurisdictions, may prevent
advising a client to "modify their social media presence once
litigation or regulatory proceedings are anticipated." 2 5 7 Law-
yers must consult obstruction statutes, spoliation law, proce-
dural rules for criminal and regulatory investigations, and
rules for civil cases before taking down or advising clients to
take down social media posts. 2 58 The time to advise clients
about the risk that information in social media will come back
to haunt them is before it is posted.
2. Rule 3.6: Extrajudicial Statements by Non-Prosecutors
Model Rule 3.6 provides: "A lawyer . .. shall not make an
extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know will be disseminated by means of public commu-
nication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter."259 The
Rule expressly details the limited kinds of information that can
and cannot be revealed. Being in front of a television camera or
talking to a reporter would put most lawyers on alert to care-
fully monitor information disclosed. However, in this genera-
tion, every lawyer can actually be the press. At any time,
including while sitting at the counsel table, a lawyer may, with
a few thumb strokes, broadcast a message to untold millions.
Hopefully, it is unlikely a lawyer would actually intend to
broadcast the information about the legal proceeding to inap-
propriate parties, but the belief that a tweet or text will be kept
private is unfounded.
Already situations involving lawyer communications dur-
ing judicial proceedings are coming to light. The harm is com-
pounded if the lawyer is an employee of the government
working for the court. For instance, a court research attorney
tweeted during an attorney discipline proceeding what was her
take on the merits of the case and the moral turpitude of the
respondent Phil Kline26 0 : "Why is Phil Klein [sic] smiling?
John G. Browning & Al Harrison, "What Is That Doing on Facebook?l": A Guide to
Advising Clients to 'Clean Up' Their Social Media Profiles, 53 Hous. LAw., Jan./Feb.
2016, at 26, 27; John Levin, Social Media-Advising Your Client, 29 CBA REc.,
Jan. 2015, at 40, 40; Agnieszka McPeak, Social Media Snooping and Its Ethical
Bounds, 46 ARiz. ST. L.J. 845, 888-94 (2014)).
257 D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 371, supra note 33, at 3.
258 Id. (citing other sources).
259 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDucT r. 3.6 (Am. BAR AsS'N 2013).
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There is nothing to smile about douchebag"; "ARE YOU
FREAKING KIDDING ME. WHERE ARE THE VICTIMS? ALL
THE PEOPLE WITH THE RECORDS WHO [sic] WERE STO-
LEN"; "I predict that he will be disbarred for a period not less
than 7 years"; and finally, "It's over . .. sorry. I did like how the
district court judges didn't speak the entire time. Thanks for
kicking out the SC Phil [sic]! Good call!" 2 6 1 The bar association
reprimanded the tweeting attorney, finding that her prediction
was a misrepresentation of fact and law, implied that she had
undue influence over the judges, disrespected a litigant, disre-
spected the judges, and prejudiced the administration of jus-
tice. 2 6 2 . This consequence of a mere reprimand seems
inadequate to address such a breach. This behavior throws the
legal system in disrepute because of the implication that a
party involved in the proceeding was subject to a general bias
and not able to obtain a fair outcome.
A new standard can remind lawyers that their online com-
munications during a proceeding are inappropriate.
Communication via social media platforms by lawyers and
court personnel constitutes "public communication." Law-
yers must avoid extrajudicial statements via social media
platforms that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know
will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an
adjudicative proceeding in the matter.
3. Rule 3.8: Extrajudicial Statements by Prosecutors
Rule 3.8 provides, "The prosecutor in a criminal case
shall ... refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have
a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of
the accused . . . .. 263 There are already reported cases involv-
ing prosecutor tweets made during a trial. One case was based
on these tweets: "I have respect for attys who defend child
rapists. Our system of justice demands it, but I couldn't do it.
No way, no how," and "Jury now has David Polk case. I hope
the victim gets justice, even though 20 years late." 2 6 4 The ap-
pellate court that considered the prosecutor's tweets did not
decide whether they were improper since the real test is
whether the trial was fair. 2 6 5 However, the judge mentioned
261 Id. ¶1 15.
262 Id.
263 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT r. 3.8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013). In addition to
the Rule, thirty states have adopted a standard encouraging honesty. Preston &
Lawrence, supra note 11, at 717 tbl.3.
264 Missouri v. Polk, 415 S.W.3d 692, 695 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013).
265 Id. at 696.
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that the timing and content of the messages increased the like-
lihood that a jury would be tainted.2 66 Aside from tainting the
jury, providing information to the public that predicts a result
or suggests facts not elicited in the evidence is covered by the
intent of Rule 3.8. The question arises of whether prosecutors
can risk posting anything on the internet relevant to any
cases.267
A new standard can remind prosecutors that online social
media communications are public, and thus there is great risk
of abuse when commenting about an ongoing case. A standard
might look like this:
Prosecutors should know that online social media posts are
public extrajudicial comments. As such, prosecutors should
ensure that their social media posts (i) do not have a sub-
stantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the
accused and (ii) do not have a substantial likelihood of taint-
ing a jury.
E. Rules 3.4, 4.1, 4.4, and 5.3: Abuse of the Research
Process
Model Rule 3.4 requires parties to act in fairness during
the discovery process. 268 This Rule originally addressed abu-
sively large and detailed discovery requests intended to require
excessive and unnecessary effort and expense of the other
party.2 69 This problem is vastly magnified with the ease of
generating electronic requests and the vastly increased
amounts of digitally stored data.
Something new and insufficiently addressed, however, are
abuses involved with electronic fact research regarding oppos-
ing parties, opposing attorneys, judges, jurors, or witnesses. In
a recent study, eighty-one percent of attorneys who responded
used evidence from social media in their cases. 270 "Facebook
was found to be the most popular source of evidence, with 66%
of attorneys responding indicating that they had used evidence
found on the site." 27 1 Some argue that a lawyer who does not
266 Id.
267 E.g., Emily Anne Vance, Note, Should Prosecutors Blog, Post, or Tweet?: The
Need for New Restraints in Light of Social Media, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 367, 384-402
(2015).
268 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT r. 3.4 (Am. BAR ASS'N 2013).
269 Id. at CmtS.
270 Zoe Rosenthal, "Sharing" with the Court: The Discoverability of Private So-
cial Media Accounts in Civil Litigation, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
227, 229-30 (2014).
271 Id. at 230.
934 [Vol. 103:879
2018] LAWYERS' ABUSE OF TECHNOLOGY 935
take advantage of the vast new resources for discovery is guilty
of malpractice. 2 7 2 One court recently held that it was not only
acceptable, but good practice, for attorneys to bring their
laptops to the courtroom and conduct searches while potential
jurors are being questioned. 2 7 3 Because of the potential for
online factual research, lawyers should warn their clients to
post only truthful statements, encourage clients to avoid post-
ing information that could be detrimental, and provide guide-
lines for taking down information. 274
This vast body of potential evidence comes with the risk of
various abuses. For example, some courts do not allow ques-
tions about political affiliations, 275 but this information is often
available on social media web pages. 276 Some courts and com-
mentators express concern that, when jurors know that law-
yers use various means, especially online, to find information
about jurors, some people would. be discouraged from jury
duty. 2 7 7 Other issues involving research are even more
serious.
Finding and using information that is publicly available
online is legitimate. 2 7 8 "Lawyers, just like everyone else, are
272 See, e.g., Shannon Awsumb, Social Networking Sites: The Next E-Discovery
Frontier, 66 BENCH & B. MINN., Nov. 2009, at 22, 26 ("[Aittorneys should explore
social networking sites as part of their formal and informal discovery efforts and
case preparation. Just as it would be unthinkable nowadays to conduct discovery
without considering what email evidence may be available, attorneys should give
the same attention to social networking information to ensure that all smoking
guns have been uncovered and addressed."); Andy Radhakant & Matthew Diskin,
How Social Media Are Transforming Litigation, 39 LITIG., Spring 2013, at 17,
18-19.
273 See Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071, at *10 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010) ("That he had the foresight to bring his laptop
computer to court, and defense counsel did not, simply cannot serve as a basis for
judicial intervention in the name of 'fairness' or maintaining 'a level playing
field.'").
274 See N.Y. Cty. Law. Ass'n, Ethics Op. 745, at 4 (2013).
275 See Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 412-13 (1895); Thaddeus
Hoffmeister, Applying Rules of Discovery to Information Uncovered About Jurors,
59 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 28, 34-35 (2011).
276 See Robert B. Gibson, Researching Jurors on the Internet-Ethical Implica-
tions, N.Y. ST. B. ASS'N J., Nov.-Dec. 2012, at 10, 12 ("Now, through the Internet,
trial attorneys can obtain information about prospective jurors that would other-
wise not be disclosed during voir dire, such as the juror's political beliefs and
economic philosophies.").
277 See, e.g., N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl & Judicial Ethics, Op. 2012-02,
at 9 (2012) ("Jiurors who understand that many of their social networking posts
and pages are public may be discouraged from jury service by the knowledge that
attorneys and judges can and will conduct active research on them or learn of
their online-albeit public- social lives.").
278 See, e.g., Or. State Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2005-164, at 453 (2016)
(finding that accessing an opposing party's public website does not violate the
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freely permitted to search social media for information con-
cerning a litigant and to view the information that is generally
available to the public." 279 However, attempts to gain access to
private social media accounts, blogs, and chat rooms are gen-
erally improper. This includes the actions of third parties at
the direction of the lawyer.
Most lawyers are not experts in internet law nor do they
carefully think through the implications of the Model Rules
when applied to novel techniques. Lawyers should be warned
about how easy and tempting overreaching is online and re-
minded that their behavior may be exposed even if lawyers
believe they act anonymously. The implications of improper
conduct affect the reputation of the lawyer personally and the
legal system as a whole if their conduct is exposed.
The use of any kind of intentional deception to obtain ad-
vantage in the legal system should be strictly prohibited. A
person who sees a communication not knowing it came from a
lawyer or a person involved in a legal process cannot weigh the
credibility of the information or recognize harmful strategic be-
havior. When doing research, lawyers. must avoid making any
communication with a judge or a person represented by coun-
sel as covered by Model Rules 3.5(b) and 4.2. Ex parte commu-
nications of this sort, including "friending" in that context, are
discussed further in subpart III.G.
1. Friending
Lawyers are tempted to send friend requests under their
names but without disclosing the lawyers' interest in a case
given that some people accept friend requests indiscriminately.
Several state and local bar associations have addressed friend-
ing specifically. The San Diego Bar Association concluded that
"friending" potential witnesses without disclosing the purpose
of the request is unethical, even when using a true name.280
Further, the Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and Philadelphia
Bar Associations have found that viewing the public portions of
a Facebook profile is ethical, but requesting access to a private
ethics rules and is conceptually no different from reading a magazine article or
purchasing a book written by that adverse party).
279 John M. Flannery, The Discoverablllty and Admissibility of Social Media in
NY Civil Litigation, in JOHN M. FLANNERY ET AL., NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN EVIDENTIARY
LAw IN NEW YORK 7, 11 (2013).
280 San Diego Cty. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2011-2 (2011).
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profile is inappropriate without using the lawyer's name and
stating his or her purpose for the request. 28 1
However, the New York City Bar Association reached a dif-
ferent conclusion.28 2 If a real name appears on the friend re-
quest, it is not making a false statement. 283 "Consistent with
the policy [in favor of informal discovery], we conclude that an
attorney or her agent may use her real name and profile to send
a 'friend request' to obtain information from an unrepresented
person's social networking website without also disclosing the
reasons for making the request,"284 as long as it does not in-
clude any kind of misrepresentation. The opinion draws the
following analogy:
[Ilf a stranger made an unsolicited face-to-face request to a
potential witness for permission to enter the witness's home,
view the witness's photographs and video files, learn the wit-
ness's relationship status, religious views and date of birth,
and review the witness's personal diary, the witness almost
certainly would slam the door shut and perhaps even call the
police.
In contrast, in the "virtual" world, the same stranger is
more likely to be able to gain admission to an individual's
personal webpage and have unfettered access to most, if not
all, of the foregoing information. 285
Unlike the opinion's holding, this reasoning suggests that, be-
cause we are not as careful in granting friend requests as we
are with opening our door even though the results could be
similar, friending to garner evidence or private information is
never proper.
Furthermore, regarding technology abuse in research, law-
yers must be warned that directing someone else to do the
research does not remove liability. Responsibility lies with the
281 N.H. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 2012-13/05, at 3 ("There is a
split of authority on this issue, but the Committee concludes that such conduct
violates the New Hampshire Rules of Professional Conduct."); Pa. Bar Ass'n Legal
Ethics Comm., Op. 2014-300, at 8-9 (2014); Phila. Bar Ass'n, Op. 2009-02, at 3
(2009) (finding that directing a third party to friend a witness using only truthful
information "omits a highly material fact, namely, that the third party who asks to
be allowed access to the witness's pages is doing so only because he or she is
intent on obtaining information and sharing it with a lawyer for use in a lawsuit to
impeach the testimony of the witness"); see also Steven C. Bennett, Ethical inita-
tions on Informal Discovery of Social Media Information, 36 AM. J. TRAL ADVOC.
473, 484 (2013) (discussing a Philadelphia bar opinion).





lawyer even if an agent, employee, or other third party takes the
action. Rule 5.3(b)-(c)(1) states:
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the non-
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the per-
son's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations
of the lawyer; and
(c) a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person
that would be a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
if engaged in by a lawyer if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the spe-
cific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved. 286
For example, while representing defendants in a personal
injury lawsuit, two attorneys directed a paralegal to gather in-
formation about the plaintiff using the internet.28 7 The plain-
tiffs Facebook page was initially public, and the paralegal
accessed it multiple times. 28 8 When the plaintiffs profile be-
came private, the attorneys directed the paralegal to continue
to monitor the plaintiffs social media activity by sending him a
"friend request."289 While the paralegal did not use a false
identity, she also did not disclose that she worked for the law
firm representing the defendants in the pending lawsuit. 29 0
When the attorneys sought to introduce the paralegal as a trial
witness and introduce documents from the plaintiffs Facebook
page, the plaintiff filed an ethical grievance complaint with the
state ethics committee. 29 1 Although the New Jersey Supreme
Court did not directly decide whether the attorneys committed
an ethical violation by requesting their paralegal to "friend" an
opposing party, it did hold that the Office of Attorney Ethics
could prosecute the alleged misconduct.2 9 2
While clients are not under the same obligations as lawyers
and their employees, lawyers are obligated to advise clients to
avoid overreaching, illegal or fraudulent conduct when trying to
communicate with a party represented by counsel. 293 Lawyers,
286 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT r. 5.3(b)-(c)(1) (AM. BAR AsS'N 2013).






292 Id. at 975.
293 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 11-461, at 5
(2011) (warning that lawyers must advise their clients that when communicating
with other parties, they should not overreach or interfere with the other party's
client-lawyer relationship).
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however, are fully responsible for using information improperly
obtained by a client. Recently, the Missouri Supreme Court
indefinitely suspended a lawyer for using information in a di-
vorce case that was obtained by his client after guessing his
wife's email password. 294
2. False Names and Identities
Most opinions so far focus on deceptive friending. Several
Model Rules touch on misrepresentations. Model Rule 4.1 pro-
vides: "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not
knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a
third person." 295 Model Rule 4.4 provides: "[A] lawyer shall not
use . . . methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal
rights of such a person."296 In addition, Model Rule 8.4 ad-
dresses fraud. 297 Using subterfuge for purposes of gathering
information is addressed in a variety of formal opinions. 298
Even the New York City Bar Association held that using false-
hoods to obtain evidence is unethical. 299 "[Flor example, an
attorney may not claim to be an alumnus of a school that she
did not attend in order to view a juror's personal webpage that
is accessible only to members of a certain alumni network."3 0 0
In one example, a lawyer in a wrongful discharge action
sought access using a false identity to the social media pages of
a client's co-workers in hopes of finding others who would
make disparaging comments about the employer.3 0 1 One
Pennsylvania county district attorney is currently facing disci-
plinary action for creating a fake Facebook page in an effort to
gain information about defendants. 302
294 In re Eisenstein, 485 S.W.3d 759, 761, 764 (Mo. 2016) (en banc). One
judge wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by one other judge, arguing that the
attorney's violation of various Model Rules warranted a suspension with no leave
to apply for reinstatement for twelve months, rather than six months as in the
majority. Id. at 764 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
295 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT r. 4.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
296 Id. r. 4.4(a).
297 Id. r. 8.4.
298 See, e.g., Or. Bar, Formal Op. 2013-189, at 581 (2013) ("Lawyer may not
engage in subterfuge designed to shield Lawyer's identity from the person when
making the request.").
299 N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl & Judicial Ethics, Op. 2010-02 (2010).
300 Id. at 8.
301 John G. Browning, Digging for the Digital Dirt: Discovery and Use of Evi-
dence from Social Media Sites, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REv. 465, 477-78 (2011).
302 Lori Falce, Centre County DA's Fake Facebook Page Entered as Evidence in





A particularly egregious case involves a forty-year-old for-
mer partner in a Bloomington, Illinois law firm.30 3 He under-
took an eleven month cyber harassment campaign of a lawyer
who had been opposing counsel in a prior matter. He set up a
fake online dating profile of her, posted a false review about her
to a database of legal professionals, and registered her to re-
ceive information from other organizations, such as Obesity
Action Coalition, Pig International, and Diabetic Living.3 0 4
Although a variety of similar deceptions likely occurred in
cases before the internet, especially those involving private in-
vestigators, the simple and relatively costless methods of ob-
taining information online make this temptation significantly
more powerful. In the real world, people do not generally give
personal information to strangers indiscriminately, but people
online are much less careful and lawyers should not abuse
their misjudgment.
3. Entrapping Disclosures
Of even greater concern are attempts by a lawyer (or a
lawyer's agent or client) to direct the conversation on blogs,
chatrooms, and other social media sites for the purpose of
inducing comments or information that otherwise may not
have been posted. In 2013, a prosecutor created a fake
Facebook profile and, via the chat feature on Facebook, pre-
tended to be the ex-girlfriend of a defendant in a murder case to
get two witnesses to change their story about the defendant's
alibi.3 05
Another issue with available technology involves recording
conversations without the consent of all the parties to the con-
versation. In most state and federal jurisdictions, it is not ille-
gal to secretly record a conversation as long as at least one
party to the conversation (the party recording) has con-
303 See Jim Dey, What Was Area Lawyer Thinking with Harassment Cam-
paign?, NEws-GAzETTE, (Aug. 17, 2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.news-gazette.com/
news/local/2017-08-17/jim-dey-what-was-area-lawyer-thinking-harassment-
campaign.html [https://perma.cc/8U8Q-YS8P; Stephanie Francis Ward, Fired
Lawyer Who Set Up Fake Match.com Profile of Female Attorney Cited by Discipli-
nary Board, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 17, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/
news/artcle/fired_1awyer who set up fakematch.com-proffle of female attor-
ney_citedby [https://perma.cc/8EXF-RBX4].
304 See Dey, supra note 303; Ward, supra note 303.
305 Aaron Brockler, Former Prosecutor, Fired for Posing as Accused Killer's Ex-
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sented. 306 Although lawyers were forbidden historically by the
ABA from making such recordings without disclosure to other
parties, the ABA reversed this position in a 2001 formal opin-
ion.3 0 7 It concluded that, although discouraged, secret record-
ings are not misconduct per se as long as it is not illegal to do
so in a lawyer's respective jurisdiction. "A lawyer who electron-
ically records a conversation without the knowledge of the
other party or parties to the conversation does not necessarily
violate the Model Rules."30 8 The previous opinion was based
upon "the principle that a lawyer 'should avoid even the ap-
pearance of impropriety.'"3 0 9 The ABA withdrew its previous
opinion because an "overwhelming majority of states permit
recording by consent of only one party to the conversation" and
there may be legitimate reasons for making a record to avoid
fraud.3 10
Although the ABA changed its position, it continues to ad-
vise against recording exchanges with clients without their
knowledge, and outright forbids any representation that a con-
versation is not being recorded when in actuality it is.3 1 With
the ABA, most state bar associations discourage secret record-
ings and remind lawyers that the totality of circumstances sur-
rounding the recording may suggest the lawyer has engaged in
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of
Model Rule 8.4(c). 3 12
Sometimes lawyers, or even judges, show undue enthusi-
asm for recording devices. For instance, in New Mexico, the
Attorney General has charged Magistrate Court Judge Connie
Johnston in connection with recording telephone conversa-
tions involving multiple people, within secure, nonpublic areas
306 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (2018) ("It shall not be unlawful under this
chapter for a person to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where
such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the
communication has given prior consent to such interception . . . ."); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3005 (2018); D.C. CODE § 23-542 (2018); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00
(Consol. 2018).
307 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422
(2001) (replacing ABA Formal Opinion 337 which in part stated that "with a
possible exception for conduct by law enforcement officials, a lawyer ethically may
not record any conversation by electronic means without the prior knowledge of
all parties to the conversation").
308 Id. at 65.
309 Id. at 66.
310 Id at 67.
311 Id at 69-71.
312 See, e.g., Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm'r on Grievances and Discipline,
Informal Op. 2012-1 (2012); Utah State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Advisory Op. No. 96-04
(1997) (stating that it is not per se unethical to record conversations but describ-
ing circumstances where it would be).
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of the courthouse without the participants' consent.3 13 In Kan-
sas City, a federal prosecutor lost her job at the U.S. Attorney's
office because she had listened to recordings of private conver-
sations between a Leavenworth inmate and his lawyer provided
by a private prison company.3 14 Lawyers must recognize that
covert recordings bring many hazards.
4. Hacking
Some lawyers have superior technological skills. Bar as-
sociations should take the lead in warning them that gaining
unauthorized access to another's electronic communications
and computers is not merely an ethical issue but is also illegal.
In addition to prohibiting intentional interception during an
electronic transmission without a court order,3 15 the Stored
Communications Act makes it illegal to access electronic com-
munications in an inbox, outbox or otherwise stored without
authorization from the owner (or to intentionally exceed au-
thorized access) and thereby obtain, alter, or prevent author-
ized access to a wire or electronic communication. 3 16
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act3 17 makes unautho-
rized access to another's computer for an improper purpose a
crime. Subsection 1030(a)(2)(C) is surprisingly broad and, by
its terms, makes it a crime to exceed authorized access of a
computer connected to the internet without any culpable in-
tent. Although some courts are unlikely to interpret minor
violations as a crime, 3 18 lawyers should stay well within the law
when doing research on the case facts, parties, judges, or
jurors.
The following is possible language addressing this concern
for use in professionalism standards:
Lawyers can and should search social media in the formal
and informal discovery processes. However, lawyers should
not seek to gain access to a private social media account by
313 Joshua Kellogg, AG Files Charges Against Aztec Judge - Connie Johnston
Facing 12 Counts of Interference with Communications, FARMINGTON N.M. DAILY
TIMES, July 29, 2017, at A2.
314 Debra Cassens Weiss, Federal Prosecutor Admits She Listened to Record-
ings of Attorney-Client Conversations, Filing Says, A.B.A. J. (June 29, 2017, 7:00
AM), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/federal-prosecutor-admitsshe_
listenedtorecordings-of attomey-client con [https://perma.cc/7RUE-69WZ].
315 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2018).
316 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2018).
317 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2018).
318 See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (holding that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act does not extend to "viola-
tions of a company or website's computer use restrictions").
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use of misleading statements or false names nor should they
direct others under their control to do so. Even "friending"
the subjects of their inquiries without a clear disclosure of
the lawyers' identity and purpose can be misleading. Law-
yers who comment online should avoid using potentially de-
ceptive methods, such as false identities, to mislead others as
to the source of online statements
F. Rule 3.4(b): Coaching Witnesses
Another issue made critical because of electronic commu-
nications is sending messages to other participants during a
proceeding. It seems to not fit well in any of the Model Rules.
The closest is Rule 3.4(b), which prohibits assisting a witness
to testify falsely.3 19 Some professionalism creeds forbid law-
yers from coaching witnesses or obstructing a deposition.
Such language, 320 including direct reference to tweets and
electronic chats during testimony, should be added to all
creeds. When the Model Rules were written, improper coach-
ing was hard to define and limited to discussion during prepa-
ration time or breaks, and rambling objections. 32 1 It would
have been impossible for a lawyer to coach a witness in specific
terms in real time.
Today, witnesses and lawyers can hold cell phones under a
table and discreetly text a witness in a deposition or in trial,
especially in video depositions. Technically, the Model Rules
only address assisting false testimony; leading a witness to give
responses that the witness did not come up with on his or her
own is false and certainly misleading testimony. 3 2 2 For exam-
ple, a lawyer in Michigan and his client in California exchanged
five text messages while the client was being deposed via vide-
oconference. 323 The only reason the exchange came to light is
because the lawyer accidentally sent a text meant for his client
to opposing counsel in New Jersey.324
319 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT r. 3.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
320 See UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILY r. 18 (2014). Six states
have this standard. Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, at 721 tbl.7.
321 See Tom Barber, Restrictions on Lawyers Communicating with Witnesses
During Testimony: Law, Lore, Opinions, and the Rule, FIA. B.J., July/Aug. 2009, at
58, 60, https:/ /www.floridabar.org/news/tfb-Joumal/?durl=/DIVCOM/JN/
jnjournalO1.nsf/Articles/F361CO4FC87EOEF2852575D600654478 [https://
perma.cc/44B5-TAH].
322 See Richard C. Wydick, The Ethics of Witness Coaching, 17 CARDOzO L. REV.
1, 3-4 (1995); Barber, supra note 321, at 58, 60.
323 Wei Ngal v. Old Navy, No. 07-5653 (KSH) (PS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS




Hopefully, the Model Rules will be amended to provide
more specific coverage about inappropriate digital communica-
tion during testimony, but in the meantime, this temptation
must be addressed in bar association standards. One option is
to provide:
During depositions and testimony, lawyers should not ob-
struct the interrogator or object to questions unless reasona-
bly intended to preserve an objection or protect a privilege for
resolution by the court. "Speaking objections" designed to
coach a witness are impermissible. This includes using tech-
nology to send any communication to, or receive any from, a
witness, lawyer, or other participant. During depositions or
conferences, lawyers shall engage only in conduct that would
be appropriate in full sight of a judge.
G. Rules 3.5 and 4.2: Ex Parte Communications
Model Rules 3.5(a) and (b) prohibit ex parte communica-
tion with "a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by
means prohibited by law" and "with such a person during the
proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court order."325
Model Rule 4.2 prohibits communicating directly with anyone
represented by counsel. 326 Recently, a district attorney was
subject to disciplinary proceedings for texting with judges
about pending cases without informing defense counsel and
failing, during a subsequent investigation, to correct the
judge's assertion that he had not exchanged texts with her,
even though he had sent her eighty-nine texts over a period of
six months.3 27 Would a prosecutor and a judge have engaged
in formal written communication without informing other par-
ties? That seems less likely, but given the ease and ubiquity of
digital communications, lawyers may fail to register the signifi-
cance of texts although the ethical result is the same.
Not all improper electronic communications are so obvious
as emails. Some lawyers may intentionally use electronic
means to send "hints" and "thoughts" to persons covered by
these Rules. Because of the increased risks and subtleties of
electronic messaging, intentional and unintentional communi-
cation by social media must be directly confronted, defined,
325 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr r. 3.5(a)-(b) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2017).
326 Id. r. 4.2.
327 Debra Cassens Weiss, Penn State Frat Prosecutor Faces Ethics Hearing over
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and prohibited rather than relying on lawyers to register how
such behavior might fit under Model Rules 3.5 and 4.2.
Recognizing the ease with which a lawyer can communi-
cate with a juror online, the New York City Bar Association has
urged lawyers to use extreme caution when researching jurors
in the course of a trial. 3 2 8 Its formal opinion warned,
"[Researching jurors mid-trial is not without risk. For in-
stance, while an inadvertent communication with a venire
member may result in an embarrassing revelation to a court
and a disqualified panelist, a communication with a juror dur-
ing trial can cause a mistrial." 329 Several professionalism
creeds include language addressing the prohibition on ex parte
communications, but none implicate the heretofore impossible
ways that a simple online click could constitute a communica-
tion.33 0 An affirmative attempt to engage in ex parte communi-
cations about a case through use of social media is clearly
inappropriate, even if the facts and identities are veiled.
The ways in which messages can be communicated elec-
tronically are so varied, I discuss several of them specifically.
1. Friending
The subject of friending for purposes of research on par-
ties, jurors, and witnesses is discussed in detail above in sub-
part III.E. In addition to the problems described in that
subpart, using the various techniques of social media associa-
tions also risks violating the rules governing ex parte
communications.
Sending a connection/access invitation (such as a "friend
request" on Facebook) is widely regarded as a communication,
even though it is simply a click of the mouse and no words are
exchanged. The ABA's Formal Opinion 466 states that, for
purposes of Model Rule 3.5, a lawyer may review a juror's or
potential juror's public postings but should not send a request
for access to private sites, directly or indirectly.33 1 This applies
to lawyers and to anyone acting on their behalf.332 The ABA
offers an analogy for explanation:
328 N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Profl Ethics, Formal Op. 2012-02, at 9 (2012).
329 Id.
330 See, e.g., UTAH STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM & CIVILITY r. 11 (2014)
("[Llawyers shall avoid impermissible ex parte communications"). Fourteen states
mention this in their standards, in addition to it being a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct. Preston & Lawrence, supra note 11, at 720 tbl.6.
331 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, supra note 32, at 4.
332 Id.
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This would be the type of ex parte communication prohibited
by Model Rule 3.5(b). This would be akin to driving down the
juror's street, stopping the car, getting out, and asking the
juror for permission to look inside the juror's house because
the lawyer cannot see enough when just driving past.3 3 3
A New Hampshire Bar formal opinion reminds us that attempt-
ing to communicate, no matter how subtly, with a witness in
the same matter involving a lawyer's client is also an improper
ex parte communication that implicates Model Rule 4.2.334
2. Follower Notifications
Some sites, such as Linkedln, send a notification to users
when a third party views their profile.33 5 This is relevant when
a lawyer is researching a juror, represented party, or judge.
Ethics opinions are split on whether this constitutes a commu-
nication.3 3 6 In a formal opinion, the ABA states that since the
automatic notification is generated by the website, it "is akin to
a neighbor's recognizing a lawyer's car driving down the juror's
street and telling the juror that the lawyer had been seen driv-
ing down the street."33 7 The lawyer's actions may seem inva-
sive, discourage jury service, and suggest a threat. The New
York City Bar Association adopted a broad definition of the
333 Id. (footnote omitted).
334 N.H. Bar Ass'n, Op. 2012-13/05, at 3 (2012) ("If the witness is represented
by a lawyer with regard to the same matter in which the lawyer represents the
client, the lawyer may not communicate with the witness except as provided in
Rule 4.2.").
335 However, the individual attorney can adjust his or her settings on LinkedIn
to tailor what the user sees about the lawyer. See Who's Viewed Your Profile -
Privacy Settings, LINKEDIN, https://help.llnkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a id/
47992/ft/eng [https://perma.cc/H2CW-IAYG (last visited Sept. 3, 2015). There
are three options:
Your name and headline (Recommended).
Anonymous profile characteristics such as industry and title.
You will be totally anonymous.
What Others See When You've Viewed Their Profile, LINKEDIN, http://www.linked
in.com (last visited Sept. 3, 2015).
If an attorney chooses one of the latter two options, however, the "Profile
Stats" feature (which allows users to tell who has viewed their profile) will be
disabled for the attorney's account. Id. Essentially, if attorneys do not want that
notification to the third party to contain any information about them, then they
have to be willing to disable the setting that allows them to see who has been
viewing their profile. In the ABA Techreport 2016, "76% of respondents report
that they individually use or maintain a presence in one or more social networks
for professional purposes. This number has also remained relatively steady since
2013." Shields, supra note 80. Obviously, in a profession that is so dependent
upon networking, disabling this feature on a personal account could be detrimen-
tal, and is therefore not a viable option.
336 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 466, at 5 (2014).
337 Id.
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word "communicate" and concluded that automatic notifica-
tions are a communication because "at a minimum, the re-
searcher imparted to the person being researched the
knowledge that he or she is being investigated."3 38 Of course,
researching opposing parties, the assigned judge, and a law-
yer's own clients is good practice.33 9 But attorneys must be
cautious about the implications of any notice generated by the
attorney that is conveyed to a third party.3 4 0
One way to determine whether an online action should
count as a prohibited "communication" is if the notification can
be construed as an intentional effort to send a "message," no
matter how subtle. 34 1 If this is the pertinent distinction, pas-
sively viewing a profile that automatically generates a notifica-
tion is not a communication, but actively requesting a friend
status is. Not all commentators make this distinction. But
lawyers deserve better guidance on what is appropriate.
3. Public Posts Intended as Messages
Even if there is no communication targeted at a specific
party, juror, judge, or witness, putting information out on the
internet still may lead to a communication that raises ethical
issues. A unique opportunity for public concern arises with
lawyers' online ability to communicate overt and covert
messages through online postings that are likely to reach par-
ties interested in a case. In some circumstances, tweeting falls
into the prohibition against public communications by a prose-
cutor,3 4 2 discussed above in subpart III.D, as well as the prohi-
bition on ex parte communications. In one example, a
prosecutor tweeted updates before, during, and after a trial. 3 4 3
On appeal, the defense argued that the verdict should be over-
turned because the prosecutor's tweets prejudiced the jury.3 4 4
338 N.Y.C. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, supra note 32, at 6.
339 See Eric P. Robinson, Virtual Voir Dire: The Law and Ethics ofInvestigating
Jurors Online, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADvOc. 597, 637-38 (2013) (warning that attorneys
should "be careful to ensure that their online research does not result in a com-
munication"). Some have even opined that it is "bordering on malpractice" not to
use the internet in jury selection. Carol J. Williams, Jury Duty? May Want to Edit
Online Profile; Trial Consultants Increasingly Use the Internet to Learn About Pro-
spective Jurors, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, at A6 (internal quotation omitted).
340 Robinson, supra note 339, at 637-38 (warning that attorneys should "be
careful to ensure that their online research does not result in a communication").
341 Id. at 638 (recommending that the rules may "need to be more flexible
regarding sites ... which automatically notify a user when someone looks at their
proffle, with no other action by the user viewing the information").
342 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(f) (AM. BAR AsS'N 2013).




The appellate court did not find prejudice but voiced concerns
that such actions could taint the jury:
[E]xtraneous statements on Twitter or other forms of social
media, particularly during the time frame of the trial, can
taint the jury and result in reversal of the verdict. We are
especially troubled by the timing of [the prosecutor]'s Twitter
posts, because broadcasting such statements immediately
before and during trial greatly magnifies the risk that a jury
will be tainted by undue extrajudicial influences.3 45
This example serves to show that a lawyer making indirect
communications may fail to assess the likelihood that online
communications will spread beyond their intended recipients.
Currently, much of a lawyer's correspondence is digital.346
As discussed above in Part II, one risk of digital information is
accidently forwarding an email, or "replying all," without realiz-
ing a judge, court official, witness, or party is on the recipient
list. Recall the example of a seasoned attorney who accidently
sent an email with negative comments about the court to the
chief judge.3 4 7 The judge treated the email as an improper ex
parte communication. 348
A more subtle violation would be posting a copy of corre-
spondence, or a summary of it, on a blog or social media site.
The digitized image or text can easily be viewed by, or shown to,
judges or members of the judge's staff. As we discuss below,
many lawyers and judges have connected on social media web-
sites. Even if the judge is not likely to see the post, the lawyer
may know that a friend or family member of the judge may see
the post and pass it on. Traditionally, this kind of indirect
communication would have required much more effort. A law-
yer would have to start a rumor or give a copy to someone she
believes will pass it on. Online, transmitting such information
to anyone and everyone is fast, simple, and can include exact
language. Many lawyers seriously underestimate how online
posts and emails can be spread to potentially wide audiences.
On the other hand, some lawyers may be fully aware of these
patterns and intend to send a message to the judge through
indirect means.
345 Id. at 695-96. Even though the court saw potential for harm with this
behavior, it did not overturn the verdict because there was no evidence that the
jury had been biased. See id. at 696.
346 LEGAL TEcHNOLOGY SURVEY REPORT, supra note 1, at 62.
347 Patrice, supra note 110.
348 Id.
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For example, after the Supreme Court's decision in Ken-
nedy v. Louisiana,3 4 9 a legal blogger found an error in the
Court's opinion.35 0 An attorney saw the blog post and men-
tioned it to his wife, a New York Times reporter, who then wrote
a front-page story about the Court's mistake.35 1 This eventu-
ally led to the court issuing an amended opinion, even though
the outcome of the case was the same. 3 5 2 Although in this
instance the blogger was an attorney that was not representing
either party in the case, it is not far-fetched to imagine a scena-
rio where counsel for one of the parties posts something online
about an ongoing case in hopes that the content gets back to
the court. In high-profile Supreme Court litigation, this possi-
bility is not too remote. SCOTUSblog, a popular Supreme
Court blog, was accessed "over a hundred" times in one day
from an IP address registered to the Court.35 3 This suggests
that members of the Court or their staff are receiving the infor-
mation included on the blog. Clearly, "the line between talking
about the Court and talking to the Court" becomes blurred at
times.3 54
A standard can warn of the risks of ex parte communications:
Lawyers should be aware that communicating using digi-
tal mediums increases the risk of ex parte communica-
tions by inadvertently or intentionally sending a message
or a copy of a correspondence to a judge or judicial staff
through an indirect route online.
When conducting informal fact research online, law-
yers should not do anything that might be interpreted as
sending a message or ex parte communication to judges,
jurors, identified witnesses, or represented parties. This
includes a request to connect, "friending," and other non-
verbal actions that send a message to the recipient. It is
always permissible to view publicly available information
online. Since any online post has a potential of reaching
unintended recipients, once a jury has been selected,
349 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
350 See Rachel C. Lee, Note, Ex Parte Blogging: The Legal Ethics of Supreme
Court Advocacy in the Internet Era, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1535, 1537-38 (2009).
351 See id. at 1538.
352 See id. at 1539-40.
353 Id. at 1542 ("Of course, these visits could be from court personnel other
than the Justices and their clerks, and some of the visits could be merely to
peruse the court calendar or read coverage of a recently released decision. But a
steady visitor to the site will be exposed to lists of cert petitions to watch, discus-
sions of the filed briefs in various cases, and recaps of oral arguments, along with
links to news stories or other blogs with similar material-all touching on the
merits of pending litigation.").
354 Id. at 1541 (emphasis added).
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lawyers should avoid posts, tweets, and social media
messages with content relevant to the case.
H. Rule 5.5: Unauthorized Practice of Law
Model Rule 5.5(a) includes: "A lawyer shall not practice law
in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profes-
sion in that jurisdiction ... ."35 Comment 4 adds, "Presence
may be systematic and continuous even if the lawyer is not
present [in the jurisdiction]."35 6 A looming risk that accompa-
nies the wonder of a webpage presence is the unauthorized
practice of law. Related risks are misleading information about
a lawyer's services, discussed in subpart III.I, and violation of
advertising regulations, discussed in subpart III.J. This sub-
part focuses on when a web presence constitutes practice in
jurisdictions where the lawyer is not licensed. While the treat-
ment of unauthorized practice is clear under the Model Rules,
what virtual activities constitute the practice of law is enor-
mously confusing. Lawyers need clear guidelines.
Any offer of legal advice online raises the risk of unautho-
rized practice.3 57 Webpages and online form services may con-
stitute the practice of law in certain circumstances. Although
this problem may seem obvious to some lawyers, other lawyers
who set up webpages with legal information as a public service
or as an inducement to attract clients seem to forget that a
webpage reaches potentially every jurisdiction in the world.
This issue becomes significantly more troubling when either
the lawyer intends to attract non-residents or, when that is not
the intent, the webpage is interactive and the host should have
realized that an out-of-jurisdiction visitor to the website would
rely on the posted information. For example, an appellate
court in Indiana stated that attorneys consent "to the estab-
lishment of an attorney-client relationship if there is proof of
detrimental reliance, when the person seeking legal services
reasonably relies on the attorney to provide them and the attor-
ney, aware of such reliance, does nothing to negate it."3 5 8
This hypothetical situation demonstrates the problem of
giving advice online. When an Idaho resident felt his rights had
been violated by the police, he turned to the internet for an
355 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 5.5(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2014).
356 Id. at cmt. 4.
357 Geraghty & Michmerhuizen, supra note 224, at 571-72.
358 Hacker v. Holland, 570 N.E.2d 951, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting
Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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answer regarding how long he would have to bring a lawsuit in
his jurisdiction.3 59 The answer was provided by a lawyer in
Wyoming who told the Idahoan that he had one year to bring
suit, which would have been accurate if the man lived in Wyo-
ming instead of Idaho.360 However, when the man tried to
bring his suit nine months later, he unpleasantly found out
that the online advice he received was inaccurate for his juris-
diction, and that in Idaho he only had 180 days to bring his
claim.3 61
The lawyer in this hypothetical could and should have been
more careful to identify the jurisdiction of the person to whom
he or she was giving legal advice, rather than assume that the
person was in the Wyoming jurisdiction. Furthermore, the law-
yer in the hypothetical may not have even realized that a law-
yer-client relationship can arise regardless of the residence of
the questioner. If a lawyer's statement regarding the statute of
limitations had not been given in response to a question, it may
still have created problems. Lawyers who give specific state-
ments of law on a webpage may be inducing reliance and thus
creating an attorney-client relationship and, if it is online and
the applicable jurisdiction is not specified, the advice could be
false and be malpractice.
This caution describes well the risks of creating a lawyer
and client relationship online:
Lawyers should be cautious not to create an unintended at-
torney-client cyber relationship. Having a conversation via
social media and offering legal advice in that manner is one
way that this could happen. To the extent that social media
involves two-way communication, the possibility exists that a
lawyer might unintentionally form an attorney-client rela-
tionship through social media. Lawyers accordingly should
avoid creating an impression that they are providing legal
services with their social media when they do not intend to do
so. Although lawyers may give legal information to members
of the public, such information can be transformed into legal
advice if the lawyer applies analysis of the law to the particu-
lar facts of an individual's situation.
Having a conversation on social media might accidentally
trap an attorney into being deemed to have provided legal
advice to someone he did not think was his client. If an
359 This hypothetical is from Kristine M. Moriarty, Comment, Law Practice and
the Internet: The Ethical Implications that Arise from Multjurlsdictional Online Le-





individual reasonably believes that a lawyer has undertaken
representation, the lawyer can be liable for negligence in pro-
viding the legal service and be subject to disciplinary
action.3 6 2
Model Rule 8.5(b)(2) offers a safe harbor to mitigate the
scope of the risk: "A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if
the lawyer's conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in
which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of
the lawyer's conduct will occur."3 63 The D.C. ethics opinion
however is quick to note that this model rule has not been
adopted in every state, thus the caution for lawyers to do their
due diligence in familiarizing themselves with surrounding ju-
risdictions' rules. 3 6
To address this issue, the ABA Commission 20/20 pro-
posed the following amendment to the Model Rules 5.5
Comments:
For example, a lawyer may direct electronic or other forms of
communications to potential clients in this jurisdiction and
consequently establish a substantial practice representing
clients in this jurisdiction, but without a physical presence
here. At some point, such a virtual presence in this jurisdic-
tion may become systematic and continuous within the
meaning of Rule 5.5(b)(1). 3 6 5
Unfortunately, this language was not adopted, apparently be-
cause of the fear that it would "chill cross-border practice."366
This risk is serious even if the ABA chooses not to warn lawyers
about it.
The problem is that webpages with legal advice are sprout-
ing like mushrooms and attorneys are left without warning of
the risks of creating a virtual presence in all the jurisdictions
serviced by a webpage. Because practitioners with virtual of-
fices can offer complete legal services, the foundational ques-
tion arises of why licenses are required for having a physical
office in a state.3 6 7 The ABA and bar associations cannot con-
tinue to ignore these issues.
362 Thomas Roe Frazer II, Social Media: From Discovery to Marketing-A Primer
for Lawyers, 36 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 539, 564-65 (2013) (citations omitted).
363 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT r. 8.5(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2014).
364 D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 370, at 5 (2016).
365 Initial Resolution by ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20-20 on Model Rule
5.5(d) (3)/Continuous and Systematic Presence, at 2-3 (Sept. 7, 2011).
366 Comments from N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Standards ofAtt'y Conduct
on Ethics 20/20 Draft Reports Dated September 7, 2011, at 3 (Nov. 21, 2011).
367 See Stephen Gillers, How to Make Rules for Lawyers: The Professional
Responsibility of the Legal Profession, 40 PEPP. L. REv. 365, 413-14 (2013).
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Cases finding the unauthorized practice of law in an online
context have already arisen. A California court acknowledged
these issues when it held that "an out-of-state lawyer's use of
[electronic communications] could constitute unauthorized
practice of law."3 68 Other courts have also addressed virtual
practice problems. A recent example is In re Brandes, where a
New York appeals court held that a disbarred lawyer who pro-
vided service over the internet involving legal advice and con-
tracting to draft briefs was engaged in unauthorized practice of
law.3 6 9 The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that an operator
of a website selling presentations on eviction law engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.3 7 0 Although the website operator
in this case was not a lawyer, a licensed attorney offering simi-
lar services online could be deemed practicing in each jurisdic-
tion where customers reside. A bankruptcy court in Montana
ruled that the operator of an internet website through which
debtors were advised of available exemptions and the site solic-
ited information from debtors was engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.3 71 In an unpublished opinion, the North Caro-
lina Superior Court found that statements on a website in-
cluded with a lien filing service constituted providing legal
advice.3 72
In another example, the principal office of Low Cost Parale-
gal Services was in Texas, but its services were offered online to
takers from other states. 373 The Rhode Island Unauthorized
Practice of Law Committee found that the operators of the
webpage were engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, a
finding affirmed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.3 74 The
court further recommended that its order be turned over to the
attorney generals of Rhode Island and Texas, the North Caro-
lina State Bar Association, and the federal agency with juris-
diction over internet-based fraud.3 7 5
368 Steven C. Bennett, Ethics ofLawyer Social Networking, 73 ALB. L. REV. 113,
128 (2009).
369 See In re Brandes, 65 N.E.3d 678, 679 (N.Y. 2016).
370 See State ex reL Comm'n on Unauthorized Practice of Law v. Hansen, 834
N.W.2d 793, 798-99 (Neb. 2013).
371 See In re Bagley, 433 B.R 325, 333, 335 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2010).
372 See N.C. State Bar v. Lienguard, Inc., No.11 CVS 7288, 2014 WL 1365418,
at *11-13 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 4, 2014).
373 See In re Low Cost Paralegal Servs., 19 A.3d 1229, 1229-30 (R.I. 2011).
374 Id.
375 Id. at 1230.
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The most notable case involved the legal forms offered by
LegalZoom.com, Inc.3 7 6 After various law suits and appeals, a
district court in Missouri held that the legal document prepara-
tion service on its website constituted the unauthorized prac-
tice of law.3 7 7 Some of the cases were settled and others were
dismissed based on the settlement.37 8 In any event, lawyers
with an online presence must carefully study which statements
made and services offered constitute providing legal services
and thus give rise to unauthorized practice claims in states
where a lawyer is unlicensed.
The language of some state ethics rules can be interpreted
to address virtual offices, but the results are inconsistent.3 7 9
For instance, Colorado allows lawyers from other jurisdictions
to practice Colorado law, as long as they do not have a "domi-
cile" or "a place for the regular practice of law" in the state.3 80
In Virginia, out-of-state lawyers can have an office in Virginia
without a Virginia license as long as they do not practice Vir-
ginia law.38 ' This language seems to suggest that a virtual
office may create the "systematic and continuous presence" for
the practice of Virginia law even without any physical pres-
ence. 3 8 2 These regulatory positions were not written to specifi-
cally cover online legal services and are inadequate to give
lawyers sufficient notice on the extent to which an online pres-
ence is considered the practice of law within a state.
Other unauthorized practice-of-law issues arise when
software designed to assist in legal matters is offered for sale
online. Of course, nonlawyers who make these forms available
or who use them may be engaged in unauthorized practice.3 83
376 For more discussion of the various law suits involving LegalZoom and
similar webpages, see Raymond H. Brescia et al., Embracing Disruption: How
Technological Change in The Delivery of Legal Services Can Improve Access to
Justice, 78 ALB. L. REv. 553, 583-85 (2014).
377 Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1064-65 (W.D. Mo.
2011).
378 Webster v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., B240129, 2014 WL 4908639 (Cal. Ct.
App. Oct. 1, 2014). The North Carolina court granted full faith and credit to the
Webster settlement to terminate the LegalZoom case in its jurisdiction. Bergen-
stock v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., No. 13 CVS 15686, 2015 WL 2345453, at *10 (N.C.
Super. May 15, 2015).
379 See Stephen Gillers, A Profession, If You Can Keep It: How Information
Technology and Fading Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace and What We
Should Do About It, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 953, 1010-11 (2012).
380 COLO. R. Civ. P. 205.1(1).
381 VA. ST. BAR RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT r. 5.5 cmt. 4 (2016).
382 Gillers, supra note 367, at 414 n.237.
383 An exception to the general rule exists in Texas. Texas took action to
protect programmers of legal-use software, at least those who use conspicuous
disclaimers, after a Texas court found software developers, whose program was
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The users of legal forms generated by software are also at
risk.38 4 Some commentators suggest all these problems can be
avoided with a disclosure.38 5 A disclosure may be sufficient to
warn a nonlawyer that general statements of the status of the
law or the existence of a variety of legal options does not create
an attorney-client relationship and such generalized state-
ments should not be relied upon. It is far more difficult to
argue that the offering of a form with specific legal language for
specific purposes can be protected by a disclaimer. Action that
contradicts the terms of the disclaimer invalidates the dis-
claimer. In addition, if the operator of such a website responds
to a question or request from a nonlawyer, the disclaimer pro-
vides no protection. It is not the potential client's job to self-
screen based on a disclosure. Another option might be screen-
ing questions by asking the poster's residence, but if the
webpage itself contains advice without further interaction,
screening is not a viable option.
The bigger problem, for purposes of this Article, is not non-
lawyer programmers or users. It is the involvement of lawyers
in drafting the forms, assisting in the creation of the software,
and making a profit on the sale of the forms. They risk the
creation of an attorney-client relationship in every state, since
the webpage will be available to all, and can be sued for mal-
practice. Again, disclaimers are a good idea to aid in the pre-
sold to help with family law disputes, to be engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956,
956 (5th Cir. 1999). Most states do not protect those who sell forms. Further,
since a downloadable program can typically be obtained by residents of every
state, even a Texas programmer is at risk in the forty-nine other states.
384 For example, an insurance agent used legal-based software to generate a
fill-in-the-blank form which he then filled out to help his elderly neighbor make a
will. Franklin v. Chavis, 640 S.E.2d 873, 875-76 (S.C. 2007). After the elderly
neighbor's death, her family sued Chavis for "engag[ing] in the unauthorized
practice of law." Id. at 875. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that Chavis
had engaged in the unauthorized practice. Id. at 876. "Even the preparation of
standard forms that require no creative drafting may constitute the practice of law
if one acts as more than a mere scrivener." Id.; see also Mathew Rotenberg, Note,
Stifled Justice: The Unauthorized Practice of Law and Internet Legal Resources, 97
MINN. L. REv. 709 (2012).
385 See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 368, at 127 ("A lawyer may use disclaimers to
reduce problems involving unauthorized practice of law ... [stating] the state (or
states) in which the attorney is admitted. Attorneys may take the additional step
of asking potential clients about their residence before answering any questions
or sending any messages." (footnote omitted)); Jordana Hausman, Who's Afraid of
the Virtual Lawyers? The Role of Legal Ethics in the Growth and Regulation of
Virtual Law Offices, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 575, 587-89 (2012); Stephanie L.
Kimbro, The Law Office of the Near Future: Practical and Ethical Considerations for
Virtual Practice, 83 N.Y. ST. B.J. 28, 30-31 (2011).
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vention of inappropriate attorney-client relationships.3 8 6
Disclaimers must be conspicuous, easily understood, properly
placed, and not misleading.3 8 7 A D.C. Bar ethics opinion puts
disclaimers in context when it "reiterate[s] 'that even the use of
a disclaimer may not prevent the formation of an attorney-
client relationship if the parties' subsequent conduct is incon-
sistent with the disclaimer.'"3 8 8
A professionalism creed should include the following:
Lawyers must recognize that a web presence is open to
residents of other jurisdictions. Attorneys making spe-
cific statements of the law applicable to certain facts or
answering questions online may create an attorney-cli-
ent relationship. A lawyer giving legal advice or selling
software to generate legal forms online must be licensed
in all applicable states or undertake measures to screen
potential clients' residences. Lawyers must always as-
certain the location of people with whom they electroni-
cally communicate before giving any legal advice via any
electronic medium.
I. Rule 7.1: Misleading Information about a Lawyer's
Services
Model Rule 7.1 states: "A lawyer shall not make a false or
misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's
services." 3 9 This restriction is related to, and overlaps some
with, Rules 7.2 and 7.3, discussed in the next subpart, which
directly addresses lawyer advertising, as well as Model Rule
8.4(e), discussed in subpart III.L, which addresses improper
implications of influence.
Lawyers have historically used various mechanisms to
mislead others about the nature or quality of their services.
The internet has introduced ample additional cheap and easy
opportunities for lawyers to make misleading assertions about
themselves in a context that may or may not qualify as adver-
tising. A New Jersey lawyer posted excerpts from court opin-
ions that complimented his work.39 0 After a judge asked that
386 See Bennett, supra note 368, at 123; Kimbro, supra note 385, at 31.
387 See Browne-Barbour, supra note 184, at 572 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics
& Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 10-457, at 1-5 (2010)).
388 D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 370, supra note 33, at 2.
389 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT r. 7.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013).
390 David L. Hudson Jr., Federal District Court Cautions Lawyers to Be Careful
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his comment be taken down, the judge referred the matter to
the New Jersey Committee on Attorney Advertising.3 9 1 The
Committee subsequently issued a guideline forbidding the use
of "a quotation or excerpt from a court opinion (oral or written)
about the attorney's abilities or legal services," commenting
that such statements are misleading.3 9 2 Such conduct could
also fall under Model Rule 8.4(e) by suggesting that this lawyer
can exercise improper influence over the quoted judge.
A recent D.C. Bar ethics opinion cautions lawyers to be
careful in their social media posts regarding results of cases
and information on clients "because [internet-based publica-
tions such as social media] have the capacity to mislead by
creating the unjustified expectation that similar results can be
obtained for others."393
One of the predominant features of the internet is the myr-
iad of ways to collect and display rankings, reviews, and other
kinds of feedback. Many businesses and professionals, includ-
ing lawyers, have hired companies that specialize in writing
and posting fake online reviews of their services.394 Fake re-
views can be positive reviews that put one's own services or
firm in a good light, or they can be negative reviews intended to
undercut other lawyers or retaliate against a judge.
Another infamous example involves a review posted by the
CEO of a Fortune 500 company, Whole Foods Market.3 95 He
used a fictional identity for eight years on message boards to
praise his brand and disparage competitors.3 9 6 Lawyers with
enough ego may well try the same scheme. For example, one
small San Diego firm found itself embroiled in a suit with Yelp
after allegedly soliciting fake reviews.3 97 Another concern is
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 370, at 3 (2016).
394 Dominic Rushe, Fake Online Reviews Crackdown in New York Sees 19
Companies Fined, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2013, 2:42 PM), http://www.theguardian
.com/world/2013/sep/23/new-york-fake-online-reviews-yoghurt?commentpage
=1 [https://perma.cc/5HS7-CKT].
395 See Sockpuppet (Internet), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Sockpuppet_%28Internet0/29 [https://perma.cc/3A65-5KX9].
396 See id.
397 Brian Focht, Astroturflng: Fake Online Reviews Are Bad News for Law
Firmsl, A.B.A. (Oct. 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/pub-
lishing/rpte-ereport/2013/5_october/astroturfing.authcheckdam.pdf [https://
perma.cc/U7J4-USDW]. Eventually, this case settled. Cyrus Farivar, Yelp Settles
Suit with Bankruptcy Lawyer over Allegations of Fake Reviews, ARTEECHNICA (Oct.





lawyers who pay real clients to write positive reviews for them
on Google or other websites. Failing to state that the reviewers
are paid or receive other forms of compensation is itself mis-
leading. Pressuring ongoing clients to write positive reviews
may be perceived as a condition of continued representation,
and such reviews are not voluntary and thus their content is
misleading.
As discussed in the next subpart, each jurisdiction may
have slightly different rules about lawyer advertising that im-
plicate testimonials. Some states do not allow testimonials or
online reviews at all, which can cause problems for lawyers
who use LinkedIn.3 98 Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional
Conduct 7.02(4) "prohibits comparisons to other lawyers' ser-
vices, unless substantiated by verifiable objective data."399 A
client writing a review on a lawyer's page that says a particular
lawyer is "the best trial lawyer in town" would be a violation of
the rules because it is a prohibited comparison. 4 00
One unusual twist arose in a recent case involving a Call-
fornia lawyer who posted on her webpage photoshopped pic-
tures of herself and various important politicians and
celebrities including Barack Obama, Arnold Schwarzenegger,
and Ellen DeGeneres. 40 1 The disciplinary body treated these
photos as a method of making herself seem more important
and connected than she really is. 4 0 2 Similarly, such photos
could suggest that she has improper influence with powerful
government actors and may be willing to use that influence on
behalf of a client.403
Standards could include a provision that looks like this:
Lawyers should be wary of quoting out of content ex-
cerpts from court opinions that mention the quality or
nature of a lawyer's services since such statements may
398 Smith, supra note 56, at 7.
399 Id.
400 Id.
401 Paul Vercammen, California Attorney Facing Suspension for Fake Photos




403 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT r. 8.4(e) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013) ("It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... state or imply an ability to influence
improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. . . ."). A more interesting
question involves the lawyer who has authentic pictures of herself with various
famous and powerful people, including judges. And consider the lawyer who
includes on her Facebook page a picture of her and the judge for whom she
clerked in a friendly embrace.
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be misleading. Further, lawyers may not pay for online
reviews or pressure clients to write reviews during an
ongoing representation. Lawyers may never misrepre-
sent their identities or write reviews of their own services
online as such conduct is clearly misleading. Finally,
lawyers should never use technology to misrepresent
their legal services, their influence in the community, or
their reputation.
J. Rules 7.2 and 7.3: Restrictions on and Requirements of
Advertising
Rules 7.2 and 7.3 on advertising and solicitation of clients
have been amended to refer to "electronic communication"
along with other written and recorded communication. 4 0 4 Rule
7.3 refers to "real-time electronic contact" along with in-person
and telephone contact.4 0 5 Although lawyers may advertise
through any kind of medium, Rule 7.2 provides in pertinent
part that, "Any communication made pursuant to this Rule
shall include the name and office address of at least one lawyer
or law firm responsible for its content." 406 Lawyers wanting to
garner clients will most likely display their name. Whereas
office letterhead typically displays an address, social media
posts or other forms of electronic communications are less
likely to display an office address. Presumably, a URL or Twit-
ter moniker is not enough.
The most obvious problem with the advertisement regula-
tions arises with online communications that the lawyer does
not recognize are "advertisements." The D.C. Bar warns that
"any social media presence, even a personal page, could be
considered advertising or marketing . . ."407
The California Bar issued a formal opinion stating under
what circumstances an attorney's postings on social media
websites would be subject to professional responsibility rules
and standards governing attorney advertising. 4 0 s For example,
in some states, creating a Linkedln profile with testimonials is
404 Id. rr. 7.2, 7.3.
405 Id. r. 7.3.
406 Id. r. 7.2(c).
407 D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 370, supra note 33, at 1.
408 Calif. Bar Stand. Comm. on Profl Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op.
No. 2012-186, at 4-6 (2012) (listing, through hypotheticals, the circumstances
when a lawyer's blog post falls within the ethics rules covering advertising and
state fair advertising laws).
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a violation of advertising rules. 409 Similarly, talking about case
results on 'witter out of context may be deemed as soliciting
clients. 4 10 Webpages and blogs, like newsletters, largely con-
sisting of "mundane advice" but including information on the
lawyer's practice areas and contact information are
advertisements. 4 1 1
An interesting issue was raised by a firm that gave out free
t-shirts with the firm logo and offered entry in a drawing for a
prize to anyone who posted a picture on Facebook of them-
selves wearing the firm's t-shirt. 4 1 2 The ABA Commission de-
termined that such a promotion pushed the lines of advertising
and might violate existing ethics rules.4 13 One enterprising
firm posted advertisements for their law services on the bulle-
tin boards of thousands of online news groups.4 1 4 People in
140 different countries, some of which had laws prohibiting
advertising by lawyers, viewed the advertisement.4 15 What
seemed like an enterprising idea was not carefully considered.
For intentional advertising, lawyers should make certain
that their social media advertisements comply with all applica-
ble state rules.4 16 Some states may require keeping a copy of
all social media posts for three years,4 17 or giving the name and
office address of the responsible lawyer or firm in the post
itself.4 1 8 In Connecticut, "even a simple LinkedIn invitation to
another user that links to a lawyer's personal page describing
his practice may be an advertisement subject to regulation." 41 9




411 See Debra Cassens Weiss, A $4.2M Mistake? Lawyer Is Liable for Faxing
'Mundane Advice' to Accountants, 7th Circuit Says, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 16, 2013,
10:30 AM), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/a_4.2m mistake_1awyer
is_liable forfaxing-mundane advice toaccountants [https://perma.cc/HYB8-
2442].
412 Lackey& Minta, supra note 136, at 160-61.
413 Id.
414 J. T. Westermeter, Ethics and the Internet, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 267,
291-92, 309(2004).
415 Id. at 309.
416 Lackey & Minta, supra note 136, at 158.
417 Id. at 158 n.57 (citing Ariz. Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Infor-
mal Op. 97-04 (1997)).
418 Id. at 159 n.59 (citing WASHINGTON RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT r. 7.2(c) (2006)).
419 Id. at 158 n.58 (citing Martin Whittaker, Internet Advertising Isn't Exempt
from Rules, Speakers Make Clear in Separate Programs, 24 LAW MANUAL ON PROF.
CONDUCT 444, 444-45 (2008)); see also Mason Gordon & Alex Derstenfeld, The
LinkedIn Lawyers: The Impact of Article 145 of the Code of Professional Conduct of
Lawyers on Social Media Use, LEXOLOGY (July 19, 2016), http://
www.lexology.com/library/detal.aspx?g=5b784395-9 1b3-4274-a964-
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A New York ethics opinion forbids law firms from listing their
services under the "specialties" section of LinkedIn, because
under New York ethics rules, lawyers, but not law firms, can be
certified as specialists. 420 The D.C. Bar warns that lawyers
should familiarize themselves with the ethical rules for social
media and online resources not just in D.C., but also in the
surrounding jurisdictions because some jurisdictions, such as
Maryland and Virginia, have rules that allow for the discipline
of lawyers that are not even admitted in their jurisdictions. 4 2 1
A standards provision might look like this:
At a minimum, lawyers need to ensure that intentional
advertisements comply with local laws and rules. Law-
yers should be aware that the advent of digital advertis-
ing allows them to advertise beyond state lines. As such,
lawyers should be prepared to comply with regulations in
other states to which they may be subject.
K. Rule 8.2: Disparaging Judicial and Legal Officials
Rule 8.2 provides:
A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to
be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudi-
catory officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for
election or appointment to judicial or legal office. 4 2 2
A famous example illustrating the need for this rule in-
volves a lawyer speaking on a talk show-although the same
communication could just as easily have been made online.
The lawyer "declare[d] war" on three court of appeals judges
calling them "jackass[es]" and compared them to Adolf Hitler
and other Nazis.42 3 Another lawyer on his blog called a partic-
ular judge an "evil, unfair witch," who "is clearly unfit for her
a587dc34807e [https://perma.cc/G7BY-DWMC] (noting that multiple authors
have argued that Linkedln constitutes an advertising platform).
420 Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Firms Can't Describe 'Specialties' on LinkedIn,
New York Ethics Opinion Says, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 16, 2013, 4:25 PM), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/law ,
firmscantdescribe-specialties on linkedin-new-york ethicsopinion-say
[https://perma.ce/6GM9-FYLQ]; accord D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 370, supra
note 33, at 5 (noting that although "Jurisdictions, like New York, do not permit
lawyers to identify themselves as 'specialists' unless they have been certified as
such by an appropriate organization[,] [tihey are ... permitted to detail their skills
and experience").
421 D.C. Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 370, supra note 33, at 1.
422 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
423 Grievance Adm'r v. Fieger, 719 N.W.2d 123, 129 (Mich. 2006).
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position and knows not what it means to be a neutral arbi-
ter." 4 2 4 These are obvious violations.
Aside from a lack of civility, such comments erode public
confidence in the legal system and profession. First, most
readers may well believe that at least some toned-down version
of the allegations is factual. Second, many readers could per-
ceive the legal system as an ugly joke rather than a serious
place to resolve disputes. Although lawyers are free to criticize
judicial opinions in public, such criticisms should be profes-
sional and not personal. In recent years, the climate of public
discourse has so coarsened that public criticism of judges'
competency and neutrality has taken center stage.4 25
Language in a bar association's standards might look like
this:
Lawyers may openly criticize judicial opinions. However,
such criticisms should always be professional and never a
personal attack on the person or the competence and bias of
the judge. Such criticisms damage the credibility of the law-
yer and bring the profession into disrepute. If the behavior of
a judge is subject to dispute, lawyers should refer the matter
to the appropriate regulating authority and avoid public
disclosure.
L. Rule 8.4: Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession
1. Rule 8.4(c): Fraud and Deception
Rule 8.4(c) offers a general statement advising lawyers to
avoid dishonesty in all its forms. It states: "It is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . ."426 As
discussed elsewhere, many types of technoblunders involve
misleading others. The remainder of Rule 8.4 addresses addi-
tional specifics.
424 Steven Seidenberg, Seduced: For Lawyers, the Appeal of Social Media Is
Obvious. It's Also Dangerous, 97 A.B.A. J., Feb. 2011, at 49, 50; see also John
Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules of the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2009, at Al.
425 For a discussion about President Trump's disparagement of judges and
Justice Antonin Scalia's biting and sometimes personal criticisms of his col-
leagues, as well as other social trends that lead to rude and uncivil language
within the profession, see Cheryl B. Preston, Professionalism in the Trump Era,
supra note 8.
426 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucT r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
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2. Rule 8.4(e): Improper Implication of Influence
Rule 8.4(e) provides: "It is professional misconduct for a
lawyer to . .. state or imply an ability to influence improperly a
government agency or official or to achieve results by means
that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other
law. . . ."427 This rule is directed to lawyers, but on occasion,
judges lure lawyers into violations because they are not careful
about their own behavior. This subpart focuses on lawyer-
judge interactions that may give the impression that the lawyer
has undue influence on the judge or that the judge is biased. It
discusses judges' friending and other social media relation-
ships involving judges. 4 2 8 Judicial conduct and technology has
received attention from the ABA. 4 2 9
Issues relating to lawyers' friending in the course of factual
research are discussed in subpart III.E. Friending as a form of
ex parte communications is discussed in subpart III.G. Issues
relating to advertising and friending are discussed in subpart
III.J.
A lawyer who is friends with or following a judge may use
that fact to create the appearance of improper communications
or relationships suggesting judicial bias.4 3 0 Such relationships
may create an impression that the judges favor such attorneys
or that the attorneys "are in a special position to influence the
judge."4 3 ' Such is why a Florida judge was disqualified in a
criminal case when it was discovered that the judge was
Facebook friends with the prosecutor. 432 However, in a recent
427 Id. r. 8.4(e).
428 For detailed discussions of judges' social media behavior, see John G.
Browning, Why Can't We Be Friends? Judges' Use of Social Media, 68 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 487 (2014), and David Hricik, Bringing a World of Light to Technology and
Judicial Ethics, 27 REGENT U. L. REv. 1 (2014).
429 See ABA Formal Op. 462, supra note 16, at 2 ("The judge should not form
relationships with persons or organizations that may violate Rule 2.4(c) by con-
veying an impression that these persons or organizations are in a position to
influence the judge.").
430 The ABA's Model Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[a] judge shall
act ... in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integ-
rity, and impartiality of the judiciary." MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDucT r. 1.2 (AM.
BAR ASS'N 2011).
431 Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Comm. Jud. Ethics, Opinion No. 2011-6, 2011 WL
7110317, at *3 (2011).
432 Domville v. State, 103 So. 3d 184, 185 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); see also
State v. Thomas, 376 P.3d 184, 198 (N.M. 2016) (cautioning against "friending"
that can be misconstrued and "create an appearance of impropriety"); Debra
Cassens Weiss, Judge Reprimanded for Friending Lawyer and Googling Litigant,
A.B.A. J. (June 1, 2009, 12:20 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
judge-reprimanded forfriendinglawyer-and-googling_1itigant/ [https://
perma.cc/8KSE-823J] (noting that a North Carolina judge was reprimanded for
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case, a Florida district court refused to disqualify a judge who
was Facebook friends with a lawyer representing a party and a
witness in the case, although it noted the earlier case in Florida
reaching a different conclusion. 433 The court stated that
Facebook friending does not necessarily signify a close
relationship.434
Attitudes differ on judges and friending.435 Most official
ethics opinions that address the issue do not condemn friend-
ing as per se improper.4 36 However, in a few states, ethics
opinions state that lawyer-judge friending is prohibited. 43 7
Whether or not judges should be allowed to friend lawyers, the
mere presence of an online friendship can produce a variety of
ethical problems.43 8 A Staten Island judge was transferred be-
cause he friended lawyers on Facebook, and the lawyers com-
"disregard[ing] the principles of judicial conduct" by "friending" a lawyer in a
pending case on Facebook, communicating about the case on Facebook, and
independently gathering information).
433 Law Offices of Herssein & Herssein v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 229 So. 3d
408 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017); see also Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Shouldn't Be
Booted from Case Because of Facebook Friendship with Lawyer, Appeals Court
Rules, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 25, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.abajoumal.com/news/
article/judge-shouldnt be booted fromcasebecauseoffacebookfriendship
with-lawy/ [https://perma.cc/LD43-XDAX].
434 Weiss, supra note 433.
435 See CHARLEs GARDNER GEYH ET AL., JuDIcIAL CoNDucT AND Emics § 10.05[6]
(Lexis Nexis, 5th ed. 2013). Compare Samuel Vincent Jones, Judges, Friends, and
Facebook: The Ethics of Prohibition, 24 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 281, 297 (2011)
("[Whenever a judge permits [a social medial user to be a 'friend,' the judge risks
violating this ethical standard because a potential consequence of [social media
'friending' is that the [social media] user could use the [social media] 'friendship'
with the judge to advance his or her personal or financial interest."), with Bill
Haltom, If You Are a Judge, You Better Get a Dog, 46 TENN. B.J., Feb. 2010, at 36
(offering a humorous rebuttal to the notion that "friending" between judges and
lawyers is unprofessional and damaging).
436 See Social Media and the Courts, NA'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http://
www.ncsc.org/Topics/Media/Social-Media-and-the-Courts/State-Links.aspx?
cat=judicial%2OEthics%2OAdvisory/o200pinions%20on%2Social%2OMedia
[https://perma.cc/NJ25-X38H] (listing and summarizing various states' advisory
opinions on judges and friending); see, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 462, supra note 16
("Because of the open and casual nature of [social media] communication, a judge
will seldom have an affirmative duty to disclose [a social media] connection."). For
another state's advisory opinion on this issue, see Ariz. Sup. Ct. Jud. Ethics
Advisory Comm., Advisory Op. 14-01, at 14 (2014).
437 Social Media and the Courts, supra note 436 (indicating that Florida, Mas-
sachusetts, and Oklahoma opinions state that judges may not friend attorneys
that may appear in their court; California, Kentucky, Maryland, New York, and
Ohio opinions state that judges may friend attorneys that may appear in their
court).
438 Jones, supra note 435, at 296-97.
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plained.439 A Florida judge was removed from a divorce case
because she friended one of the parties. 440 The litigant did not
accept the friend request, and she feared that this offended and
biased the judge against her. 4 4 1
In another example, a trial judge who sent a friend request
to one the parties in a divorce case was disqualified because
sending the request placed the party in the position of ac-
cepting the invitation and engaging in improper ex parte com-
munications or facing the reasonable fear that rejecting the
request would offend the judge. 442 Although these cases in-
volve judges, who are subject to separate ethical rules, the
rationales used in these cases may apply equally to a lawyer
who accepts a friend request or who sends them to other law-
yers or parties in the litigation.
Aside from friending, social media posts or other forms of
electronic advertising may run afoul of Model Rule 8.4(e) be-
cause lawyers post pictures of themselves with judges or quote
or restate praise given to them by a judge.4 43 One case that
reached the Federal Circuit involved a lawyer from a big firm
who circulated a praise-filled email received from a former chief
judge.44 4 After the lawyer-recipient forwarded the email widely
in connection with soliciting business,44 5 the lawyer was pub-
licly reprimanded, and the judge resigned. The court held:
While the dissemination of complimentary comments by a
judge contained in a public document would not itself consti-
tute a violation of Model Rule 8.4(e), we conclude respon-
dent's actions violated the rule. First, the email both
explicitly describes and implies a special relationship be-
tween respondent and then-Chief Judge Rader. The text of
the email describes a close friendship between the two.4 4 6
The lawyer may have had time to think in the process of retyp-
ing the words into an advertisement and mailing copies. But
the ease of forwarding an email was too tempting.




440 Stephanie Francis Ward, Judge Removed from Divorce Case After Sending




442 Chace v. Loisel, 170 So. 3d 802, 803-04 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
443 See, for example, supra text accompanying note 403.
444 In re Reines, 771 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
445 Id. at 1331.
446 Id. at 1330 (footnote omitted).
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A professionalism standard could include this language:
Lawyers should be very circumspect in requesting other law-
yers and judges to indicate relationships on social media that
may suggest any improper influence or potential lack of ob-
jectivity in resolving legal disputes even if the relationship
was initiated by the judge.
3. Rule 8.4(d) and Rule 8.4(g): Conduct Prejudicial to the
Administration of Justice
Rule 8.4(d) is the catchall many judges and disciplinary
councils use to punish a lawyer for bad behavior that is diffi-
cult to fit under one of the more specific Model Rules. It pro-
vides: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of jus-
tice . . . ."447 The Model Rules include a general statement
requiring respectfulness in Rule 8.4(g), but the issue of civil
discourse justifies more targeted attention.
a. Rude, Crude, and Inhumane Descriptions of
Participants in the Legal System
Lawyers are sometimes crude and brutal in traditional
written communications such as letters. This kind of language
is often expressly covered by stated professional standards.
The temptation to use disrespectful and vulgar language seems
to be heightened in the fast and informal context of electronic
communications. Even though mediums such as email invite
offhanded and uncensored explosions and vitriol, hopefully
lawyers can recognize that incivility in any communication to
opposing counsel is subject to professionalism constraints.
Examples abound. For instance, a lawyer in Ohio sent e-mails
to the opposing party's older brother, insulting and demeaning
the entire family's gene pool and calling the opposing party, a
pro se litigant, an "'anencephalic cretin' with a 'single operating
brain cell' whose 'brain-dead ravings' and 'anal rantings' were
characteristic of the 'lunatic fringe.'"448
What may be less obvious are communications not in-
tended to be seen by anyone other than those working on the
case, or maybe family and friends. It has become increasingly
easy and tempting for lawyers to criticize anyone-even their
own clients-online, not realizing the implications of the online
medium. In one instance, Steve Regan, an attorney at the
447 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
448 Butler Cty. Bar Ass'n v. Foster, 794 N.E.2d 26, 26 (Ohio 2003).
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Pittsburgh office of Reed Smith, a big law firm, wrote on the
Twitter feed of SCOTUSblog, which he mistakenly believed was
the blog of the Supreme Court, "Don't screw up this like ACA
[Affordable Care Act aka Obamacare]."44 9 After SCOTUSblog
tweeted back "Intelligent life?," Regan replied, "Go [expletive]
yourself and die."4 5 0 His firm eventually stated "the posting of
offensive commentary or language on social media is inappro-
priate and inconsistent with Reed Smith's social media policy.
We are addressing this matter internally." 4 5 1 In the heat of a
tweet, people do not stop to think about how it will read in
national news.
Even if the lawyer making the communication does not use
names, context is frequently more than sufficient to reveal the
targeted party. For example, an Illinois attorney lost her job
when she posted in her blog about a judge referred to as "Judge
Clueless."4 5 2 She "thinly veiled the identities of clients and
confidential details of a case, including statements like, 'This
stupid kid is taking the rap for his drug-dealing dirtbag of an
older brother . . . .'"4ss While she might have recognized the
lack of professionalism in this language in a written letter, she
did not expect her online comment to become as public as it
was. Even communications intended for the private use of co-
workers and family can be easily saved and then forwarded.
As discussed in Part II, online comments are likely to be
read by more people than intended. The person who is criti-
cized in an electronic communication is more likely to find out
about the criticism than if the lawyer had expressed the criti-
cism in a private conversation. Beyond the personal offense
suffered by the victim, the injured party may experience dam-
age to commercial, professional, social, and personal relation-
ships stemming from any number of third parties who may
harbor negative opinions about the victim.
Furthermore, electronic communications are forever. Even
if something is "deleted," the email or post can be preserved by
449 Staci Zaretsky, A Biglaw Partner's Big Twitter Meltdown, ABOvE L. (Oct 16,
2013, 12:58 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/10/a-biglaw-partners-big-twit-
ter-meltdown/ [https://perma.cc/798-LU931.
450 Id.




452 John Schwartz, A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules of the Bar, N.Y.





anyone who saw it before it was "deleted," and the electronic
memory of the transmission can be easily saved in a variety of
ways.4 5 4 In May 2017, the ABA issued Opinion 477 that noted,
"In the electronic world, 'delete' usually does not mean infor-
mation is permanently deleted, and 'deleted' data may be sub-
ject to recovery. Therefore, a lawyer should consider whether
certain data should ever be stored in an unencrypted environ-
ment, or electronically transmitted at all."4 5 5 But no further
guidance, standards, or advice is given.
Unfortunately, electronic mediums lend themselves to
thoughtless outbursts. 4 5 6 Worse, lawyers may believe they are
posting anonymously, give sway to their coarser natures, 4 5 7
and then discover that their identity can be traced 458 and their
content never disappears.
A possible civility standard to address these issues might
state:
Lawyers should be respectful to all participants in the legal
system and avoid vulgarity, personal insults, name calling,
and other uncivil language. A lawyer should be cautious of
memorializing in written electronic communications com-
ments that are unprofessional and patently offensive regard-
ing any person involved in a litigation or negotiation.
b. Disrespecting Opposing Counsel, Opposing Clients,
and Others
Some states have adopted standards explicitly relating to
communications to opposing counsel, in addition to a general
454 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
455 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof1 Responsibility, Formal Opinion
477R, at 7 (revised May 22, 2017).
456 See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
457 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 382, 385
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "a person who is required to put his
name to a document is much less likely to lie than one who can lie anonymously"
and that anonymity "facilitates wrong by eliminating accountability"); DANIEL J.
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: Gossip, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET
140 (2007) (concluding that "anonymous, people are often much nastier and more
uncivil in their speech[ ] [because it] is easier to say harmful things about others
when we don't have to take responsibility"); Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity,
Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces,
104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1642-43 (1995) (noting anonymous or pseudonymous post-
ings "relieve[] their authors from responsibility for any harm that may ensue[ I]
[and that] [tihis often encourages outrageous behavior without any opportunity
for recourse to the law for redress of grievances").
458 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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statement requiring lawyers to treat all others with dignity.4 59
Specifically, some standards forbid: imputing improper motives
to an adversary without a factual basis; embarrassing or per-
sonally criticizing another attorney; attributing a position not
taken to an adversary; and impugning an adversary's charac-
ter, intelligence, or morals.46 0 Online, lawyers sometimes
make disrespectful statements about other lawyers and partici-
pants in the legal system in communications directed to third
parties. Nonetheless, the target often discovers the communi-
cations directed to others. Even if undiscovered by the target,
such postings can poison the well for judges, jurors, and the
public who are exposed to the post.
In one example, the lawyer may have believed his email to
opposing counsel seemed innocuous or even humorous at the
time, but the Missouri Supreme Court found it to be a violation
of Model Rule 8.4(d). 46 1 After a contested hearing, the lawyer
sent the following email: "Rumor has it that you are quite the
gossip regarding our little spat in court. Be careful what you
say. I'm not someone you really want to make a lifelong enemy
of, even though you are off to a pretty good start."46 2
While the target of the criticism may deserve reprimand,
the lawyer involved in a particular case should not be making
judgment in an effort to intimidate, harass, or demean others
involved in the suit. In a heated and pending domestic dispute,
the mother's attorney sent an email directed to the father's
attorney reciting details of his daughter's drug dealing in a
dangerous neighborhood and suggesting the father should take
more seriously his daughter's behavior.4 63 The recipient's wife
(who, coincidentally, was also an attorney) read the email and
459 Twenty-two states have adopted at least one of these standards urging
respect towards other attorneys. Preston & Lawrence supra note 11, at 718-19
tbls.4 & 5.
460 Id.
461 In re Eisenstein, 485 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).
462 Id at 761.
463 In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 709 S.E.2d 633, 636 (S.C. 2011).
The email text reads: "I have a client who is a drug dealer on [ ] Street down town
[sic]. He informed me that your daughter, [redacted] was detained for buying
cocaine and heroine [sic]. She is, or was, a teenager, right? This happened at
night in a known high crime/drug area, where alos [sic] many shootings take
place. Lucky for her and the two other teens, they weren't charged. Does this
make you and [redacted] bad parents? This incident is far worse than the allega-
tions your client is making. I just thought it was ironic. You claim that this case
is so serious and complicated. There is nothing more complicated and serious
than having a child grow up in a high class white family with parents who are
highly educated and financially successful and their child turning out buying
drugs from a crack head at night on or near [ ] Street. Think about it. Am I right?"
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reported the sending attorney for discipline.46 4 The Supreme
Court of South Carolina issued a private letter of caution4 6 5
and dismissed the sending attorney's claim that the bar's civil-
ity oath was an unconstitutional limit on his First Amendment
rights.4 6 6 Litigants do have a First Amendment right to be
tacky, but lawyers cannot similarly conduct themselves in this
way under the professionalism and civility constraints of the
profession. Allowing egregious incivility to persist under the
banner of freedom of speech would be a disservice to the pro-
fession. The South Carolina Supreme Court put it this way:
The State has an interest in ensuring a system of regulation
that prohibits lawyers from attacking each other personally
in the manner in which [the sending attorney] attacked [the
receiving attorney]. Such conduct not only compromises the
integrity of the judicial process, it also undermines a lawyer's
ability to objectively represent his or her client.4 67
Lawyers are asked to report to the relevant bar association
misconduct of other lawyers, and doing so through the estab-
lished system is an appropriate way to seek improvement in the
legal profession.46 8 However, a malicious online attack on an
individual lawyer or firm is inappropriate. Ajudge or bar asso-
ciation, at least, can request and receive evidence and may
refuse to take any action against the allegedly misbehaving
attorney if there is not enough evidence to prove liability. The
public, however, cannot request or receive evidence and may
not be as careful about refraining from punishing a lawyer for
unsubstantiated claims. Members of the public may choose
not to go to a certain lawyer or firm based on malicious infor-
mation they found online about that lawyer or firm, and thus
the attacked firm or lawyer can lose clientele, even if the attack
was unsubstantiated or completely false.
Last year, a lawyer sued the former spouse of a divorce
client because he wrote a negative review of the lawyer on
Google Plus.4 6 9 The review said the lawyer worked for an "ex-
ceptionally unethical law firm . . . ."470 The former spouse was
464 Id.
465 Id. at 638.
466 Id. at 637-38.
467 Id. at 638.
468 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
469 Steve Miller, Naperville Lawyer Sues Man over Negative Comments Online,
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not a lawyer, but such comments could be posted by lawyers
who falsely believe they are acting with anonymity. The percep-
tion that lawyers are lacking in moral and competency qualities
by attacking, insulting, or demeaning others online erodes the
public's faith in the legal system.
c. Creation, Use, and Storage of Improper Electronic
Content
In addition to sex discrimination implications, some behav-
iors involving sexually explicit materials bring the profession
into disrepute, and often, these behaviors involve the internet.
For instance, one would imagine that lawyers recognize that
using electronic communications to request sexual services as
pay is inappropriate, but not everyone gets the message. 47 1
One lawyer persistently pressured in a series of emails a third-
year law student who had worked for him for only a few weeks
to provide sexual favors as a condition of keeping her job. 4 7 2
One East Texas chief judge deleted his social media infor-
mation and resigned rather than give up his records or produce
his phone in an investigation of sexting allegations.47 3 He
claims he gave his phone to "charity."474 While serving in his
official capacity as vice chairman of the State Commission for
Judicial Conduct, he sent sexually explicit messages to a
woman who responded to his friend request.4 7 5 She employed
a private investigator to pursue the matter.4 7 6 The investigator
found and turned over photos and more than a thousand sexu-
471 See Amanda Griffin, Texas Lawyer Accused of Sending Inappropriate Texts,
JD J. (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.jdjournal.com/2016/11/09/texas-lawyer-ac-
cused-of-sending-inappropriate-texts/ [https://perma.cc/AST5-KW4H].
472 Jackie Borchardt, Supreme Court Suspends Willoughby Lawyer For Sexu-
ally Explicit Texts Sent to Employee, CLEVEIAND.COM (June 12, 2014, 12:20 PM),
http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2014/06/supreme
court suspends-wlloug.html [https://perma.cc/3QA9-DSLGI; Staci Zaretsky,
Lawyer Sends Nasty Text Messages to 3L, Demands Sexual Favors, ABOvE L.
(June 18, 2014, 1:12 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2014/06/lawyer-sends-
nasty-text-messages-to-31-demands-sexual-favors/ [https://perma.cc/YG8Q-
FXJK].
473 Smith County Judge Joel Baker Resigns, TYLER MORNING TELEGRAPH (Sept.
23, 2016, 9:37 AM), http://www.tylerpaper.com/TP-Breaking/241295/smith-
county-judge-joel-baker-resigns [https://perma.cc/TZ6G-5xBR].
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ally explicit messages, many of which were verified by a local
television station.4 77
Another issue implicating Model Rule 8.4 involves using
the internet to access or store illegal or even unregulated sexu-
ally explicit content. Disciplinary actions have been brought
against judges, district attorneys, and other governmental law-
yers for excessive use of pornography on government-owned
computers, using government-provided internet access, or on
government time. In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Beatse, pornography was found on an assistant district attor-
ney's state-provided computer.4 7 8 An investigation ensued
which found that he had been spending massive amounts of
time looking at pornography.4 7 9 He had originally lied and said
that it was his son who had been looking at the pornography on
his computer.480 He also sent a number of sexual email
messages to various people, including two government employ-
ees, one of whom was a court reporter. 48 1 Some of the emails
described looking at and touching the breasts of government
employees. 4 8 2 He admitted to having lied about the emails and
the pornography, and he was publicly reprimanded.48 3
Some judges have been disciplined for sexually harassing
or sexting staff or attorneys, even if the sexual exchanges were
voluntary. In 2014, a justice on the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was ousted after sending pornographic emails to con-
tacts in the Attorney General's office. 4 8 4 In another case, the
court approved a stipulation for the retirement and public rep-
rimand of a judge who was accused-along with failing to dis-
close a juror written conmunication and engaging in
inappropriate conduct towards two female attorneys-of habit-
ually viewing pornographic images on his courthouse com-
puter.485 The court pointed out that this caused numerous
viruses to infect his computer, that personnel were exposed to
477 Id.
478 In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Beatse, 722 N.W.2d 385, 386-90
(Wis. 2006).
479 See id. (noting that the attorney had spent thirty-six hours browsing por-
nographic websites).
480 Id. at 387.
481 IdL
482 JL
483 Id. at 388-89.
484 Angela Couloumbis, Supreme Court Suspends McCaffery over Porn E-mails,
PHIIA. INQUIRER (Oct. 21, 2014, 1:07 AM), http://www.phly.com/philly/news/
politics/20141021-SupremeCourtvotes-tosuspendMcCaffery-over-e-mals
.html [https://perma.ce/5YV7-CJEQ].
485 In re Downey, 937 So. 2d 643, 645-49 (Fla. 2006).
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the pornography when coming to repair the computer, and that
the judge ignored requests to stop issued because his actions
were threatening to infect the entire courthouse computer sys-
tem with unwanted computer viruses. 48 6
4. Rule 8.4(g): Discrimination and Prejudice
Model Rule 8.4(g) forbids a private attorney to make public
comments that are racist, sexist, or that express negative
group stereotypes.48 7 Although few current statements of pro-
fessionalism expressly warn about such bias, all bar associa-
tions should include a charge against comments that further
racial, sexist, or other biases. Lesley M. Coggiola, disciplinary
counsel for the South Carolina Supreme Court, reported that
she has seen lawyer posts online that are degrading to various
classes of people, and argues that the lawyers behind such
posts should be sanctioned for "bringing the profession into
disrepute."4 8 8 She noted that one of her ongoing cases involved
a lawyer's blog that she described as "vile."4 89 The blog is "in-
sulting everybody from Hispanics to women to 'midgets.'"
490
According to Coggiola, "technology is cited most often as the
foundation for boorish behavior."49 1 The serious issues they
have had, she explains, "[a]re all related to social media." 492
Various examples abound. A lawyer at a large law firm was
unveiled as having posted misogynistic lyrics online.4 93 Al-
though the poster likely believed he or she was anonymous or
speaking to a close and trusted group, the posting was exposed
and the poster was fired. 494 But the consequences do not stop
there. Those who associated those lyrics with a lawyer and
those who read about it in the press retain an association of
such attitudes with lawyers. 4 95
486 Id. at 645-46.
487 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDuCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013).
488 G.M. Filisko, You're Out of Orderl: Dealing with the Costs of Incivility in the
Legal Profession, 99 A.B.A. J., Jan. 2013, at 35, 37; see also Christina Parajon
Skinner, The Unprofessional Sides of Social Media and Social Networking: How
Current Standards Fall Short, 63 S.C. L. REV. 241, 258 (2011) (noting a Texas
judge's comments that lawyers were "on the verge of crossing .. . ethical lines
when they complain about clients and opposing counsel" in social media posts).




493 LoRI ANDREWS, I KNow WHO You ARE AND I SAW WHAT You DID: SOCIAL NET-
WORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 123 (2012).
494 Id.
495 Cf. Filisko, supra note 488, at 37 (discussing how unprofessional conduct
can bring the legal profession into disrepute).
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While online comments on message boards, social media,
and emails may not immediately be seen as "public comment,"
the ease of spreading such comments to unintended readers
and even the press argues for more explicit regulation. Such
statements are detrimental to the perception of the profession
and legal system. For example, underrepresented groups
might be discouraged from using the legal system to resolve
disputes, fearing that the biases of lawyers and judges make it
unlikely they will receive fair treatment. Members of the
maligned group may believe that their treatment in prior cases
was unfair, and thus, they are justified in disobeying court
orders or not paying judgments.
While bias reflects poorly on all of the profession, the prob-
lem is even worse if a judge or other public official is the source
of the electronic communication. Judge Cebull, a federal
judge, forwarded a seemingly racist email about President
Obama to some of his close friends. 496 After the email came to
light, a commnission investigating its impropriety uncovered
many more emails laced with "disdain for African Americans,
Latinos, women and various religious faiths."4 9 7 Highlighting
the problem in this case, the panel observed, "The racist and
political [email language] reflects negatively on Judge Cebull
and on the judiciary and undermines the public trust and con-
fidence in the judiciary."4 98
Professionalism standards could state:
Lawyers should not express through electronic or other me-
dia sources bigotry, prejudice, or disdain for any class of
people. Such behavior brings the legal profession into disre-
pute and weakens the confidence of the public in the fairness
and efficacy of the judiciary.
CONCLUSION
As the recent ABA's Commission 20/20's failures amply
illustrate, the ABA cannot be expected to address the risks of
technology within any reasonable time. Moreover, the Model
Rules acknowledge that they do not "exhaust the moral and
ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, ... [they]
496 Murphy, supra note 82.
497 Saba Hamedy, Montana Federal Judge Sent Hundreds of Biased Emails,
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simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law." 4 9 9
Increasing pressure on the ABA to shore up the Model Rules is
essential. In the meantime, however, bar associations must
take action now.500 One option is formal ethics opinions that
lawyers can research by jurisdiction, if the lawyer is alert
enough to ask questions. A better option is a statement of best
practices standards adopted by state, local, and practice group
bar associations. Professionalism creeds address a more ex-
pansive range of behavior, but most are aspirational, meaning
violators are not subject to formal discipline affecting their
standing to practice law. New professionalism creeds must be
adopted, integrated into lawyer education, and subject to en-
forcement. The legal profession, and the society it serves, de-
serves a clearer statement of moral ground in technology use.
Professor Chaffee suggests that aspirational standards can
be implemented "with broad moral language and a high moral
tone to engage with the emotions and intuitions of those prac-
ticing law and to play upon the intuitions and emotions of
those interacting with lawyers to make them believe that they
are being treated fairly."5 0 ' The importance of ensuring those
who interact with lawyers believe they are being treated fairly is
largely underestimated by the legal community. If the Model
Rules and professionalism standards fall short of society's ex-
pectations because attorney behavior seems "intuitively wrong
or elicits negative emotions," the legitimacy of the profession is
threatened. 502 The lack of stated moral standards relating to
an issue as important as technology and social media abuses
"creates an incentive for those outside of the legal profession to
begin to interfere with the self-regulation of the profession,
which may have negative consequences if it is done in an unso-
phisticated way."503
As outrageous examples of attorney abuses of technology
continue to make headlines, the public may form the opinion
that attorney conduct is not sufficiently regulated and urge
499 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT pmbl. & scope 1 16 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
500 For a discussion of the role of law schools in the professionalism crisis and
how they can take concrete steps to educate law students better, see Cheryl B.
Preston, Professionalism in the Trump Era, supra note 8.
501 Eric C. Chaffee, The Death and Rebirth of Codes of Legal Ethics: How
Neuroscientific Evidence ofIntuition and Emotion in Moral Decision Making Should
Impact the Regulation of the Practice of Law, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 323, 354
(2015).




lawmakers to impose external regulation on the profession.5 0 4
Rules backed by legislation will undoubtedly be more difficult
to change and less attuned to realities of the practice than the
Model Rules. The profession itself can no longer ignore lawyer
abuses of technology.
504 Professor Chaffee recalls how this very thing happened with business con-
duct in the wake of the Enron scandal. Id. at 358-60. Frustrated American
people successfully urged Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; there
were many regulations in the Act that addressed attorney ethics, which were
previously regulated by the American Bar Association. Id.
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